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To My Father, Franciszek 
Preface 
For a long time there has been a need for a detailed 
account of United States-Polish relations in the years immediately 
following World War II, the crucial period during which Poland 
became a Soviet satellite. This book not only deals with the political 
and economic relations between the United States and Poland but also 
explores the impact of these relations on such postwar issues as relief, 
repatriation, Polish American opinion, and most importantly the 
origins of the Cold War. 
Many people have helped with this book, and it is a pleasure for 
me to thank them here for their assistance. To B.F. Jones, Richard 
Fraser, Wallace Prescott, and Arliss Roaden-all at Tennessee Tech-
nological University-! am indebted for the reduction in my teaching 
load and for some of the funds that enabled me to travel to the 
depositories where most of the research material for this book is 
located. 
I owe a special debt to Tim Callahan, Pat Eggleston, Betty Huehls, 
Andrew Sorokowski, and Steve Williams for helping me with some 
of the research that has gone into this study. 
Daniel Buczek was especially kind in providing me with material 
from the files of the Rev. A.A. Skoniecki. James Bochan, Waclaw 
Jedrejewicz, B.B. Kopecki, Stefan Korbonski, Pelagia Lukaszewska, 
Wanda Rozmarek, and Paul Zaleski shared their knowledge and 
personal experiences with me, greatly enriching my understanding of 
important aspects of the subject. 
I am indebted to the librarians and archivists of the many institu-
tions I visited to gather material for this study. Without exception 
they were efficient and unfailingly kind to me. 
Linda Ogletree, who acquired material through interlibrary loan 
services for me, was most helpful. My thanks to Lois Richardson, who 
typed the rough draft of the manuscript, and Linda McDearman, who 
did the final copy. I am grateful to Nolan Fowler for helping me read 
proof, and also to Harry Lane for drawing the map. 
Without the financial aid of the Kosciuszko Foundation, the 
American Council of Learned Societies, and the Social Science Re-
search Council, this book would not have been a reality. To be sure, 
the findings and conclusions presented here do not necessarily repre-
sent the view of these donors. 
My gratitude to my wife, Marita, can not be adequately expressed 
in words. 
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I The Road to Potsdam 
Recent events in Poland have reawakened considerable 
American interest in that country. One of the questions often raised 
today is how did Poland become a communist state. This study, which 
focuses on Poland from the Potsdam Conference through the elec-
tions of 1947, is an attempt to fill a major gap in the historical 
literature by offering a detailed account of why United States policy 
was unable to reverse the process begun at the Yalta Conference that 
transformed Poland into a Soviet satellite. 
American policy toward postwar Poland was based upon the un-
realistic belief that the United States would be able to exert some 
political" influence in an area that had been written off as a Soviet 
sphere of influence by the Roosevelt administration. Largely through 
economic diplomacy, the United States expected to maintain a 
presence in Poland and to insure that the Polish Peasant party of 
Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, the former premier of the Polish government-
in-exile who took a seat in the provisional government in Warsaw, 
would have a place in the political life of Poland. On their part, 
Mikolajczyk and his supporters were just as unrealistic as the Ameri-
cans in insisting upon free elections which the communists could not 
allow because an open expression of opinion by the Polish people 
would have expelled them from power. The failure of the communist-
dominated block and Mikolajczyk's party to reach a modus vivendi 
doomed the hopes and expectations of the American and Polish peo-
ple and underscored the limitations of American policy in an area 
where the Soviets were dominant and were determined to exclude 
American influence. 
The Polish question, which had dominated so many of the discus-
sions of the leaders of the Big Three during the war, continued to 
occupy a major place at Potsdam, the last meeting of the leaders of 
the victorious anti-German coalition. Although Poland's eastern fron-
tier had already been decided and the Allied powers had supervised 
the establishment of a communist-dominated Polish provisional gov-
ernment of national unity, two major questions remained to be settled 
-the implementation of the Yalta Conference pledge that the War-
saw regime conduct "free and unfettered elections" to establish a 
permanent government in Poland and the settlement of Poland's 
boundary with Germany. 
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The long and tortuous road to Potsdam was not an easy one. After 
the ill-fated September campaign of 1939, the Polish government fled 
into exile and eventually found its permanent wartime home in Lon-
don, from which it maintained contact with underground political 
and military authorities in Poland. The London Poles, as they were 
called, were recognized by the United States, by Great Britain, and 
-after Hitler unleashed Operation Barbarossa in June 1941-by the 
Soviet Union as the legal political representatives of the Polish state. 
Preoccupied with its own survival during the early months of the 
Russo-German conflict, the Kremlin could not afford to alienate its 
western Allies over issues which had not been satisfactorily resolved 
by the Polish-Soviet Treaty of July 1941. But as Soviet military for-
tunes improved, the Kremlin established a position of strength that 
enabled it to deal more independently, and even arbitrarily, with 
Polish authorities in resolving such questions as the supply and re-
cruitment of a Polish army on Soviet soil, the relief and evacuation 
of Polish refugees, and most importantly the postwar boundary be-
tween the two nations. 
One of the most divisive issues between Poland and the Soviet 
Union was the controversial question of what should be their future 
boundary. The London Poles insisted that the Riga Line be reestab-
lished. This line had been drawn by the Treaty of Riga after the 
Russo-Polish War of 1920 and constituted the boundary between 
Poland and the Soviet Union during most of the interwar years. The 
Soviets favored the Curzon Line which came close to the line agreed 
upon by the Kremlin and Berlin when they partitioned Poland by the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939. 
Polish-Soviet relations deteriorated to the point that by the spring 
of 1943 almost anything could have triggered a final break. In April 
the Germans discovered the mass graves of thousands of missing 
Polish officers in the forest of Katyn and charged the Soviets with the 
atrocity. The Polish government in London headed by General Wla-
dyslaw Sikorski, long suspecting Soviet culpability, asked the Red 
Cross to investigate the German allegations. That was enough for 
Stalin to cut off diplomatic relations with the London Poles. 
Western sympathy for the Poles, and there was a great deal of it 
especially during the early years of the war, never was translated into 
strong political support because the United States and Great Britain 
believed that their alliance with the Soviet Union was absolutely 
essential to win the war against Germany and Japan. This preoccupa-
tion with military matters, coupled with the growing awareness that 
Soviet armies would eventually be in a position to determine the 
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political future of Poland, placed the United States and Great Britain 
in the role of mediators between Poland and the Soviet Union rather 
than partisans for Polish interests. At no time during the war did 
London or Washington want to jeopardize its alliance with the 
Soviet Union over Polish issues. 
Even though Washington was reluctant to take initiatives on Po-
land's behalf and possibly risk the Kremlin's displeasure, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt encouraged the London Poles to believe that 
the United States would give greater support to Poland when the 
balance of power in Europe improved in the West's favor. Yet at the 
Tehran Conference late in 1943 Roosevelt joined Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill in agreeing to the Curzon Line without asking 
anything in return from Stalin. Roosevelt's agreement was kept secret 
for domestic political reasons until Soviet Foreign Minister Vyaches-
1av Molotov blurted it out to Premier Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, head of 
the Polish government-in-exile, a year later. 
Roosevelt's lack of candor with the Poles and his buoyant optimism 
that satisfactory solutions to Polish issues would somehow be found 
eventually undermined the efforts of Churchill, who failed to convince 
the London Poles to compromise with the Soviets on the frontier 
question. Churchill hoped that such a compromise might pave the 
way for a solution, favorable to the London Poles, to the even thornier 
problem of what kind of government the Soviets would tolerate in 
Warsaw after the war. 
The West had genuine cause for concern when the Kremlin an-
nounced in July 1944 the creation of the Polish committee of national 
liberation, or Lublin committee as it was popularly known. This 
group of Polish communists and socialists had been selected by Mos-
cow to administer Polish lands liberated by Soviet armies. Although 
the Lublinites were not yet considered a government by the Kremlin, 
the fear that the group would soon receive such recognition was not 
an idle one. 
Soviet" political intentions in Poland were made clear at the time of 
the Warsaw Uprising in August and September of 1944. The Polish 
Home Army (Armia Krajowa ), led by General Tadeusz Bor-
Komorowski, rose up against German occupation forces in anticipa-
tion of a Soviet entry into the Polish capital. The Polish action was 
a bold political statement; the Polish government-in-exile through its 
military and political representatives on Polish soil hoped to assert its 
political control over the capital and confront the Kremlin with a fait 
accompli. 
Stalin chose to make a political statement of his own. Soviet forces 
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brought their successful drive against the Germans to an abrupt halt 
on the eastern bank of the Vistula River, claiming unconvincingly for 
the next six weeks that they were unable to assist the beleaguered 
Poles. The Kremlin even refused to permit aircraft of the United 
States Army Air Forces to use Soviet air bases in shuttle operations 
from England to Warsaw to aid the Poles. After substantial American 
and British pressure, Stalin relented and gave his permission when 
Polish capitulation to the Nazis was a virtual certainty. By the time 
the Home Army surrendered on October 1, 1944, much of the pro-
western Polish intelligentsia in the underground had been killed, 
wounded, or taken prisoner. The Soviets now had an ideal opportu-
nity to establish the Lublinites as the new political authorites in 
Poland. Stalin lost little time; he extended recognition to the Lublin 
committee as the provisional Polish government on the eve of the 
Yalta Conference, confronting the West with a fait accompli of far-
reaching significance. 
In dealing with Stalin on the Polish question, Roosevelt had shied 
away from balance of power politics with the result that the Kremlin 
was able to impose the kind of settlement it wanted concerning the 
controversial boundary matter and the complexion of the future gov-
ernment in Warsaw. When the Big Three met at the Yalta Conference 
in February 1945 the United States and Great Britain confirmed their 
earlier agreement to the Curzon Line for which Poland was to receive 
compensation at German expense in the North and West and en-
dorsed an imprecise political understanding which called for the Lub-
lin regime to "be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the 
inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles 
abroad." Once reorganized, the current Polish government would be 
called the Polish provisional government of national unity and would 
be recognized as the legal government of Poland by the United States 
and Great Britain. The reorganized government would "be pledged 
to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on 
the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot." Although Roosevelt 
exuded an optimistic sense of achievement over the settlement, 
Churchill was closer to the mark when he told the House of Commons 
upon his return to England that whether Poland was to be free or a 
projection of the Soviet Union depended upon Soviet good faith. 
Western hopes concerning the Polish settlement did not last long. 
The differences in the interpretation of the Yalta agreement reflected 
the huge gulf between the perception of the Soviet Union on the one 
hand and the United States and Great Britain on the other concerning 
the political future of Poland. The stalemate provoked by the Krem-
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lin's interpretation of the agreement dragged on so long that when it 
finally ended in May 1945 it appeared that a genuine breakthrough 
had been made in East-West relations over Poland. But as Churchill 
observed, it was nothing more than an advance on the deadlock over 
the implementation of the Yalta agreement. 1 
During the discussions held in Moscow among various Polish fac-
tions in June 1945, which finally led to the establishment of the 
provisional government of national unity, Stalin made it clear to the 
Poles and to the western powers who controlled events in Poland. He 
staged the trial of sixteen Polish leaders who had been arrested by the 
Soviets after they had been enticed under false pretenses from the 
safety of the underground. Stalin dubbed the Poles "violators of the 
law for safeguarding the rear of the Red Army." Fifteen men (one was 
not tried because of illness) received sentences of from four months 
to ten years. Of those tried, only one did not break down and sign a 
prefabricated confession. Several of the prisoners died in prison and 
many of those released were arrested again in Poland. A few managed 
to flee to the West. 2 
As originally constituted, the Polish provisional government of 
national unity consisted of twenty-one seats, of which sixteen were 
occupied by the Lublinites, a communist-dominated coalition. The 
non-Lublinites got only five seats and one of those declined his port-
folio. The new government was no less friendly to the Soviet Union 
and was considerably stronger than its predecessor. 3 The major par-
ties included the Polish Workers party (Polska Partia Robotnicza or 
PPR), the Polish Socialist party (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna or PPS), 
and the Polish Peasant party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe or PSL). 
There were three smaller parties-the Peasant party Stronnictwo 
Ludowe or SL), the Labor party (Stronnictwo Pracy or SP), and the 
Democratic party (Stronnictwo Demokratyczne or SD). 
The leadership and direction of the new Polish government was in 
the hands of a capable group of Polish communists, a large number 
of whom were Jews who had spent years in political training in the 
Soviet Union. Boleslaw Bierut, the president of Poland, was a friend 
of Stalin, who regarded him highly. Born in Lublin and a printer by 
profession, Bierut became a communist shortly after Poland regained 
its independence following World War I and worked for the Polish 
section of the Communist International in Moscow. On his last pre-
war trip to Poland from the Soviet Union he was arrested by Polish 
authorities on charges of conspiracy but was later handed over to the 
Soviets. Bierut played a role in the organization of the Krajowa Rada 
Narodowa (KRN), a communist-sponsored parliament, which 
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became the source of authority of the Polish committee of national 
liberation. Soft-spoken and undistinguished in appearance, Bierut was 
essentially a titular leader. In order to persuade Mikolajczyk to join 
the communist-dominated government in Warsaw, Bierut told him, 
"We are not Soviet agents, we do not want to Sovietize Poland." 
Arthur Bliss Lane, the first American ambassador to postwar Po-
land, described the Polish president in unflattering terms: "He im-
pressed me as a shifty and opportunistic individual who was not 
master in his own house. " 4 
Even communist sources acknowledge that Jakob Berman was the 
eminence grise who, though he occupied only lesser positions in the 
government, had greater power than Bierut. Berman had close ties 
with Moscow, where he had received his political training. Like 
Bierut, Berman was arrested on charges of conspiracy against the 
Polish state and spent some time in prison before World War II. After 
his release from prison, he returned to the Soviet Union and sat out 
the war there with other Polish communists. Ambassador Lane soon 
learned that if he wanted to cut through the red tape of Polish official-
dom, he had to seek out the highly intelligent and dignified Berman 
to get results. 
Hilary Mine was reputed to be Poland's economic genius. Like 
Berman, Mine was a Jew who spent most of World War II in the 
Soviet Union. Specializing in law and economics, Mine served as 
minister of industry and chairman of the economic committee of the 
cabinet, which in effect made him the tsar over the Polish economy. 
Fluent in French, Mine impressed American officials with the range 
and depth of his knowledge of financial and economic matters. 
Universally hated was Stanislaw Radkiewicz, a Polish Jew who 
headed the ministry of public security, an agency which controlled by 
1947 over 200,000 members of the security police. In close contact 
with Lavrenti Beria, his counterpart in the Soviet Union, Radkiewicz 
became a communist at an early age, went to Moscow in the 1930s 
and became an NKVD officer. He returned to Poland with the Lublin 
committee in 1944 as chief of the agency that eventually helped turn 
Poland into a communist-dominated country. 5 
In contrast to so many of the Moscow-trained communists, Wla-
dyslaw Gomulka, who served as secretary of the central committee 
of the PPR, first deputy premier, and minister of western territories, 
was not a Jew and spent most of his life in Poland. Raised as a socialist 
from early youth, Gomulka first joined Sila, the youth organization 
of the PPS. Only later did he join the Polish Communist party, serving 
as a trade union organizer and political writer in the 1920s and 1930s. 
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Gomulka was both a communist and a patriot. "He saw no reason 
why he should choose between country and ideology," one biographer 
wrote. As subsequent events bore out, however, he would be forced 
by his own party to resolve the dilemma of a man who as a Marxist 
respected the Soviet Union and as a nationalist loved his country. 
Gomulka was an extremely intense man and fiery orator, convincing 
some of his opponents that he was a deranged fanatic. 8 
Like President Bierut, Poland's premier, Edward Osobka-Moraw-
ski, was not an impressive individual. Had it not been for the figure-
head role the communists wanted him to play, Osobka-Morawski 
would have remained a rather diffident, good-natured petty agitator 
in the Polish Socialist party. Morawski came from Konski, where he 
worked as a bookkeeper. He joined the PPS and had advanced only 
to the district committee of the party in Radom when, with Moscow's 
help, he was catapulted to the presidency of the central committee of 
the PPS. In July 1944 Moscow named this modest man who loved to 
attend political meetings, where he said he heard "the voice of the 
people," to head the Polish committee of nationalliberation. 7 
Marshal Michal Rola-Zymierski vel Lyzwinski, ostensibly with no 
party affiliations, headed Poland's defense ministry. After his brother 
murdered the manager of a bookstore, and the bad publicity following 
the incident, Lyzwinski changed his name to Zymierski. He trained 
officers for Polish regiments in Austria and later served with the 
Polish legionnaires in World War I. He advanced to the rank of 
general after Poland's war with the Soviet Union in 1920. Zymierski 
became involved in a bribery scandal when he was chief of administra-
tion in the ministry of military affairs, was dismissed from the army, 
and was sentenced to prison. After his release, he lived in France and 
came into contact with communists during the Spanish Civil War. 
When the Polish Home Army spumed his offer to serve with it during 
World War II, Zymierskijoined the communists and became head of 
the People's Army (AL) as "Rola," his nom de guerre. After the war, 
Rola-Zymierski had obvious value to the new Polish government as 
an experienced army officer, and because of his questionable past he 
was not very likely to pose a political threat to the regime. In any case, 
effective political control of the army remained in the hands of Gen-
eral Marian Spychalski, a gifted old-line communist whose back-
ground was in architecture, not the military. But this did not prevent 
his advancement to the rank of general and "guardian angel," as one 
observer described him, to Rola-Zymierski. 8 
One of the weakest members of the Lublinite coalition was Winc-
enty Rzymowski, who served as foreign minister. A leftist writer who 
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was expelled from the Polish academy of literature before the out-
break of World War II, Rzymowski was not very highly regarded 
even in Polish government circles. Lane commented that it was 
"never possible for any foreign diplomat, with the possible exception 
of the Russian, to see him alone." Invariably, Rzymowski, who Miko-
lajczyk claimed was a Soviet citizen, was shadowed by his nervous but 
able deputy, Zygmunt Modzelewski. 9 
The best-known non-Lublinite in the Polish provisional govern-
ment of national unity was Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, who served as 
vice-premier and minister of agriculture. Unsophisticated but shrewd, 
Mikolajczyk came from peasant stock in western Poland. In some 
ways his career was as meteroric as Osobka-Morawski's. Mikolajczyk 
was not very well known before the war; his political constituency was 
in Poznan, where he represented the conservative wing of the Polish 
Peasant party. He became vice-premier and minister of interior in 
Sikorski's government-in-exile and, after the general's death in July 
1943, sue<ceeded him as premier. In time Mikolajczyk saw that he 
presided over a doomed government, despised by Stalin and inade-
quately supported by Roosevelt and Churchill. The longer the Polish 
government-in-exile refused to compromise on the controversial 
boundary with the Soviets and to change its political complexion 
enough to satisfy the suspicious leader in the Kremlin, the more it 
became isolated from the Big Three who openly and privately criti-
cized the London Poles for their stubbornness. Convinced that accep-
tance of the Curzon Line was the sine qua non of an agreement with 
Stalin, Mikolajczyk failed to win the support of any political party 
except his own in the London government. He resigned in November 
1944. With Mikolajczyk's departure, the London Poles became in-
creasingly Russophobic and irrelevant. 10 
The months Mikolajczyk was out of the political limelight must 
have been difficult for this ambitious man who enjoyed politics and 
hobnobbing with Allied leaders. He was also a patriot who believed 
that the only way to deal with the communist threat was, in his words, 
"by pitting oneself against the task on the spot, in Poland, notwith-
standing the enormous risks and hazards." 11 His decision to join the 
Polish provisional government of national unity was hailed by his 
prowestern countrymen but was widely condemned in emigre circles 
in Great Britain and the United States. 
When President Harry S. Truman and his secretary of state, the 
able and ambitious James F. Byrnes, came to the Postdam Confer-
ence, they had no intention of pursuing goals which could be inter-
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preted as a challenge to Soviet hegemony in Poland. Byrnes, to whom 
Truman gave more latitude than Roosevelt had given to Hull and 
Stettinius, was more interested in the resolution of the German ques-
tion than that of Poland. 12 
When the subject of future elections in Poland was raised, Truman 
and Byrnes were no more inclined to press for international supervi-
sion than Churchill and his foreign minister, Anthony Eden, had 
been. Byrnes thought the "best observers" were the "gentlemen of the 
press" and rejected the advice of the Department of State which had 
recommended that it was necessary to work out some arrangements 
for the supervision of the Polish elections by representatives of the Big 
Three. 
"Unsupervised elections might give [a] free hand to the growth of 
Soviet influence," the State Department warned. It was aware that 
Washington would not oppose a political scenario which gave the 
Soviets hegemony in Poland but, it reasoned, "neither would it desire 
to see Poland become a Soviet satellite and have American influence 
there completely eliminated."13 
Neither did the appeals of thirty-four distinguished American lead-
ers-including John Dewey, Alfred Landon, A. Phillip Randolph, 
and Herbert Hoover, who urged Truman to secure "concrete guaran-
tees of truly free elections" from the Soviets-influence the president 
or the secretary of state. To these men, the Warsaw government was 
essentially composed of holdovers from the Lublin regime, and there-
fore "by no stretch of the imagination can this be called an honest 
fulfillment even of the Yalta agreement." They recommended that 
Soviet troops be withdrawn before the Polish elections, and if the 
Kremlin was unwilling to remove its forces, then American and Brit-
ish troops should join the Soviets in Poland during the electoral 
period. 14 
Appeals of Polish Americans fell on deaf ears too. Charles Roz-
marek, head of the Polish American Congress, the spokesman for 
most Americans of Polish descent, had been one of the earliest and 
most vocal critics of the Yalta agreement. 15 Early in July 1945, before 
Truman went to Potsdam, Rozmarek warned that free elections in 
Poland could not be held "under the rule of Soviet bayonets, Soviet 
police and Soviet puppets." The Polish American leader, who also 
headed the Polish National Alliance, the largest Polish American 
fraternal organization, seemed to echo the opinion of most Americans 
of Polish descent when he scored Washington for following a policy 
of appeasement toward the Kremlin. 16 
During the fifth plenary meeting of the Big Three on July 21, 1945, 
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at the Cecilienhof Palace, Truman casually raised the question of the 
Polish elections. He referred to his six million Polish American con-
stituents, indicating that a free election in Poland "would make it 
easier to deal with these Polish people." In other words, Truman, like 
Roosevelt before him, made it appear to Stalin that the Americans 
considered the election issue in terms of its impact on American 
politics, not as a serious matter related to the independence of Poland. 
Stalin was more concerned with a statement in a proposed draft on 
Poland that referred to the freedom the Allied press should enjoy in 
order to report on developments in Poland before and during the 
elections. Stalin pointed out that press correspondents were already 
in Poland and had freedom to report. "There is no use repeating," he 
said. "The Poles are very touchy and will be hurt." But Stalin saw that 
Truman and Churchill were united on the question of a free press 
reporting on the future Polish elections. Although Stalin failed to have 
the reference to the press deleted from the text that eventually was 
approved on Poland, he did succeed in getting Truman and Churchill 
to accept an amendment which watered down the force of the state-
ment.17 
The election issue was not entirely resolved before Churchill's gov-
ernment was swept out of power while he and Eden were at Potsdam. 
Clement Attlee, dour head of the Labor party, replaced Churchill as 
prime minister, while Ernest Bevin became the new foreign minister. 
Bevin tried to do something that Mikolajczyk had urged the United 
States to do, namely, to link western agreement on Poland's western 
frontier with guarantees that the Polish elections would indeed be 
free. 18 But this was not the linkage that interested Byrnes or Truman. 
Bevin's efforts simply garnered verbal assurances from Bierut and the 
Polish delegation that the elections would be held as soon as possible, 
it was hoped not later than early 1946, and that the foreign press 
would be free to monitor them. In his conversations with Bevin, the 
Polish president tried to make the timing of the elections contingent 
upon the repatriation of Polish citizens from abroad. After Bevin 
received Bierut's assurances concerning the elections, he agreed to go 
along with Poland's claims for its western frontier. 19 
Predictably, the Soviets were more interested in the activities and 
assets of the London Poles, no longer recognized as the legal represen-
tatives of Poland by the Big Three, than they were in the implementa-
tion of the Yalta pledge concerning free elections in Poland. 20 When 
Stalin complained about the continued activities of the London group, 
Churchill gave him a short course in English civil liberties: "You 
cannot prevent-in England-individuals from going on talking," the 
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prime minister snapped.21 As for Polish gold in England, Churchill 
assured him that the Warsaw regime would get it. It was during this 
exchange that Stalin affirmed that the Polish armed forces under 
British operational command during the war should be subordinated 
to the Polish government of national unity. Britain would try to 
persuade the men to return home, said Churchill, but it would not 
force them to do so. 22 
The Polish boundary with Germany proved to be the most difficult 
issue to resolve, revealing just how far apart the Big Three were on 
this sensitive and potentially explosive matter. Warsaw's claims for 
German territory to the Oder-western Neisse River were strongly 
supported by the Soviets, who had turned over administration of the 
area to Polish authorities when they occupied it. The United States 
and Great Britain criticized the Soviets for thus unilaterally creating 
what amounted to another occupation zone. Although the United 
States and Great Britain agreed that Poland should receive territorial 
compensation at the expense of Germany, they opposed what they 
considered to be exaggerated Polish claims. Churchill believed that 
the success of the conference hinged upon an agreement on this issue. 
In the end, Byrnes came up with a compromise, an arrangement that 
tied the frontier question with two other issues-German reparations 
and admission ofltaly into the United Nations. The Byrnes proposals 
were accepted and the divisive Polish boundary question was resolved 
-at least until September 1946, when the permanency of the Polish-
German boundary was questioned by the same man who had offered 
the compromise at Potsdam to settle it. 
The Poles based their claims to the Oder-western Neisse frontier 
upon impressive historical, political, economic, demographic, and 
ethnic arguments. They declared that the lands between the Oder and 
Vistula "may be considered as the primordial territories of the Polish 
state." If Poland acquired the new frontier with Germany, the Polish 
government felt that the country would be a natural and geographical 
unit just as it had been when the Piast dynasty controlled the Oder 
and Vistula river systems. In order for Poland to be strong and 
independent, a goal the Big Three had consistently endorsed during 
the war, the country needed adequate territory, especially in view of 
the fact that it had given up a major chunk to the Soviets in the east. 
If all Polish claims to German lands were granted, Poland would still 
be 22 percent smaller than it had been in 1939; yet Germany, the 
defeated aggressor, would be only 18 percent smaller. The density and 
natural growth of population demanded that the country acquire the 
western lands, Warsaw argued. The Poles imitated the Czechs by 
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suggesting that from a geographical point of view, the Polish position 
on the Oder-western Neisse would help it to play the role of an 
intermediary between East and West. Not the least of the justifications 
for the coveted land was the need to improve Poland's economic 
recovery by increasing agricultural yields and industrial output. And 
with the additional land along the Baltic, including the ports of Stet-
tin, Gdansk, and Elbing, German hegemony on the Baltic would end 
and the Polish connection between these coastal areas and the hinter-
land would be strengthened. Warsaw suggested that Polish control of 
the Oder, the area that historically constituted the place d'armes from 
whence Germans had invaded Poland, would end the threat of Ger-
man aggression in the future and thus be of obvious interest to all 
peace-loving nations. To communist and noncommunist Poles the 
frontier they claimed with the Germans was especially significant 
because it weakened Germany. Mikolajczyk echoed the views of most 
Poles when he told leaders of his party, "The Germans should be 
controlled forever. They will always be a danger to peace."23 
The United States and Great Britain once had held views which 
came close to endorsing Polish claims to German territory. In Febru-
ary 1944 Churchill asked Stalin to join him to see that Poland incor-
porated not only Gdansk, Silesia, and East Prussia but also "as much 
territory up to the Oder as the Polish government sees fit to accept."24 
On November 2, 1944, in the so-called Cadogan Letter, the British 
told the Mikolajczyk government that they supported Polish acquisi-
tions to the Oder, including the port of Stettin, though to which 
Neisse River-there were two of them-was not made entirely clear. 
Churchill told the House of Commons that "the Poles are free so far 
as Russia and Great Britain are concerned to extend their territory 
at the expense of Germany to the West." And he was not sensitive 
at that time about the total expulsion of Germans from the area 
acquired by Poland. 25 Roosevelt, who played a low-key role on the 
question, told Mikolajczyk at this time that the United States would 
go along with Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and Poland on any 
agreement regarding Poland's frontiers, including territorial acquis-
tions from Germany. Mikolajczyk, unable to get the endorsement of 
his govemmeni for what amounted to a quid pro quo-acceptance of 
the Curzon Line in the east for substantial acquisitions in the west-
left office, his place taken ·by one of the grand old men of Polish 
socialism, Tomasz Arciszewski, whose strongly Russophobic govern-
ment stubbornly refused to accept the Curzon Line and made only 
very modest claims to German lands. 26 
When the Big Three met at Yalta in February 1945 the position of 
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the London Poles on the boundary question had become an academic 
point because Stalin now recognized the Lublin Poles as the govern-
ment of Poland, which endorsed the Curzon Line with the Soviet 
Union and wanted the Oder-western Neisse line in the West. But now 
the American and British positions had changed, doubtless because 
of communist hegemony in Poland. Churchill himself admitted, "We 
need not make the same concessions to the Lublin Poles which we 
were prepared to make toM. Mikolajczyk in order to obtain a solution 
of the Polish problem." Roosevelt joined Churchill in agreeing to 
Polish territorial compensation to the Oder River but not to the 
western Neisse River. Now the president and prime minister ex-
pressed their concern about the large number of Germans who would 
be forced out of the area claimed by Poland. Roosevelt wanted the 
transfer of population to be gradual, and Churchill wondered if the 
Poles had the capability to absorb the frontier even to the Oder River, 
remarking that "it would be a great pity to stuff the Polish goose so 
full of German food that it died of indigestion." Since maps of the area 
involved were not even used in these discussions and, as Churchill 
admitted, "The distinction between the Eastern and Western Neisse 
did not emerge as clearly as it should have," there is little wonder that 
this vital issue became so beclouded and confusing. 27 In the end, 
Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin at Yalta pinned down the Curzon 
Line which, with minor rectifications, would constitute the Soviet-
Polish boundary. But they failed to delineate the German-Polish 
boundary, simply stating "that Poland must receive substantial acces-
sions of territory in the North and West."28 
By the time the Big Three met at the Potsdam Conference, the 
Warsaw government had inherited the administration of Germany's 
eastern lands from the Soviets and promptly divided them into four 
voivodeships-Upper Silesia, Lower Silesia, West Pomerania, and 
East Prussia. 29 This action greatly disturbed the president and the 
prime minister. Truman's anger came through in a notation he made 
in his diary: "At the Conference Poland and the Bolsheviki land grab 
came up. Russia helped herself to a slice of Poland and gave Poland 
a nice slice of Germany .... Just a unilateral arrangement without so 
much [as] a by your leave. I don't like it."30 
During the fifth plenary meeting on July 21, 1945, Truman took the 
initiative on the issue and questioned Stalin's right to assign the Poles 
what amounted to an occupation zone without consulting him or 
Churchill. Stalin justified his action on the grounds that since the 
Germans had fled from the advancing Russians, some friendly admin-
istration in the area was necessary to ensure stable conditions to the 
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rear of the Soviet armies. Besides, Stalin argued, the Kremlin saw no 
harm in allowing Poles to administer an area where allegedly only 
Poles remained and which was likely to be ceded to them anyway. 
Truman countered that he could not accept the separation of eastern 
Germany when the matter was, after all, related to such vital ques-
tions as German reparations and food supplies. 31 
Churchill was concerned that the area claimed by the Poles had 
been a major food and coal producing area for Germany. He errone-
ously claimed that the Poles were taking more from the Germans than 
they had lost to the Soviets, and he fretted over the expulsion of 
millions of Germans who would become a burden on the remainder 
of Germany. "We should not have a mass of people dumped upon us, 
while the Poles acquire food which the Germans need," Churchill 
said. With his propensity for hyperbole, the prime minister intoned 
that the Allies might be confronted with a situation similar to the 
starvation which affiicted the victims in German concentration 
camps.32 
"No single German remained in the territory to be given Poland," 
Stalin declared, apparently with a straight face. Even Polish commu-
nists admitted that there were 1-1.5 million Germans left in the 
area. 33 As one scholar has aptly observed, Churchill's concern over 
the transfer of Germans from Polish-controlled territory contrasted 
sharply with his earlier views on the matter, for only one year before 
he had invited Stalin to join him in supporting "the removal from 
Poland including the German territories to be incorporated in Poland 
of the German population."34 
The leaders had reached an impasse, and in an effort to break it they 
agreed to invite representatives of the Polish government to Potsdam 
to hear their views on the question. The Poles were ready. Although 
the Polish government was asked to send only two or three representa-
tives to Potsdam, Bierut appointed three members-Osobka-Moraw-
ski, Mikolajczyk, Rzymowski-and because of the importance of the 
issue involved, he himself decided to attend. Before the Polish ques-
tion was resolved, several other Polish leaders had made their way 
from Warsaw to Potsdam. It was no accident that the Warsaw gov-
ernment included the Polish leader the United States and Great Brit-
ain most admired-namely, Mikolajczyk, who was in complete 
agreement with his colleagues on territorial acquisitions to the Oder-
western Neisse. It was significant, too, that other prowestern Poles 
were included in the expanded Polish delegation-Professor Stanis-
law Grabski, one of the vice-presidents of Poland who prepared a brief 
submitted by Warsaw to the Allies, and Jan Stanczyk, a prominent 
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left-wing socialist with close ties to Bevin and the British Labor 
party.35 
The Poles, obviously well prepared to argue their case, had several 
opportunities to present their views to representatives of the Big 
Three. Most of the arguments were esentially a restatement of Polish 
views presented to the United States and Great Britain before the 
Potsdam Conference convened. Mikolajczyk cogently argued that the 
western lands were needed as a reservoir to absorb the Polish popula-
tion east of the Curzon Line, Poles who returned from the West, and 
Polish people who lived in the overcrowded central districts of Po-
land. Linking the frontier question with the pledge of the Warsaw 
regime to hold free elections, he showed that if a decision on Poland's 
western frontiers were delayed, "then there would be no possibility 
either of transfer of population from the east or the west, or of holding 
elections there." He convincingly argued that without the settlement 
of the western frontier, Poland could only conduct partial elections 
while the Soviets stood "as hosts" in the western lands claimed by 
Warsaw. Emphasizing the fact that the Poles already administered the 
area they claimed, Bierut bluntly told Churchill: "Recognize the fact 
which already exists. We want to live and not to die slowly."36 
Polish arguments did not change Churchill's view that the Poles 
were simply asking for too much land, which would force Germans 
into the American and British zones of occupation to be fed. Truman 
agreed and reiterated his position that the Polish frontier should be 
settled at a peace conference. Meanwhile, if the Poles were to have an 
occupation zone, which the United States and Great Britain opposed, 
"they were responsible to the Soviet Union for it.'m 
But the deadlock did not last much longer. On July 26 Averell 
Harriman, who served as American ambassador to the Soviet Union, 
met with Mikolajczyk and other members of the Polish delegation and 
revealed that the United States was moving in the direction of separat-
ing the question of the Polish-German boundary from the more imme-
diate issue of Polish administration in order to enable the Poles to 
secure the harvest and organize the industrial production of the occu-
pied area. "The Russians cannot do it," Harriman said, "it has to be 
done by the Poles. "38 
A few days later, July 29, Molotov met Truman and Byrnes-Stalin 
was ill-and was handed an American proposal to resolve the bound-
ary question. The United States agreed to accept Polish administra-
tion of land to the Oder-eastern Neisse until a final peace conference 
determined the boundary. Byrnes made it clear that the American 
offer was part of a quid pro quo by which the Soviets would accept 
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American proposals regarding German reparations that allowed each 
of the occupation powers to take its share of reparations from its own 
zone and provided for the admission ofltaly into the United Nations. 
Molotov indicated that Stalin would not be pleased with the offer 
because it denied Polish administration of the area between the two 
Neisse rivers. Moreover, he also had reservations about the American 
reparations offer which did not mention specific figures. 39 Truman did 
not exaggerate when he told the Soviet foreign minister that the 
American offer "represented a very large concession on our part;" the 
State Department had strongly advised him that he should agree 
"only with reluctance" to the Oder-eastern Neisse frontier. 40 
Meanwhile there was a flurry of activity among the Poles and 
Russians. On July 29, Stalin met with Bierut and asked whether the 
Poles would not agree to make some concessions in view of the fact 
that the United States had gone so far. After consultations with 
experts the Poles bent a little, agreeing to the establishment of the 
boundary somewhere between the western Neisse and the Queiss 
(K wisa). But later the same day the Poles reconsidered their position; 
Bierut, accompanied by Rola-Zymierski, returned to Stalin and ar-
gued against any compromise with the Americans. Stalin told his 
Polish proteges that he would defend their position at the confer-
ence.41 
But Stalin's pledge to the Poles did not have to be tested, for on July 
30, without further pressure from the Poles and Soviets, Byrnes 
offered a "package deal," apparently suggested to him by Joseph 
Davies, one of the American advisers at Potsdam, which linked a 
settlement of the Polish question with reparations from Germany and 
the admission of Italy into the United Nations.42 The package was a 
quid pro quo-United States acceptance of the Polish-Soviet position 
on the boundary in return for Soviet acceptance of American terms 
on German reparations and the admission of Italy into the United 
Nations. Byrnes, working closely with Truman, was anxious for an 
accord. He emphasized to Molotov that the three issues had to be 
considered as a unit and that the United States would accept "all three 
or none." To dramatize this "last" American offer to resolve the 
impasse, Byrnes told Molotov that he and the president intended to 
leave for the United States on August 1. 43 Byrnes's offer produced 
results. On July 31, at the eleventh plenary meeting of the Big Three 
and their advisers, agreement was reached, though only after consid-
erable Soviet haggling over the amount of German reparations they 
would receive from the western zones of occupied Germany.44 
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The Byrnes initiative had produced a compromise that appeared to 
be satisfactory to all parties. The Poles obviously considered Potsdam 
a major success for them.45 The Untied States, though long opposing 
a Polish-German arrangement that inevitably made Warsaw more 
dependent upon Moscow, could not continue its opposition on an 
issue which ran the risk of jeopardizing whatever influence Washing-
ton still expected to exert in postwar Poland. After all, Mikolajczyk, 
the man the West hoped could prevent Poland from becoming com-
pletely communist, had joined his communist colleagues in eloquently 
presenting the Polish case. Byrnes and Truman could not be totally 
oblivious to that fact. Besides, as Brynes himself wrote later, neither 
the United States nor Great Britain "knew of any way to force the 
Soviets to oust the Poles and to take back the administration of the 
territory concerned, short of resorting to force. "46 In the final analysis 
a resolution of the reparations issue was probably more important to 
Truman and Byrnes anyway, and if they had to give in on the Polish 
issue to secure a satisfactory settlement on German reparations, it was 
worth it to them. 
As has been seen, British acceptance of the Polish position on the 
western frontier was made after Bevin had been assured by Bierut that 
there would indeed be free elections in Poland. If Churchill's govern-
ment had not been defeated in the summer of 1945, there is some 
reason to doubt whether Truman and Byrnes would have been so 
successful at Potsdam. Churchill claimed later that he never would 
have agreed to the Oder-western Neisse and was ready for a "show-
down" and "if necessary, to have a public break rather than allow 
anything beyond the Oder and the eastern Neisse to be ceded to 
Poland. "47 
Even though the Potsdam communique stated that a permanent 
boundary between Germany and Poland had to await a future peace 
conference, what the Allied leaders did at Potsdam constituted a de 
facto territorial settlement. 48 The manner in which the agreement was 
achieved, based on Byrnes's three-point package, made it clear that 
this was not considered a provisional arrangement. It would have been 
absurd, not to mention inhumane, for the Big Three to agree to Polish 
administration of an area that involved the transfer of millions of 
people only to cast doubt on the validity of their decisions at some 
future peace conference. As Bevin told Stanczyk, one of the Polish 
representatives, "To return the western land to you means to return 
this land forever."49 Joseph Davies said the same thing: "It was taken 
as a matter of course that the three powers would support the Polish 
claims as to those frontiers at the final Peace Conference, which had 
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to ratify all territorial changes."50 The Soviets had no doubt about 
what transpired at Potsdam. Scarcely two weeks after the conference, 
they signed a treaty with the Poles, fixing the Oder-western Neisse as 
Poland's postwar boundary with Germany. 51 
At Potsdam the Untied States lost an opportunity to concert mea-
sures with the British and link the Polish election and frontier issues. 
To have done so would have been a major departure from Roosevelt's 
policy of postwar accommodation with the Soviet Union. Truman and 
Byrnes, along with Attlee and Bevin, displayed no inclination to 
challenge the Soviets on the election issue and risk a break. Perhaps, 
too, they were reminded of Stalin's admission that freely elected 
governments in eastern Europe "would be anti-Soviet and that we 
cannot allow."52 Besides, Poland no longer had the same priority it 
once had to American policy makers. Truman and Byrnes were far 
more concerned now with the political and economic recovery of 
those areas in Europe not under Soviet influence. 
II Postwar Poland 
Polish politics were far more fluid before the contro-
versial elections of January 1947 than is often realized. Although the 
dominant group in the government was the PPR, the Polish commu-
nists were in no position to establish their domination over the entire 
country. During this dynamic period in the political life of postwar 
Poland, the PPR ruled in a coalition with the PPS and a few smaller 
political parties and regarded the PSL, which they identified with 
reaction, as its major threat. 1 
Ever since the creation of the Polish provisional government of 
national unity, the communists had held the vital portfolios in the 
regime-police, army, industry. Although Premier Osobka-Moraw-
ski was a socialist, Vice-Premier Gomulka, who served as administra-
tor of the western territories, was much more powerful. The same was 
true of the courts; the jurisdiction of the socialist minister of justice, 
Henryk Swiatkowski, only applied to lesser offenses, while major 
cases, including political ones, were tried before military courts. One 
of the few PSL members in the government, Wladyslaw Kiernik, 
served as minister of public administration, but control of the police 
was left to Radkiewicz, a communist. Mikolajczyk's power as minis-
ter of agriculture was curtailed not only by Gomulka's ministry but 
also by the PPR-controlled ministries of food and forests. The PPS 
filled almost every other major post not held by the PPR. But every 
noncommunist minister had a communist vice-minister to supervise 
the affairs of his department. Thus communists like Berman ran the 
premier's office while Modzelewski was the de facto foreign minister. 
Instead of cabinet mettings being limited to ministers, communist 
supernumeraries also attended, puffing up the number of people at 
these sessions to more than a hundred. 2 
The commanding political position of the PPR was not a reflection 
of its popular support and leaders of the party knew it. Estimates of 
communist strength vary from a low of fewer than 200,000 in 1945 
to an inflated claim of almost 600,000 in 1946. 3 But in candid conver-
sations most informed communists seldom claimed the allegiance of 
more than 12 percent of the Polish people. Even communist sources 
admit the poor quality of the active members of the party; fewer than 
20 percent of them in 1945 had a higher education.4 Most of the 
specialists and experts, which the government depended upon to 
rehabilitate the ravaged country, were not communist. 
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The PPR was far from being a monolithic party. The major di-
chotomy was between the "Nativists" and the "Muscovites." The 
former were a homegrown variety of communist whose perspectives 
were strongly colored by domestic influences and realities. Gomulka 
was a representative of this group, a devoted communist who reserved 
his most scathing attacks for Mikolajczyk and the PSL. Yet Gomulka 
never seriously believed that Polish socialism should be a mirror 
image of Soviet experience. Although not an original intellect, Go-
mulka had the courage to challenge not only the "Muscovite" wing 
of the party but also the Soviets themselves. The Soviet army was 
notorious for its looting in the western provinces, making it difficult 
for Gomulka as minister of these lands to rehabilitate the area. Go-
mulka ordered Polish troops to fire on Soviet soldiers who were 
caught looting and communicated his order to Soviet military author-
ities.5 Gomulka's assets in 1945 proved to be liabilities in 1948 when 
he lost his position as secretary general of the PPR. 
The "Muscovites" had spent a long time in the Soviet Union and 
had become indoctrinated in the Soviet Marxist experience. These 
Sovietized Poles, represented by the Bierut wing ofthe party, were less 
enthusiastic about the spontaneous policy lines followed by the party 
during the early postwar period and tended to rely more on the 
Kremlin. Bierut was so devoted to Moscow that he once suggested 
that the Polish national anthem, Jeszcze Polska Nie Zginela ("Po-
land Is Not Yet Lost"), be replaced by one that was not so nationalis-
tic. Stalin restrained his protege, saying, "It's a good song. Leave it 
for a while."6 
The PPR had a major liability in the large number of Jews who 
were top leaders of the party, something which even the Zionist 
leader, Emil Sommerstein, regretted. As one scholar has pointed out, 
"Given the numerical weakness of the party and the traditionally high 
percentage of Jews in the leadership of the Polish communist move-
ment, it is not surprising that they became highly visible."7 Since 
Polish Jews were part of the Muscovite wing of the party and linked 
with the more repressive aspects of the regime, little wonder that 
anti-Semitism became an issue in postwar Polish politics. 
Stalin, who distrusted all Poles, including those who collaborated 
with him, shared the views of the Gomulka wing of the PPR that 
intimidation and terror alone would not achieve communist goals in 
Poland. In order to win over a people who were historically anti-
Russian and anticommunist, communism had to be made acceptable 
to the Polish people. 8 What better way was there than to show the 
nation that Polish communists were really patriots who were anxious 
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to rebuild their devastated country? This approach was more likely 
to win over noncommunist Poles-including the skilled technicians 
and experts, the Poles who lived abroad, and the people whose politi-
cal views had not crystallized yet-to help the PPR-dominated coali-
tion rebuild the country. Such a strategy was necessary too in order 
to assure the United States and Great Britain that the Warsaw govern-
ment intended to fulfill the Yalta and Potsdam political pledges. This 
emphasis on Poland's own road to socialism obviously worked to 
mitigate Polish resistance to communism and helped to undermine 
the efforts of the PSL to challenge the regime effectively. 
Even with Soviet backing the PPR had every reason to be apprehen-
sive about its ability to control the uncertain political situation in the 
country at a time when the communists suffered a decline in mem~er­
ship and the PPS had the loyalties of most of the urban proletariat. 9 
But most Polish socialists recognized that it was necessary to forge a 
united front with the PPR and to work for close cooperation with the 
Soviet Union. They realized that their country was irrevocably in the 
Soviet sphere of influence and that Poland's future lay in its ability to 
accommodate itself to Soviet economic and foreign policy. This did 
not prevent the PPS from demonstrating its independence from the 
PPR from time to time; in the fall of 1945, for example, the PPS even 
admitted anticommunists into its party. 10 
The left wing of the party, led by JozefCyrankiewicz, an intellectu-
ally gifted opportunist, was prepared to go much farther in sacrificing 
the independence of the PPS than many moderates and the right wing 
believed was either necessary or prudent. Cyrankiewicz, who had 
served as secretary of the Krakow district committee of the PPS in 
the 1930s, fought in the resistance against the Germans and was 
arrested. He was sent to a concentration camp where he became 
converted to the idea of close collaboration between the socialists and 
communists. 11 Cyrankiewicz's belief was reinforced when he visited 
London, sized up the Polish political situation there, and returned to 
Poland with the conviction that his future-always a major preoccu-
pation with this ambitious politician-and that of the PPS were tied 
to the PPR. 12 He told Liston Oak, the managing editor of the New 
Leader, "I do not want to be an emigre or to be isolated and power-
less. Neither do I want to be merely an agent of Moscow .... Believe 
me, I am still a Socialist and not a Communist. If I am compelled to 
capitulate to the Communists it is because of 'realpolitik' and not 
because I want to do so. I hope for a change in international relations 
which will enable me and my party to reassert our independence. 13 
Kazimierz Rusinek, another leader in the PPS, felt much the same 
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way. Rusinek, who headed the Seamen's and Cokers' Union of 
Gdynia before the war, also spent time in a Nazi concentration camp, 
and it was there that he too became convinced that the future of the 
PPS lay in collaboration with the PPR after the war. Rusinek was a 
major figure in postwar Poland, heading the powerful central commit-
tee of Polish trade unions. 14 
The PPS was convinced that it should collaborate with the PPR or 
risk losing political power to the PSL, which enjoyed the greatest 
popularity and support among the Polish people. A PSL victory, the 
PPS believed, would trigger a Soviet occupation, which no Pole, not 
even the PPR, wanted. PPS collaboration with the PPR appeared to 
make sense to party members in view of the large number of prewar 
reactionaries, with no legal party of their own in postwar Poland, who 
rallied around an embarrassed Mikolajczyk. 15 
The right wing of the PPS was led by Zygmunt Zulawski, a tall 
aristocratic-looking man whose socialist roots went back to the pre-
war period. Zulawski recognized the political realism of cooperating 
with the Kremlin but tried unsuccessfully to maintain the integrity 
and independence of the PPS. In October 1945 Zulawski failed to 
establish a separate Social Democratic party. A few months later, as 
a sop to his group, Zulawski and his followers were given eleven seats 
on the executive council of the PPS. But Zulawski soon discovered 
that the left wing of the party had no intention of allowing him and 
his colleagues to have any influence in the party, and he resigned his 
affiliation within a year. 16 
The PSL was a large, though not a unified, party which had come 
into existence after the PPR had created a communist-front group to 
draw people away from the large and popular prewar party of Winc-
enty Witos and Stanislaw Mikolajczyk. Upon his return to Poland, 
Mikolajczyk's party took the name PSL in order not to confuse it with 
the SL, the original name of the Polish Peasant party now appropri-
ated by the proteges of the communists. Mikolajczyk's shrewd ma-
neuever greatly disturbed the PPR, which claimed that the Moscow 
discussions that led to the establishment of the Polish provisional 
government of national unity did not provide for Mikolajczyk and his 
followers to be associated with a party other than the SL. To the anger 
of the PPR, Mikolajczyk returned to Poland like a conquering hero 
and presided over the most popular political party in Poland, which 
numbered at least 600,000 members by January 1946Y 
As has been seen, Mikolajczyk chose to return to Poland and work 
within the political framework imposed upon Poland by the Big Three 
at the Yalta Conference. His views were no different from those of 
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other members of his party who spent the war years in the homeland; 
he shared with them the view that it was foolish, if not suicidal, to 
adopt the position of the London Poles and fight the Soviets. Miko-
lajczyk's aims were to encourage the peasants to cooperate in the 
reconstruction of the country, to bolster the morale of a people physi-
cally and emotionally exhausted by the war, to avoid further blood-
shed, to fight for social change, independence, and democracy by legal 
means, to develop friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet 
Union and Poland and the West, and to execute the Yalta decisions 
concerning Poland. 18 
Mikolajczyk was able and courageous, but his judgment was often 
faulty. He gave little thought to developing a political strategy that 
had any chance of genuine success other than the unrealistic one of 
refusing to join an electoral bloc, except on the most exaggerated 
terms, and urging that the Polish elections, promised at Yalta and 
Potsdam, be held as early as possible. He believed the sooner the 
elections were held, the better the chances would be for a PSL victory. 
Even when the weakness of his strategy became increasingly apparent, 
he did not display sufficient flexibility to modify it. 
Mikolajczyk did not return to Poland with the belief that he would 
receive strong support from the United States and Great Britain in his 
domestic battles with the communists. On the basis of his wartime 
relationships with Roosevelt and Churchill that led to Tehran and 
Yalta, Mikolajczyk was under no illusions about receiving firm sup-
port from the West. On his departure from London for the Moscow 
talks in June 1945, Churchill conveyed to him his pessimism about 
the Polish situation and did not hold out the offer of assistance from 
the democracies, which Churchill predicted would return "to bed and 
rest" after the war. Mikolajczyk's personal assessment of the likeli-
hood of his party's getting any kind of effective help from the West 
was equally pessimistic. 19 Yet when he returned to Poland he did not 
disabuse his followers of the notion that he had returned home with 
an Anglo-American guarantee of support. He believed that he could 
not tell his followers the truth because he wanted not only to win and 
hold the support of the overwhelming majority of Poles but also to 
impress his political opponents with the belief that if the PSL were 
pushed too far it would indeed receive the support of the West. 
Even Mikolajczyk's closest associates believed that their leader had 
some secret agreement from the United States and Britain concerning 
Poland's future. One of Mikolajczyk's colleagues, Stefan Korbonski, 
a distinguished attorney who served as chief of the civil resistance 
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during World War II, assumed that Mikolajczyk had returned with 
some assurances from the West. "Surely Mikolajczyk wouldn't be so 
stupid as to come on his own with nothing at all," Korbonski wrote 
in his diary at the time. 20 Even when Mikolajczyk finally revealed the 
truth to his followers, Korbonski and others assumed that their leader 
demurred in order to safeguard the secret of future American and 
British aid.21 The leaders of the PSL were no different from the mass 
of Polish people who convinced themselves that Mikolajczyk had 
brought with him a plan to save Poland. There were high hopes 
among the Polish people, especially in late 1945, that the United 
States and Britain would indeed free Poland. The most common 
question American correspondents were asked by the Poles was, 
"When is the American army coming to liberate us from the Rus-
sians?" There was also a widespread belief among Poles at home and 
abroad that a war between the United States and the Soviet Union was 
imminent. One Pole told an American correspondent that the United 
States intended to use the atomic bomb on the Soviet Union because 
Mrs. Truman was Polish!22 
If Mikolajczyk's strategy did not depend upon American and Brit-
ish support but only on the illusion of it, how did he expect to 
maintain the PSL as a viable force in Polish political life? Mikolajczyk 
possessed a strong conviction of the power of Polish nationalism and 
the ability of the Poles to defend their independence. He believed that 
traditional Polish hostility toward the Russians and communism 
could work to the advantage of his party. He reasoned that Moscow 
understood the Polish national character and was unlikely to risk 
satellization of a people who could and would resist it. 23 Besides, there 
was ample evidence in other countries in eastern Europe that the 
Kremlin allowed peasant parties to participate in the government and, 
in the case of Hungary in 1945, even to win a political victory.24 
Mikolajczyk believed that if he could convince Stalin that the PSL 
wanted friendly relations with the Soviet Union, the Soviet chief 
would then allow reasonably free elections in Poland, and Mikolaj-
czyk expected to win. Like Benes and Masaryk, Mikolajczyk mistak-
enly assumed that Stalin would allow Poland and Czechoslovakia to 
be a bridge between the Soviet Union and the West. But, as one 
scholar has aptly put it, "Moscow regarded them merely as a bridge-
head."25 
Mikolajczyk, who came from western Poland and never really 
understood the Russians, had misjudged Soviet intentions concerning 
Poland. To him the party that had survived Pilsudski could survive 
26 BnTER LEGACY 
Stalin; it proved to be a fatal miscalculation. The irony is that Miko-
lajczyk transferred the illusions he once had about western support for 
an independent Poland to the Soviet Union. As late as the fall of 1946 
Mikolajczyk told a British journalist about the rightness of his policy 
of legal peaceful opposition, 26 even though by then the intimidation, 
harassment, and murder of members of the PSL should have jolted 
him into the realization that the communists would not allow his 
party to win power. By then, the PSL's strategy against the commu-
nist-dominated regime was appropriately described as "a struggle 
between bare buttocks and a whip. "27 
Mter Mikolajczyk fled to the West in 194 7, he told an interviewer 
that had he remained in England and refused to go to Poland in the 
summer of 1945, "It could have been said that no Pole could be found 
who was willing to cooperate, to compromise." Paul Zaleski, Miko-
lajczyk's former aide and confidant, added: "Without Mikolajczyk 
there, the United States and Britain would have blamed him for 
making no effort to prevent Poland from becoming Communist."28 
As one astute observer pointed out at the time, Mikolajczyk's return 
to Poland emerged as part of "a horrifying indictment of the sacrifices 
which had been demanded of Poland to appease not simply Russia, 
but the Allies in their appeasement of Russia."29 
The reform program of the PSL was close but not identical to that 
of the PPR and PPS. Like the other two parties the PSL supported 
the nationalization oflarge industry, but it wanted to preserve private 
ownership of smaller and medium-sized industry. The PSL supported 
land reforms that would go farther than those favored by the PPR in 
creating strong independent farmers. To do this it urged dividing up 
church and state lands and consolidating small and inefficient hold-
ings. The PSL also urged what most Poles wanted-namely, an end 
to the ministry of internal security. As one of Mikolajczyk's lieuten-
ants said, the major difference between the government's economic 
reform program and that of the PSL was, "we believe in civil liber-
ties."30 The party also stood for friendly relations with the Soviet 
Union and the West, but it had a serious problem countering the PPR, 
which placed itself in the position of claiming a monopoly on the 
intentions of Poles who wanted close relations with the Soviet 
Union.31 As Mikolajczyk soon discovered, the PSL's view of Polish 
foreign relations did not coincide with the Kremlin's concept of what 
constituted a dependable pro-Soviet regime in Warsaw. 
According to the agreement that resulted in the establishment of 
the Polish provisional government 9f national unity, Mikolajczyk's 
party was supposed to receive one-third of the seats in the temporary 
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parliament when it was called into session. But the PSL never received 
the seats because the regime insisted that members of the fellow-
traveling SL also be included. Eventually, when the parliament con-
vened between December 29, 1945, and January 3, 1946, the PSL was 
offered fifty-two seats, considerably fewer than the one-third that had 
been originally proffered. The PSL decided to accept the seats because 
important legislation concerning the nationalization of industry and 
the nation's electoral law were scheduled to come before the parlia-
ment.32 
Shortly after the PSL took its place in parliament, the PPS took the 
initiative on behalf of the communist bloc and, repeating an earlier 
offer, invited the PSL to join an electoral bloc in which it would have 
20 percent of the seats. In a candid but conciliatory reply to the PPS 
and PPR on February 22, 1946, the PSL indicated that it shared many 
of the aims of the PPR and PPS and recognized that whatever the 
results of the future elections the three major parties must be reflected 
in the composition of a future permanent government for Poland. But 
it rejected the offer of 20 percent of the seats, indicating that 75 
percent of the parliamentary representation should go to the represen-
tatives of the peasants-the PSL and SL. As Mikolajczyk later ex-
plained, the PSL "wanted only 51-52 percent." In its reply, the PSL 
also called for the abolition of the ministries of supply and propaganda 
and information, and demanded that the regime cease its attacks 
linking leaders of the PSL with the underground. 33 
The demand for 75 percent of the seats was rejected by the PPR, 
which was willing to grant the PSL and SL approximately 200 out of 
444 seats, substantially fewer than the majority Mikolajczyk wanted. 
Because the PPR and PPS claimed peasant groups of their own, 
Gomulka argued that the peasants would be represented in parlia-
ment according to their actual strength. 34 
The refusal of the PSL to accept the offer of the government bloc 
condemned it in the eyes of the opposition to the reactionary camp. 
In the months that followed, the opposition increased propaganda 
attacks against the PSL, intimidated, harassed, and even murdered 
members of the PSL and seriously curtailed the press activity of the 
party. By the spring of 1946 the regime became more brazen in its 
efforts to intimidate the PSL. On March 12, for the first time, the 
security police raided the party's headquarters. In April the regime 
legalized ORMO, a kind of citizen's militia which had the effect of 
expanding the system of terror associated with the security police. 
Stanislaw Banczyk, vice-chairman of the PSL, delivered a major 
speech in parliament condemning the use of terror: 
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There is so much falseness, hypocrisy, and injustice in Poland 
today that an honest person is overcome by fear. We are pushed 
by the Marxists along the path which leads to the dictatorship 
of the proletariat by the use of superior force and oppression of 
all other parties. It is claimed that the Polish Peasant Party is 
reactionary. The criterion is that anyone who is not in favor of 
dictatorship is reactionary. Even our Boy Scouts have been 
declared a reactionary force. What became of our sacrifices 
during the war? The ordinary citizen feels worse than he did 
when there was no hope of improvement. There is no legality 
or security. In order to maintain itself the government has to 
keep many thousands of police who do not ask the citizen what 
he does or how he does it, but only in what he believes. 
On May 3, 1946, the conflict between the PSL and its supporters 
on the one hand and the regime on the other became so bitter that 
the police attacked crowds of people who had gathered in several 
cities to celebrate the constitution adopted by the Polish Diet in 1791, 
the anniversary of which was observed as a Polish national holiday. 
Political feelings reached such a fever pitch of intensity that there was 
talk of a Polish civil war. 35 
The PSL could not effectively respond to the growing use of terror 
by the government. Controls and censorship of the press prevented 
the party from communicating the extent of the persecution through 
its newspapers and periodicals. Gazeta Ludowa, the official organ of 
the PSL, could not be published before it was subjected to government 
censorship. Once censored-usually 30 percent of the political con-
tents of the paper was affected-the newspaper could not appear with 
blank spaces. Censorship even affected some commercial advertise-
ments. Since distribution of the newspapers was a state monopoly, the 
distributors were often threatened with arrest and the papers seized 
by the security police. 36 That is why the PSL, which theoretically still 
had the right to assemble, tried to communicate the extent of the 
regime's political persecution by meetings and demonstrations which 
grew more difficult. 
The severe pressure began to take its toll on the PSL. During an 
executive council meeting of the PSL at the end of May 1946, it was 
apparent that some leaders of the party favored joining an electoral 
bloc on terms substantially lower than those Mikolajczyk was holding 
out for. They argued that to continue to remain in opposition isolated 
the PSL from the political process. "We are not the navel of the 
world," one member exclaimed. Mikolajczyk's critics believed that 
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the PSL should not hold out for the future elections but try instead 
to develop a political orientation that had the stamp neither of the 
London Poles nor of the Soviet Poles. Faced with the rising criticism 
of his own associates, Mikolajczyk shot back: "I did not tell anyone 
to count on any miracle or on the threat of the atomic bomb."37 
While the regime escalated the level of violence against the PSL, 
Mikolajczyk and his colleagues countered with demands that the 
promised elections be held by July 28, 1946, one year after the Pots-
dam Conference. The KRN, however, called for a referendum in-
stead. The referendum would approve or disapprove three major 
questions-the incorporation of the western lands from Germany, the 
land reform and nationalization of industry, and the abolition of the 
Senate. The government bloc's decision was an obvious attempt not 
only to blunt the repeated criticisms of the regime by the PSL for 
delaying the elections but also to demonstrate to the United States and 
Britain, with whom the government wanted to firm up economic 
relations, that the communist-dominated coalition enjoyed the popu-
lar support of the nation. At first the PSL threatened not to take part 
in the referendum which was scheduled for June 1946 but later de-
cided to participate after the regime pledged itself to hold the prom-
ised elections in the fall of 1946.38 
The American State Department opposed the efforts of the commu-
nists and their supporters to present the Polish electorate with a single 
list of candidates which might relegate the PSL to a role of ineffective-
ness. Yet it revealed the weakness of the American position when it 
advised in a policy and information statement in May of 1946, "Care 
should be taken, however, not to overplay our support of Mikolajczyk 
and his followers to the point where it might have the reverse of the 
desired effect."39 Like Mikolajczyk and his followers, the Department 
of State did not anticipate the implications of insisting on a political 
course that could only result in fraudulent elections. 
One of the persistent themes in the attacks leveled by the PPR 
against the PSL was the alleged link between it and the reactionary 
elements in Poland who wanted to topple the government and estab-
lish a capitalist regime. The fact that the PSL repudiated the support 
of reactionary groups failed to impress the communists, who were 
convinced that the Polish underground was tied to the PSL. In May 
1946 Gomulka said that "the time had come to announce to PSL 
leaders that according to the wishes and interests of the major part 
of the Polish nation and in conformity with the resolutions of the 
Yalta and Potsdam conferences only antifascist democratic organiza-
tions can act legally in Poland. "40 To the communists, the PSL 
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wanted it both ways-to function as a legal body and to operate in 
collusion with terrorists. 
In response to charges that it supported underground bands, the 
PSL declared: "These are irresponsible accusations and harmful 
charges, poisoning public life, filling it with the greatest distrust, 
calculated to disturb agitated people and people who are impassioned 
against the serious and responsible People's Movement." Then it tried 
to put the opposition on the defensive: "The agitators ofPPR on many 
occasions have tried to join PSL with these bands. And when we come 
out in defense of our party and our honor immediately there is raised 
the great cry that we are defending these bands. Gentlemen, please 
stop joining PSL with these bands and then we will not have to write 
such articles because there will be no need for them. PSL does not 
organize bands and has no need of this."41 One of the ironies in 
postwar Poland was that the actions of the Warsaw government were 
largely responsible for creating a new underground which, by sup-
porting the PSL, seriously compromised the PSL's position and made 
it easier for the PPR to undermine it. 
The Polish underground consisted of a heterogeneous group of 
political and military organizations which shared a common hostility 
toward the communists and with few exceptions supported the PSL. 
Some members came from the wartime underground-former sol-
diers in the Home Army-while others were newcomers, including 
deserters from the Polish Army, who were driven to clandestine 
operations against the Warsaw regime. Depite the fact that thousands 
of men ended their association with the underground by the amnesty 
granted by the government in August 1945, there were still probably 
50,000-100,000 people in Poland's underground in the period 1945-
1947.42 
Several underground political groups established the coordinating 
commission of political parties, known as "The Center," to which was 
later added a military organization called "Freedom and Indepen-
dence," or WIN, after the Polish words Wolnosc i Niezawislosc. WIN 
assumed control over former Home Army units and other partisan 
units which operated in the for~sts. WIN's commander, Colonel Jan 
Rzepecki, was arrested on November 5, 1945, but his place was taken 
by Colonel Franciszek Niepokolczycki, who met the same fate a short 
time later. 43 Other important groups of the underground included the 
National Armed Forces, or NSZ, an active right-wing group, and the 
Ukrainian Liberation Army, known as the UPA. 
The scale of the underground's operations is revealed by the gov-
ernment claim that 15,000 people were killed by the underground in 
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the period 1945-1948-7,500 in 1945 alone-with the greatest activ-
ity concentrated in Bialystok, Lublin, Rzeszow, Warsaw, Krakow, 
and Kielce.44 The security police, dubbed the "Red Gestapo," were 
quite efficient in discovering, infiltrating, and attacking underground 
units. The success of the government's campaign was obvious by the 
decline in the underground's attacks from 1,214 in October 1946 to 
178 in April1947.45 
Korbonski offered a vivid portrait of the chaos that existed in some 
parts of southern Poland in early 1946: 
These southern districts of ours, formerly called the "Wild 
Fields," comparable to the American Wild West early in the 
nineteenth century, are a veritable no man's land, haunted by 
Ukrainian gangs, a few scattered Home Army guerrillas, Zymier-
ski's troops, and Soviet troops. It has become difficult to say who 
fights whom, for as a final touch, gangs of Soviet deserters attack 
all others. Zymierski's troops liquidate the latter with special 
ruthlessness. They express all their hatred for the Soviets on 
those innocent deserters. In many cases they also battle with 
"the fraternal Soviet army."46 
One of the best-known leaders of a partisan band was Jozef Kuras, 
a Polish mountaineer who was known by the name of Ogien. Famous 
throughout Galicia, Ogien operated freely and virtually paralyzed the 
government's administration of the area. Protected by the local popu-
lace, he managed to conduct operations until early 1947 when he and 
his men were surrounded by security troops. After a battle in which 
his men were killed, Ogien committed suicide rather than be taken 
prisoner.47 
Early in March 1946 the American ambassador to Warsaw, Arthur 
Bliss Lane, and his British counterpart, Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, 
were concerned by the scale of underground activities at a time when 
several thousand Soviet troops had recently been moved to the vicin-
ity of Otwock and Anim, only a few miles from Warsaw. Lane and 
Bentinck feared that the dissatisfaction of so many Poles, coupled 
with the escalation of underground attacks, might spark an uprising 
which would result in stern retaliatory measures by the Soviets. Lane 
and Bentinck contacted individuals who were connected with the 
underground and urged restraint to avoid a repression which, in 
Lane's words, "would give the people to the east the excuse of impos-
ing a military dictatorship on a permanent basis."48 
Although the underground continued activities after 1947, its lead-
ership, organization, and morale were seriously weakened. As a result 
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of the amnesties granted by the government, the ministry of public 
security reported on May 7, 1947, that 55,277 people had revealed 
themselves to the authorities. Of these, 22,887 were members of WIN, 
4,892 came from the NSZ, 8,432 were members of forest units, and 
7,448 had deserted from the Polish army.49 
Following the war, relations between the Roman Catholic church 
and the provisional government were tense, but neither side made an 
overt effort to disturb the delicate modus vivendi. The government 
allowed the church a brief respite while it dealt with the reconstruc-
tion needs of the state and the opposition represented by the PSL. To 
be sure, the government left no doubt about what its policy toward 
the church would be. In 1945 it voided the concordat of February 
1925, justifying its action by the alleged pro-German policies of the 
Vatican during World War II. Once the concordat was abrogated, the 
church operated in a kind of vacuum until a new agreement replaced 
it. Even the "Little Constitution" of 1947 did not allude to the subject 
of religion. 50 
Relations between church and state grew increasingly strained 
when Cardinal Augustus Hlond criticized the government following 
the Kielce pogrom in July 1946.51 Later, he and other prelates openly 
endorsed the PSL in the elections of January 1947. "We had no 
choice," Hlond told one interviewer. "It was a matter of atheism or 
Christianity; barbarism or civilization"52 It was predictable that 
sooner or later the church would become the major source of opposi-
tion to the regime after the PSL was eliminated as a political factor 
in Polish politics, playing a role so familiar to it in Poland's history. 
Government activity against the church escalated in succeeding years, 
reaching a high point in the spring of 1950 when the state nationalized 
church land. 
World War II had devastated Poland. Over 6 million Poles, almost 
20 percent of the nation's people had died, the highest percentage of 
loss suffered by any country overrun by Nazi Germany. According to 
the Polish war reparations office, Poland lost 6,028,000 citizens be-
tween 1939 and 1945. Approximately 10.7 percent of the people died 
as a result of military operations, while 89.9 percent perished as a 
result of the Nazi terror. Of the total number of victims of the terror, 
3,577,000 died in death camps or as a result of pacifications and 
executions, 1,286,000 died in concentration and labor camps and in 
prisons, and 521,000 died from wounds, injuries, overwork, or physi-
cal exhaustion. Among those who perished-mostly as victims of the 
mass extermination campaign-were 3,200,000 Polish Jews. 53 
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Economically, the country was in ruins. The Poles sustained losses 
estimated at $50-$60 billion or approximately 40 percent of the coun-
try's total wealth. 54 Poland lost 60 percent of its industrial capacity, 
40 percent of its farm buildings and machinery, 72 percent of its 
sheep,and 60 percent of its cattle. Polish cities were gutted-almost 
85 percent of Warsaw was destroyed and 80 percent of Wroclaw 
suffered damages. 55 When Mikolajczyk returned to the Polish capital 
in June 1945 he commented on seeing a devastated city and the smell 
of corpses lying under the rubble "like an evil blanket on the ruins." 
Irving Brant, a correspondent for the Chicago Sun who visited War-
saw in October 1945, wrote: "An American enters Warsaw with the 
feeling that he has stepped out of the real world into something which 
could not possibly exist. These rows of roofless, doorless, windowless 
walls, reaching in parallel columns mile on mile, might have been dug 
out of the earth by an army of archaeologists."56 
Since the Nazis placed a high priority on destroying Polish culture, 
little wonder that Poland's cultural losses were so devastating. The 
intelligentsia died by the thousands. Polish educators especially 
suffered a very high mortality-700 university professors, 1,000 high 
school teachers and 4,000 elementary school teachers were elimi-
nated. The Germans destroyed historical monuments, library collec-
tions and works of art. What the Germans did not destroy, they 
looted. One postwar visitor to Poland noted that when she walked into 
any government ministry, the walls were lined with heavy but empty 
bookcases. "In all of Poland," she said, "there are not enough books 
to cover the walls of the ministries."57 
The task of reconstruction facing Poland was enormous. During 
the period 1945-1947, the PPR-controlled government wisely chose 
to pursue the goal of recovery, not socialism. Like Lenin's Russia in 
the 1920s, Poland needed a commitment to reconstruction, not 
ideology. Besides, the regime expected that its moderate political and 
economic policies would lure the intelligentsia who had survived the 
war to help rebuild the nation and to facilitate getting credits from the 
United States and Great Britain. The policy of moderation in these 
years worked. Even Mikolajczyk commented upon "the initial period 
of unbelievable enthusiasm" which characterized the spirit of the 
Polish people during the early postwar years. 58 
The Poland that emerged after World War II was approximately 
20 percent smaller than it had been before the war. The Poles lost 
territory east of the Curzon Line, including oil fields, timber, salt 
deposits, and the major cultural centers ofVilna and Lwow. Moscow 
claimed the area the Poles won from Germany was worth at least 
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two-and-a-half times more than what they had lost to the Soviet 
Union. One authority has indicated that the acquisitions in the West 
were so significant that even when war damages are factored, by 1946 
Poland had an industrial production capacity one-third greater than 
prewar Poland. 59 
There is no doubt that despite its losses to the Soviets, Poland was 
potentially a stronger nation from an economic point of view than it 
had been before the war. It had acquired coal mining centers in Silesia, 
the richest coal fields in Europe, which even surpassed the reserves of 
the Ruhr. Poland not only acquired the hard coal and chemical 
industry of Silesia but also picked up lignite mines, rich deposits of 
zinc and lead, and machine-making, rolling-stock, textile, and glass 
factories. These lands also substantially added to Poland's output of 
electricity. And even though the Poles lost more agricultural land to 
the Russians than they gained from the Germans, the quality of the 
new lands was better. 
The geographical changes gave Poland 500 kilometers of coastline 
in contrast to the prewar 140 kilometers. Poland now had several 
ports-Gdynia, which it had before the war; Gdansk, which had been 
the free city of Danzig but tied by a customs union with Poland; and 
Szczecin (Stettin), which was a major new gain. The acquisition of 
Szczecin was especially important because it enabled the Poles to use 
the Oder River, economically a far more important waterway than the 
Vistula, to export coal to Sweden and to import Swedish iron ore to 
Silesia.60 
Poland was a more homogeneous nation than it had ever been in 
the past. Almost one-third of the people of prewar Poland were not 
Polish. Some of its largest minorities included 5 million Ukrainians, 
over 3 million Jews and 750,000 Germans. This ethnic heterogeneity 
was reflected in the diversity of religions-75 percent of the people 
were Roman Catholic and 25 percent belonged to the Orthodox, 
Jewish, and Protestant faiths. But after World War II there were only 
500,000 non-Poles in the country, and 98 percent of Poland's citizens 
were Roman Catholic. 61 
One of the immediate tasks facing the Warsaw government was to 
resettle the lands acquired from Germany. Stalin argued at the Pots-
dam Conference that all the Germans had fled the area before the 
arrival of Soviet troops. This, of course, was an exaggeration. There 
was a large German population there when the Poles began to admin-
ister the area. Moreover, many Germans who had fled out of fear of 
Soviet retribution returned to their homes, unable or unwilling to 
accept the fact that eastern Germany was now Polish. Even after most 
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of the Germans were transferred from the region in 1946, many 
Germans assumed that Polish mismanagement would inevitably lead 
to the appointment of other administrators for the area-no doubt 
Germans.62 
In view of the enormous devastation, the dismantling and looting 
of property by the Soviets, and the sheer magnitude of transferring 
Germans out of and Poles into the area, it is remarkable that the new 
provinces began to assume a Polish character as soon as they did. On 
November 20, 1945, the Allied Control Council approved a plan 
which provided for the transfer of 3.5 million Germans from western 
Poland-the Soviets agreed to accept 2 million and the British 1.5 
million in their zones of occupation. The major expulsions of Ger-
mans from Poland were completed by 1946, though another 500,000 
were transferred from Poland to the Soviet zone of Germany in 1947. 
By 1948 approximately 5.25 million Poles lived in the western territo-
ries while only 100,000 Germans remained there. Considering what 
the Poles had experienced at the hands of the Germans during the 
war, they were not overly sensitive to the conditions under which the 
expellees were transferred from the area. One recent critic has claimed 
that the transfer of Germans from Poland and Czechoslovakia was 
conducted in such a way as to constitute a crime against humanity. 63 
The Poles were so enthusiastic about acquiring the new lands that 
even a heavy tax, the proceeds of which were to be spent on the 
development of the region, was not unpopular. The Polish settlers in 
the "Recovered Territories," the term the Poles used to describe the 
lands which had once been part of medieval Poland, were very poor 
and came from the more densely populated areas of the nation. The 
inhabitants of the western lands were shocked by the poverty and the 
ignorance of intensive farming methods of the new immigrants. No 
doubt this was the basis of the German expectation that the Polish 
settlers would fail to develop the resources of the area. Belying all 
predictions of disaster, the Poles succeeded in rebuilding the region 
and in producing a bumper crop by 1949.64 
Poland's early postwar economic policy was characterized by the 
nationalization of key industries and land reform. Before World War 
II a high percentage of Poland's industrial reserves had been foreign 
owned. In 1936, almost 90 percent of the oil industry, 60 percent of 
the chemical industry, more than 50 percent of the metal industry and 
more than 80 percent of the nation's electric power were in foreign 
hands. Out of 1,066 joint-stock companies, more than one-third had 
heavy foreign capitalization. What was not under foreign control fell 
under state ownership. The state owned the armament and commer-
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cial air industries and controlled most of the iron, railway, merchant 
marine, and salt industries. During the Nazi occupation, most facto-
ries and mines had come under German control and, in effect, their 
owners had been dispossessed. Czeslaw Milosz, the Nobel laureate, 
said: "We must remember that five and a half years of Nazi rule had 
obliterated all respect for private property."65 
Thus the substance of the nationalization law of January 3, 1946, 
which allowed the government to take over enterprises employing fifty 
people or more during a single shift, did not provoke much contro-
versy in Poland. There was debate, however, over how the measure 
would be administered. Except in the case of German-owned enter-
prises, the principle of compensation was recognized. This meant that 
American investors, whose investments totaled $210 million in Po-
land before the Second World War, could expect to receive compensa-
tion. The State Department looked upon the nationalization of 
industry in broader terms than simply the amount and method of 
compensation to former owners. It viewed the nationalization pro-
gram as a determined effort by the Polish communists to diminish 
Poland's western orientation and to tie it more closely to the Soviet 
Union. "Next to Catholicism and immigration," the State Depart-
ment declared, one of Poland's most intimate ties with the West was 
western involvement in key Polish industries. The department opined, 
"One of the most interesting aspects of the political contest in the 
months ahead is likely to be the endeavors of Polish traditionalism, 
as typified in Mikolajczyk and his movement, to preserve these West-
em ties in economic as in other ways."66 
Another law passed the same day protected private enterprise in 
businesses not covered by the nationalization law. According to an 
UNRRA report published in April 1947, 80 percent of the Polish 
working class was employed in privately owned enterprises and only 
20 percent worked in the nationalized sector of the economy. 67 
One ofthe major problems facing the Warsaw government was the 
shortage of workers for all the nation's industries. Late in 1945, Mine 
himself admitted that in order to meet the minimum needs of the 
territories acquired from Germany, 300,000-400,000 additional Pol-
ish workers were required. 68 The shortage of workers emphasized the 
pragmatic necessity for the Warsaw government to project an image 
of moderation at home and abroad in order to induce the Polish 
skilled workers and technicians to return to work and help rebuild the 
nation. No doubt, too, this impelled the Poles to keep rather than to 
repatriate the skilled German workers who lived in postwar Poland. 
Predictably the poor wages paid to Polish workers was another 
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problem facing the government. The rise of wages never did keep up 
with the rise in the cost of living. Although nominal wages doubled 
in 1946 and 1947, real wages increased only 29 percent. In March 
1947 the index of real wages was still only 51.2 percent of the 1938 
level. To make matters worse, wages were often paid in kind. In 
January 1946less than half of the workers' salaries were paid in cash. 
It was not unusual for workers to be paid in bread. Worker dissatisfac-
tion with the situation resulted in strikes among the employees of 
textile factories in Lodz who objected to what was called the 'Pstrow-
ski' system, a Polish version of Stakhanovism. 69 
Throughout 1946 and much of 194 7 the Polish government espe-
cially emphasized the private enterprise component of its hybrid econ-
omy in its dealings with the West. As will be seen in more detail later, 
this was a time during which the credit-hungry Polish government 
was most anxious to foster and develop closer economic ties with the 
United States, the country that was in the best possible position to 
meet Polish economic needs. 
The agrarian reform of September 6, 1944, extended to all parts of 
the nation by the end of the war, was a major factor in neutralizing 
the peasantry at a time when the PPR was trying to isolate and 
eventually destroy the PSL as a force in Polish political life. The land 
reform, popular among the poor peasants who benefited most from it, 
provided that all estates exceeding 100 hectares in total area or 50 
hectares of cultivable land in central Poland would be expropriated. 
In western Poland, only holdings in excess of 100 hectares, regardless 
of the amount of cultivable land, were broken up. The land made 
available by the reform was divided into 5-hectare farms. In the 
western territories, however, the regime permitted individual farms to 
be a little larger-7-15 hectares and up to 20 hectares for dairy 
farms. 70 The PSL, criticizing the small size of the holdings, hoped that 
a middle class of peasant farmers would be created in Poland. To 
Mikolajczyk and his followers, the PPR-inspired reform was a delib-
erate effort to sabotage the success of the newly created farms-they 
were considered too small to be productive-and to make it easier 
eventually to collectivize them. The PSL's criticism did not find a 
responsive audience among farm laborers and small peasants whose 
land hunger was appeased by what appeared to them to be a con-
cerned government. 71 
The area most affected by the land reform was western Poland. It 
was there that more than two-thirds of the 6 million hectares which 
were available for private use was distributed to individual farmers. 
The state held back almost 4 million hectares and converted most of 
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the acreage into state farms. 72 A substantial amount of the arable land 
in western Poland remained in Soviet hands, ostensibly to feed the 
Soviet army there. As late as April1947 the Poles and Soviets signed 
an agreement which looked toward a reduction of Soviet land hold-
ings from 340,000 to 180,000 hectares. 73 
In the period 1945-1947, the PPR-dominated government was in 
no position to carry on a major political struggle with the PSL without 
trying to mitigate the fear of the Polish peasants that collectivization 
was just around the comer. There was at least no open talk of collec-
tivization. Czeslaw Milosz remarked that "whoever dared to speak of 
collectives at that time was punished as an enemy of the people for 
spreading alarm and slandering the govemment."74 One American 
authority on Polish agriculture has suggested that before 1948 the 
PPR was not even thinking in terms of collectivized agriculture. And 
when it finally got around to doing so, the PPR announced the ex-
tremely modest target of collectivizing only 1 percent of Poland's 
privately owned farms in 1949.75 
Predictably, Poland's principal trade partner in 1945 was the Soviet 
Union. Approximately 91 percent of the nation's imports and 93 
percent of its exports were exchanged with the Soviets. Yet by 1946 
the figures had dropped to 70 percent and 46 percent, respectively. In 
1947, despite increased volume, the Soviet share of Poland's imports 
and exports dropped to less than 30 percent. The same pattern was 
true of Poland's foreign trade with other eastern European nations in 
this period. 76 This decline stemmed largely from the fact that Polish 
economic needs could not be met exclusively by the Soviet Union and 
the other states of eastern Europe. 
This does not mean that the Kremlin allowed Polish economic 
interests to take priority over those of the Soviet Union. Despite 
imaginative and resourceful efforts by Warsaw to diversify its com-
mercial connections with the West, the Soviet Union subjected Poland 
to a consistent pattern of economic exploitation. The Poles first got 
a taste of it when the Soviets seized and dismantled property from 
Poland's western lands. That was accompanied by robbing, looting, 
and raping by soldiers of the Soviet army, a situation not limited to 
the western territories alone. 77 Beginning in 1945, the price structures 
in bilateral agreements between the two nations revealed the extent 
to which Poland was exploited by the Soviets. Evidence suggests that 
before 1948 Poland was required to pay 131 zloty for every dollar of 
imports from the Soviet Union while the Soviets paid the equivalent 
of 75 zloty for every dollar of Polish goods.78 
The most notorious example of Soviet economic exploitation was 
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contained in the Soviet-Polish Frontier and Reparations Agreement 
of August 16, 1945. In compensation for waiving its rights to former 
German mines in Poland's western territories and for the delivery to 
Poland of 15 percent of German reparations, the Soviet Union was to 
receive 8 million tons of coal from Poland in 1946 and 13 million each 
year thereafter until1950 at which time deliveries were to level off to 
'12 million tons a year as long as Germany was occupied. 79 
During the discussions that led to this agreement, the Soviets had 
suggested an exchange of stock in the eastern Galician oil and potash 
deposits for Polish-owned concerns in the territory acquired from 
Germany. Since that inevitably meant Soviet control of much of 
Polish industry and little or no Polish influence in the oil and potash 
industries in eastern Galicia, the Poles turned down the offer. There-
upon the Soviets wanted the Poles to sell them coal for $1.00 a ton 
when the official export price was $8.00 a ton and some countries had 
offered Poland as much as $12.00 a ton. Premier Osobka-Morawski 
defended the deal on the grounds that Polish assistance to the Soviet 
Union "will be returned to us." As finally worked out, the Soviets 
ended up paying the Poles a few more cents-$1.25-$1.30 a ton. In 
Mikolajczyk's account of the background to this agreement he sug-
gests that the Soviets originally were willing to pay the cost of mining 
the coal, which was $5.00 or $6.00 a ton, but that Mine was allegedly 
responsible for lowering the figure that was finally agreed upon. When 
Mikolajczyk characterized the deal as robbery, Mine rebuked him 
saying, "You seem to forget how much Soviet Russia has done for us; 
how it liberated us and helped us." Mikolajczyk was unimpressed. "If 
Hitler had not attacked them, they'd still be the enemy of Poland and 
all the Allies," he replied. Mikolajczyk was overruled. The agreement 
stood.80 In March 1947 the amount of the so-called "reparation coal" 
was reduced by half, but an agreement of January 1948 determined 
Poland's coal export to the Soviet Union at 6.5 million tons. By then, 
the Soviets had agreed to pay a higher price for the coal-$2.25 a ton 
-but still considerably less than it cost the Poles to mine it. 81 
Despite the large amounts of coal that were exported to the Soviet 
Union at ridiculously low prices in the period 1945-1948, Polish coal 
production was so high-24 million tons in 1945, 47 million tons in 
194682-that Poland was able to sell large quantities to western Eu-
rope, which regarded it as a major factor in its postwar recovery. The 
French not only admitted their dependency upon Polish coal but also 
stressed the important role of Poland in the economic unity of Europe. 
In July 1947 French President Paul Ramadier said: "Indeed, it is 
indispensable that this unity should include Poland for it can be said 
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that Europe extends as far as [the] Vistula. Beyond, things are differ-
ent. To wish to have Europe stop this side of [the] Vistula would be 
equivalent to having [the] United States stop at [the] Mississippi."83 
On July 2, 1947, the Sejm passed the Three Year Plan of Economic 
Reconstruction which was intended to raise the standard of living of 
the working people above the prewar level by concentrating on restor-
ing existing plants to full capacity. Three sectors of the economy-
state, cooperative, and private-would operate according to the guid-
ing principles of the national economic plan. 84 One of the major aims 
of the plan was to unify the former German lands with central Poland. 
To that end, Gomulka's separate ministry for the administration of 
the former German areas was abolished and the new land was incor-
porated within the framework of the general administrative system of 
Poland.85 
Neither the Poles nor the Czechs, both of whom expressed cautious 
interest in the American offer of the Marshall Plan, were permitted 
by the Kremlin to participate in a program that linked them econom-
ically with the West. With the advent of the Cold War, whatever 
economic autonomy the Poles had managed to establish within the 
Soviet sphere of influence between 1945 and 1948 gave way to new 
political and economic dynamics within the communist world which 
now emphasized long-range planning and development in order to 
strengthen and integrate the political and economic systems of the 
Soviet Union and the satellites. 
m From Potsdam to Kielce 
Washington recognized that Poland was in the 
Soviet sphere of influence, but it expected to exert some political and 
economic influence there after World War II. Whatever optimism 
Washington may have had about its ability to play a role in postwar 
Warsaw soon gave way to uncertainty, resulting in an ambivalence in 
American policy toward Poland. In the months following the Pots-
dam Conference, the United States believed that Polish reconstruc-
tion needs made Poland dependent upon American economic aid, 
which presumably would enable Washington to moderate communist 
rule in Poland and to safeguard the position of Mikolajczyk and the 
PSL, around which the hopes of the United States were based. 
Despite the urging of its ambassador in Warsaw, the United States 
did not directly tie its economic aid to Poland to political conditions. 
Rather, Washington extended credits after receiving Polish assur-
ances of an economic open door for the United States in Poland. Since 
Poland had enormous reconstruction needs and would require addi-
tional American aid, Washington expected to have a lever to influence 
the political situation in the country. Before and after the extension 
of economic aid to Poland, the communists steadily expanded their 
political grip over the country, intimidating, harassing, and terroriz-
ing the PSL. By the summer of 1946, Washington policymakers no 
longer believed that genuinely free elections would ever be held in 
Poland, but they still had hope that the future of the PSL and Ameri-
can interests, which were closely tied to it, was not entirely grim. 
Before the Potsdam Conference, the State Department had advised 
the president about the impact of American economic assistance to 
Poland: "Immediate action on our part to facilitate by credits and 
otherwise the supplying to Poland of urgently needed equipment and 
relief materials will promote in a far-reaching and enduring manner 
a healthy American influence in Poland, especially in regard to the 
holding of free elections, the final step in the Yalta program." In order 
to maximize the influence of economic aid, the State Department 
preferred that American efforts be on a national basis rather than 
through an international organization such as UNRRA. Betraying an 
obvious sensitivity to the relationship of the Polish issue to American 
domestic politics, the State Department urged that the sooner rela-
tions between the two countries were normalized the better it would 
42 BITTER LEGACY 
be: "The rapid establishment of normal friendly relations and contacts 
between our two countries is particularly important, since the popula-
tions of Polish extraction in our country might otherwise seek to make 
a domestic American political issue of conditions inside Poland." 1 
Averell Harriman, the American ambassador to the Kremlin who 
kept a close eye on Polish developments prior to the time Lane took 
up his diplomatic post in Warsaw, had long been a proponent of 
American economic leverage in dealing with the Soviet Union. 2 And 
Poland was no exception. Harriman was convinced that "if we con-
tinue to take a sympathetic interest in Polish affairs and are reason-
ably generous in our economic relations there is a fair chance that 
things will work out satisfactorily from our standpoint."3 Harriman 
advised Washington that "it is of inestimable importance from a 
political standpoint" to grant at least small credits to Poland to permit 
purchase and shipment of equipment needed for reconstruction. He 
saw these smaller credits being expanded later through the Export-
Import Bank when Congress appropriated additional funds. To Har-
riman there was "no doubt" that prompt aid to Poland would "have 
a far-reaching and permanent effect on the influence of the US in the 
political scene in Poland." The ambassador felt that an immediate and 
dramatic gesture, such as sending several hundred used trucks from 
the United States army in Europe, would help to strengthen the 
prowestern elements in the Polish government. "In other words," 
Harriman declared, "I feel that a small gesture made quickly will be 
of even greater political as well as practical value than substantially 
larger transactions made at a later date." 
By the time of the Potsdam meeting, the United States had drawn 
up a tentative program of economic assistance by which Poland would 
receive UNRRA supplies, surplus war materiel-including the army 
trucks-and eventually, after certain legal barriers were removed, 
loans from the Export-Import Bank. The United States looked to the 
early reestablishment of private trade and regarded the Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, negotiated in 1931, as 
still effective, though welcomed an improved treaty with Poland. State 
Department officials urged the Poles to submit a list of their recon-
struction needs, and at the Postdam Conference the Polish delegation 
presented its priority needs, which included ports and port equipment, 
the city of Warsaw, railways, cars, locomotives, bridges, highways, 
trucks, and road building machinery. 5 It was assumed that whatever 
credits the United States extended to the Polish government would be 
contingent on equality of trade opportunities and investments and 
access to sources of information for the United States.6 
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United States aid to Poland had been predicated on the assumption 
that the Polish need was so great that the Warsaw regime would not 
take actions to jeopardize it. That assumption was disproved after 
Arthur Bliss Lane took up his post in Warsaw as ambassador to 
Poland. Lane, born into a wealthy Brooklyn family, had graduated 
from Yale in 1916 and only a few years later served as second 
secretary of the American legation in Warsaw under minister 
Hugh Gibson. After that, he served with distinction in several diplo-
matic posts in Europe and Latin America. 7 Lane was conscientious 
and professional, though at times he could be too idealistic and un-
imaginative. He was tenacious in devoting himself to the fulfillment 
of America's commitment to see that free elections were held in 
Poland as provided in the Yalta and Potsdam declarations. When 
Lane saw early in his mission that Poland was unlikely to become 
independent, he believed that the Polish experience could serve as a 
valuable lesson to educate the American public in the failure of a 
policy based on accommodation with the communists, thereby forcing 
a reevaluation of American policies toward the communist world. 8 
Having an abrasive diplomat like Lane in Warsaw during this crucial 
time in United States-Polish relations did not augur well for the 
future. What the United States needed in Poland was a more imagina-
tive and flexible man who, by being sensitive to the political and 
economic nuances of postwar Poland, could exploit various opportu-
nities to American advantage. 
After Lane's arrival in Warsaw, the Poles made clear their eager-
ness to establish economic contacts with the United States. In return 
for the promise of economic aid, Bierut told Lane that Poland was 
prepared to permit American consulates to open in several cities-
Gdansk, Krakow, Lodz, Poznan, Breslau-to allow planes of the 
United States Army Air Forces Air Transport Command to fly to 
Warsaw, to permit American newsmen to enter the country and 
report on developments there, and to welcome a congressional com-
mittee on a tour of the country. 9 It did not take Lane very long to 
establish contacts with antiregime leaders-Archbishop Stefan 
Sapieha, Stanislaw Grabski, Wincenty Witos, Zygmunt Zulawski-
who convinced him that an American credit to Poland would be 
interpreted by the Polish people as acquiescence in the undemocratic 
and even brutal practices which existed in the country.10 Lane himself 
had observed several actions of the regime which made him question 
the wisdom of extending credits. 
In the political area, Lane complained about the lack of freedom 
of the press. Before Lane's intervention in the matter, Polish author-
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ities wanted newsmen to submit copies of their stories to the Polish 
foreign office before they were transmitted abroad. He criticized the 
lack of political freedom, which included the terrorization of noncom-
munist parties and the arrests by the security police of many people 
who claimed American citizenship. In order to bolster the position of 
the PSL, Lane endorsed Mikolajczyk's plea that the United States 
strongly press the Kremlin to withdraw the Soviet army from Poland. 
Lane expressed concern about the prospect of Poland ever having free 
elections when terror was used against the political opposition and 
tied the entire matter to Poland's request for American credits. 11 
Bierut, who took a strong dislike to Lane, bluntly told him that 
Poland would not accept American meddling in its internal affairs as 
the price of economic aid, a position that the Warsaw government 
steadfastly maintained throughout Lane's tenure in Poland. 12 On his 
part, Lane did not share the optimism of the Polish people in 1945 
about the prospect of free elections. He told Elbridge Durbrow, chief 
of the division of Eastern European affairs of the State Department 
on October 22, 1945: "Unfortunately, I feel that as both the Govern-
ment and the Government to the east desire that the local crowd 
here should remain in power, I do not see much hope of a free 
expression of opinion."13 
In the economic area, Lane was concerned that the proposed na-
tionalization program might not adequately compensate former own-
ers. He was especially disturbed by Warsaw's failure to establish a 
reasonable rate of exchange. The official rate of 100 zloty for $1.00 
was unrealistic, considering the rampant inflation in Poland. The 
black market rate was 200 zloty for $1.00 in the summer of 1945, and 
six months later it catapulted to 1,300 to 1. The impact of the official 
exchange rate was such that Lane joined other ambassadors in War-
saw and exchanged their currencies for zloty on the black market. 14 
Lane urged Washington not to extend credits to Poland as long as 
Warsaw engaged in political and economic policies opposed by the 
United States. He recognized that American refusal to extend the 
credits could make the Poles even more dependent upon the Kremlin. 
But, Lane told Byrnes: "I feel that unless we speak clearly and em-
phatically to the Polish government at this moment, when the regime 
here is requesting definite financial assistance, we will be losing an 
opportunity to make felt our prestige and at the same time we may 
be able, as has been shown on other occasions in Soviet-controlled 
territory, to influence conditions for the better by taking a strong 
determined stand against any movement to stifle democratic life in 
Poland." In other words, as Lane wrote later, he was determined to 
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use American economic leverage to pressure the Poles to follow poli-
cies acceptable to the United States.15 
The State Department saw matters more in economic than political 
terms, though it did not reject attaching political conditions to credits 
for Poland. Dean Acheson, who served as acting secretary of state 
while Byrnes was preoccupied with the problem of the postwar peace 
treaties, advised Lane that if Poland did not grant American business 
treatment as favorable as that it granted other countries he saw no 
hope for substantial American financial aid to Warsaw. Byrnes later 
told Lane much the same thing, emphasizing the important point that 
before the United States granted credits it would have to have eco-
nomic data regarding commercial arrangements between Poland and 
other countries. But Byrnes also indicated that political conditions 
relating to freedom of the press and the promised elections had not 
been ruled out. 16 
While the State Department tried to come to grips with a definite 
policy concerning aid to Poland, the Poles made it clear that their 
economic needs were both substantial and immediate. Ludwik Rajch-
man, a kind of Polish Talleyrand who once enjoyed the confidence of 
premier Wladyslaw Sikorski and now was Poland's representative to 
UNRRA, played a major role in promoting his government's eco-
nomic needs in Washington. He told State Department officials in 
October 1945 that his country needed an immediate loan of $380 
million and looked toward a total figure of $700 million. 17 Durbrow 
worried that the resourceful Rajchman might succeed in convincing 
the right people in Washington to give the Poles the sought-after 
credits. Durbrow confided to Lane: "While so far we have had suc-
cess, I frankly do not feel that we can guarantee that things will 
remain this way since Dr. Rajchman has many friends, some of whom 
may be able to swing this way from the firm position we have all taken. 
In any event, we shall keep up the good fight from our end."18 
Lane, Durbrow, and others had indeed succeeded in convincing the 
administration not to give large credits to Poland in 1945. The United 
States had agreed to a three-year credit for the purchase of a thousand 
army trucks which, considering the Polish need for vehicles, Poland 
did not appear very eager to take advantage of. However, the United 
States refused to grant credits to cover the equipping of the Polish 
army with uniforms, boots and overcoats. Though Warsaw had been 
included in the list of governments to receive a cotton credit through 
the Export-Import Bank, the State Department recommended against 
it. 19 
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Late in 1945, however, the visit of Mikolajczyk, who stopped in 
Washington on his return from a United Nations food and agriculture 
meeting in Quebec, proved to be a turning point in American eco-
nomic relations with Poland. Unlike so many of Lane's contacts in 
Poland, Mikolajczyk believed that United States credits were one of 
the best assurances of Poland regaining its independence and showing 
the Polish people that the West was still very much interested in them. 
In addition, American credits would offset the image of the Soviets, 
who had made more promises than they were able or willing to 
keep.20 When Mikolajczyk saw Truman on November 9, 1945, the 
president was agreeable to assisting Poland to meet its immediate 
needs to buy trucks, rolling stock, tractors, and harbor and road 
repair machinery. Mikolajczyk did not ask for nor did Truman agree 
to an unlimited credit for Poland.21 Based upon this understanding, 
the State Department planned to release surplus stocks of trucks and 
other equipment, to approve $25 million for projects approved by the 
American embassy in Warsaw and to provide an additional $25 mil-
lion to fund one major reconstruction project, such as a port. Byrnes, 
after hearing Mikolajczyk's assessment of the Polish situation, be-
lieved that the stopgap credit policy would let the Polish people know 
that the United States had not abandoned them; yet, it would not 
necessarily contribute to the prestige of the Warsaw regime. Lane 
agreed to the limited credit policy, though he still opposed long-range 
loans to the Warsaw government, which, in his words, would make 
"political capital" out of it. 22 
By the end of 1945 Washington concluded that it could not procras-
tinate much longer in developing an economic policy that would give 
at least a token American presence in Poland. Byrnes, still optimistic 
about the situation for the United States in Poland, believed that it 
was not wise to politicize American aid to Warsaw at a time when he 
was anxious to secure Soviet agreement to peace treaties with the 
Balkan states and to a four-power pact which might induce the Soviets 
to loosen their grip over east central Europe. Byrnes was interested 
in finding common political ground with the Soviets, even though 
some of his rhetoric at times sounded abrasive. As one scholar has 
aptly put it, "Byrnes continued to seek an arrangement whereby 
Soviet control in East Europe would be dominant, but not exclu-
sive."23 Moreover, the State Department believed that it was easier 
for the United States to apply economic than political pressure in 
Warsaw. Economic issues were specific and obviously less likely to 
provoke charges of American interference in the internal affairs of 
Poland. Even though it was doubtful that the promised elections in 
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Poland would be free, "Washington could more easily object to what 
had already happened than to what might be expected to occur 
later."24 
Besides, the political situation in Poland was not entirely grim. 
After all, the PSL flourished, despite communist harassment. The 
PSL was still represented in the government and the PPR and PPS 
courted Mikolajczyk's party to join the government bloc. Even Lane, 
usually so pessimistic about the situation in Poland, noted some im-
provement at this time concerning press freedom and commented on 
the effort of the government to come to terms on some of the issues 
dividing the United States and Poland. 25 Byrnes still thought the 
political experiment in Warsaw was sufficiently positive to use as a 
model to solve problems in Rumania in the fall of 1945.26 
Byrnes's reluctance to protest every political transgression of the 
PPR-dominated government is revealed by his refusal to take a strong 
stand, urged upon him by Lane, when the communists limited politi-
cal parties in Poland to six organizations. To be sure, the United 
States could not defend the anti-Semitic Endeks, one of the prewar 
right-wing groups excluded from the Polish political spectrum. Be-
sides, Mikolajczyk feared that more than six political parties might 
draw away support from the PSL. Finally, just as the State Depart-
ment had anticipated, even a relatively moderate protest by Lane to 
Bierut on the issue brought a tough rejoinder that the United States 
should mind its own business. 27 
But Byrnes could not ignore domestic and foreign sources which 
pressured him to speak out against the mounting repression that was 
taking place in Poland. Late in January 1946, while the American 
delegation to the United Nations met in London, foreign secretary 
Ernest Bevin in the House of Commons strongly condemned the 
political murders that had occurred in Poland and charged the Polish 
security police with the crimes. The American delegation felt the 
United States should take some position on the matter.28 Senator 
Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, one of the members of the delega-
tion, felt very strongly about the issue. Vandenberg, sensitive to the 
opinion of the large number of Polish American voters in his state, 
had close ties with Frank Januszewski, publisher of the Detroit Dzien-
nik Polski (Polish Daily News) and one of the founders of KNAPP 
-the Komitet Narodowy Amerykanow Pochodzenia Polskiego (Na-
tional Committee of Americans of Polish Descent}-a nationalistic, 
anti-Soviet organization established in New York in June 1942. Janus-
zewski, who also was prominent in the Polish American Congress, a 
huge federation of Polish American fraternal, church, and profes-
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sional organizations which had been established in May 1944,29 had 
urged Vandenberg for a long time to speak out strongly for the rights 
of Poland and to condemn the policies of the Soviet Union. Shortly 
before the Vandenberg mission to London, Januszewski wrote an 
emotional appeal to the senator: 
Make our people realize that Polish rights have been trampled 
under the boot of an aggressor-her courts robbed of their 
independence-her press of freedom of speech-her working 
class of freedom of assembly-all persons deprived of the right 
to choose their work and excluded from the possibility of right 
to the results their work may bring. Make them see that since 
Teheran, Yalta,and Potsdam each of us is responsible for thou-
sands of executions of brave Polish patriots, tens of thousands 
of political arrests, hundreds of thousands of deportations. 30 
Vandenberg, regarded by Polish Americans as the major defender of 
the rights of the Polish nation in the United States Senate, believed 
that the United States should "defend whatever Polish equities may 
still remain" in Poland. 31 He met with members of the former Polish 
government in exile and threatened to make a statement about the 
political situation in Poland unless Byrnes made one himself. Senator 
Thomas Connally, chairman of the Senate foreign relations commit-
tee and also a member of the American United Nations delegation in 
London, told Byrnes how strongly Vandenberg felt about the matter: 
"We kind of thought that if you decided to make a statement, you 
could base it on Bevin's. I think that will satisfy him, but if you don't 
... I think he will go on his own and make a statement along the line 
of Bevin's. He said in conversation to me the other night 'My God! 
Why can't we do something like this!' And he has been bawling on 
this ever since."32 
Byrnes was reluctant to make a statement as strong as the one made 
by the British foreign minister unless the facts justified it. He preferred 
to deal in general terms, avoiding, as he put it, "a general row." 
Byrnes's statement, far more restrained than Bevin's, noted that the 
Polish security police appeared to have been implicated "in a number" 
of the murders which hindered Poland's fulfillment of its election 
commitments. He called on the Polish government "to take necessary 
steps to assure the freedom and security which are essential to the 
successful holding offree elections."33 While Vandenberg thought the 
statement too mild, 34 the Poles thought Byrnes had gone too far. 
Foreign minister Rzymowski charged that members of the Polish 
security police had been murdered by underground groups who al-
From Potsdam to Kielce 49 
legedly took orders from General Wladyslaw Anders, a well-known 
Russophobe who had led Polish soldiers out of Russia in 1942 and 
commanded them in several gallant military operations in the West 
during World War II. Rzymowski further charged that the British 
had evidence of this activity but refused to stop it. The Pole also 
suggested that some of the leaders of the Polish terrorists were en-
sconced in the American occupation zone in Germany. 35 
Before the United States came up with a definite economic policy 
toward Poland, Lane, who had angered Polish officials by his candid 
observations concerning the growing repression in their country, 
became the victim of a crude attempt by the Warsaw regime to 
discredit him. After the nationalization decree of January 1946, the 
Polish government distorted Lane's remarks about the rights of for-
mer owners to inspect their properties slated for nationalization to 
suggest that he opposed the decree. The effort to discredit Lane was 
well orchestrated and involved Rajchman, whose mission in Washing-
ton played a major role in seeking loans for Poland, and Rzymowski, 
who flew to Paris to complain directly to Byrnes about Lane. 36 The 
misrepresentation of remarks made by Lane and statements of Byrnes 
concerning the exchange rate was too much for the harried secretary 
of state who wanted the Poles to know that their tactics "cannot fail 
to have an unfortunate effect upon our relations with the Pol[ish] 
Provisional Gov[ernment] and upon the current credit negotiations in 
particular."37 
United States-Polish economic negotiations began to crystallize 
early in 1946. The decisive factor was western Europe's need for coal 
and Poland's ability to deliver it, provided the Poles had enough 
locomotives and gondolas to do so. As Byrnes cabled Lane, "If we 
should refuse credit [for] this purpose now we might be open [to the] 
accusation next winter that vitally needed Polish coal could not be 
moved to western Europe because [the] U.S. Gov[ernment] refused 
credits." Moreover, there were obvious benefits to help orient Polish 
trade toward the West, 38 a healthy development which Polish officials 
continually repeated would reduce Poland's dependence upon the 
Soviet Union. 
The United States was prepared to grant Poland a $40 million 
credit from the Export-Import Bank, considerably less than the Polish 
request to buy 500 locomotives and 20,000 gondola cars at an esti-
mated cost of $90 to $100 million. The credit was contingent upon 
Polish acceptance of six conditions, only one of which was political 
in nature. Poland was expected to affirm the principles of free trade, 
agree with American proposals for expansion of world trade and 
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employment, extend most-favored nation treatment to the United 
States, agree to respect rights of American citizens and compensate 
them for the nationalization of their properties, provide full informa-
tion on Polish economic relations with other countries, and reaffirm 
the Potsdam commitment concerning free elections. If the Poles ac-
cepted the conditions and concluded a bilateral air agreement with 
Washington, then the State Department was prepared to extend addi-
tional credit to Warsaw. If the Poles did not agree to the six condi-
tions, the State Department was prepared, as a demonstration of 
friendship to the Polish people, to agree to a $25 million credit. 39 
In addition, Washington offered a $50 million credit to purchase 
surplus property, excluding munitions and other military supplies, 
from the Federal Liquidation Commission. 40 The credit for surplus 
goods, however, was not tied to the six conditions imposed on the 
Poles for the Export-Import Bank credit for the obvious reason that 
the United States wanted to get rid of the property it not longer 
needed. 
Polish and American officials exchanged notes for the $40 million 
credit on April 24, 1946, and the Poles promised to publish the notes 
in the Polish press. Two days later Osobka-Morawski told the Polish 
parliament that the promised elections would be held in accordance 
with the Yalta and Potsdam pledges and that the upcoming referen-
dum, scheduled for June, was to be "an initial step leading to these 
elections. " 41 
Lane had consistently opposed American credits to Poland until 
political repression and violations of freedom of the press had stopped. 
To Lane, it simply made no sense to grant credits at a time when the 
Warsaw regime flouted its Yalta and Potsdam pledges. "Mikolaj-
czyk's chances of winning the elections are virtually nil," he wrote in 
March 1946. He doubted there was much the United States could do 
in the next few years in Poland "except to show sympathy for the 
Polish people and to maintain our firm position regarding American 
rights." But there was an important educational value to the grim 
future for Poland and other eastern European countries. He told H. 
Freeman Matthews, director of the office of European affairs of the 
State Department, 
I feel that we should look at the situation in Poland from a long 
range viewpoint and in connection with similar situations in 
other countries within the Soviet orbit. I believe it essential for 
the Congress and for the American public to be informed re-
garding conditions in Poland, Yugoslavia, etc. Education of the 
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public cannot take place overnight. In my opinion, it will per-
haps take a year or two. There will be attacks on us from the 
left-wing press and from some of the more radical labor ele-
ments to the effect that we are endeavoring to bring about 
hostilities with the Soviet Union. Our stand should, in my opin-
ion, be based not on ideologies but on determination to protect 
American lives and property rights. 43 
51 
When he learned that Washington intended to follow through with 
the credits, Lane pleaded with Byrnes not to do it: "With the greatest 
earnestness of which I am capable I beg the Department not to 
approve the extension of any credit facilities at this time." When the 
United States-Polish agreement was reached, Lane interpreted the 
State Department's action as a vote of no confidence in him as ambas-
sador.44 Lane attended the meeting ofthe Polish parliament on April 
26 when Osobka-Morawskijubilantly announced to the delegates that 
Washington had granted the long-sought credits. The spectacle was 
too much for Lane; he became so enraged that his hands trembled and 
his speech became so incoherent that his interpreter, Lt. William 
Tonesk, thought he had suffered a stroke.45 
The British position came close to that of Lane. Bevin was "dis-
mayed" by Washington's decision to grant the credit because, in his 
judgment, all the United States received in return were "paper com-
mitments." The British hoped that the United States would at least 
defer the credit until the Polish government set a definite date for the 
elections or until after the June referendum. Ideally, the British hoped 
the United States would not grant Warsaw any credits until after the 
promised elections actually took place. 46 Like Lane, the British gov-
ernment urged Washington to tell the Poles that no aid would be 
forthcoming until political conditions improved, especially an end to 
the activities of the security police against the PSL and a definite date 
had been set for the elections. The British foreign office wanted Britain 
and the United States to "make it clear that, until the elections have 
taken place, they meant to insist upon the full observance of the 
Moscow Agreement as the result of which recognition was granted to 
the present Polish Provisional Government."47 
Shortly after the Poles and Americans exchanged notes on the 
credit agreement, the Polish government made an effort to appease the 
United States on two issues which had disturbed relations between the 
two countries-namely, the question of compensating Americans 
whose property had been nationalized and allowing American 
embassy officials to communicate with jailed individuals who claimed 
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to be American citizens. 48 For months Lane had tried to protect 
American interests on both issues but without much success. When 
Lane approached Polish officials concerning arrested Poles who 
claimed American citizenship, he usually was told that the people 
had acquired Polish citizenship and had been jailed for being members 
of criminal and terrorist bands. As a gesture of conciliation, the Polish 
government granted exit visas to fifty-six American nationals at this 
time. It also proposed that the two governments establish a commis-
sion composed of representatives from both nations, to determine the 
citizenship of the arrested claimants. However, the first meeting was 
not held until June 1947.49 
There were still additional snags to be untangled in the credit 
arrangements. Poland did not publish the exchange of notes of April 
24 in the Polish press and did not provide its economic treaties with 
other nations to the United States, both of which the two governments 
had agreed upon during the negotiations. Lane flew to Paris to meet 
Byrnes and convinced him that the United States should stop aid to 
Poland until the Poles met all the conditions ofthe agreement. Byrnes 
wired Acheson that all but $3.7 million worth of surplus, which had 
already been delivered to the Poles under the surplus property ar-
rangement, be stopped. Also, the United States did not intend to 
implement the credit authorization under the Export-Import Bank 
until the Poles met the conditions of the agreement. 50 
The Warsaw government eventually got around to publishing the 
conditions of the American credit in the Polish press and promised 
to provide the treaty information to the United States. On June 26, 
1946, the State Department resumed deliveries under the surplus 
property agreement on the assurance of receiving the treaties but 
would not sign the Export-Import Bank credit until the treaties were 
actually received. It took until October 2 before the Export-Import 
Bank credit was finally signed. 51 
Polish failures to publish the notes and to provide the United States 
with the treaties appear to be more the result of bureaucratic bungling 
than a studied attempt to avoid commitments to the United States. 
The Poles were angry over the American freeze on the credits. Oscar 
Lange, who renounced his American citizenship to become postwar 
Poland's first ambassador to Washington, seriously questioned 
whether United States policy would make it possible for Poland to 
rely upon American assistance. President Bierut was so angry he 
refused to see Lane, who had made three attempts to see him in order 
to explain the American position on the controversial matter. 52 
Lane's personal relations with Polish officials had deteriorated so 
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badly that when he tried to board a plane in Warsaw for Paris, the 
security police tried to search his luggage on the grounds that he 
might be smuggling gold out of the country!53 
Even after the Polish government published the text of the credit 
notes, C. Burke Elbrick, assistant chief of the Department of State's 
division of Eastern European affairs and a close friend of Lane's, 
favored withholding all credit to Poland because of the deterioration 
in the political situation in Poland. By then, a serious question was 
raised concerning the press freedom for foreign correspondents in 
Poland. Larry Allen of the Associated Press filed a dispatch which 
included a denunciation of the security police by Stanislaw Banczyk, 
formerly a member of the SL who joined the PSL. The dispatch was 
not received in New York until after Washington suspended the credit 
deal. 54 
After the Poles met the conditions of the credit, Lane reluctantly 
reconciled himself to following through with the surplus property 
agreement but not the Export-Import Bank loan "until other commit-
ments under the Yalta, Moscow and Potsdam agreements are 
fulfilled." He even thought the entire Polish issue should be aired 
before the United Nations. 55 The British, too, wanted to see the 
United States pursue a tougher policy. But Byrnes refused to agree to 
the imposition of new conditions and did not bend to the pressure. 
Before the delicate credit issue had finally been laid to rest, General 
Tadeusz Bor-Komorowski visited the United States. Bor was the 
former commander of the Armia Krajowa which had launched the 
unsuccessful uprising against the Germans in Warsaw in August 
1944. Mter the uprising, the London Poles appointed him command-
er-in-chief of the Polish armed forces. Even though there is some 
question about the wisdom of his decision to order the uprising 
against the Nazis before the Soviets had fully committed themselves 
to the liberation of Warsaw, 56 Bor was a courageous officer who in 
many ways symbolized the plight of the Polish people at a time when 
the Soviets refused to launch an offensive to liberate Poland's capital. 
Bor's five-week visit in May and June of 1946 could not have been 
more poorly timed from the standpoint of United States-Polish rela-
tions. The presence in the United States of a representative of the 
London Poles, whom the communists linked with the terrorist under-
ground in Poland, and the friendly reception he was given by Ameri-
can military and political officials was considered an unfriendly act by 
the Warsaw government. Coming at a time when there was some talk 
in the United States Congress of establishing a kind of foreign legion 
of Polish veterans who refused to return from the West to Poland, 
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Bor's visit gave Polish officials a bad case of the jitters. Ambassador 
Lange seriously inquired of the State Department whether Bor was 
to lead an army of Polish emigres in a war against the Soviets. 57 
The general's visit, arranged by the Polish American Congress 
which was hostile to the PPR-dominated regime in Poland, was part 
of a general campaign launched by the organization against the com-
munists. Bor spoke to many Polish American audiences in the United 
States, but none received him more enthusiastically or emotionally 
than the 200,000 people who gathered in Humboldt Park in Chicago 
on May 5 to commemorate the 155th anniversary of the Polish consti-
tution. While in the United States, Bor urged America's Polonia to 
defend the independence and sovereignty of Poland, a charge that 
characterized the activities of the Polish American Congress for years. 
Bor repeated what most Polish Americans already knew: there could 
never be free elections as long as Soviet armed and police forces 
occupied Poland. 58 The political embarrassment that the Bor visit 
caused the State Department convinced Byrnes that in the future he 
did not want any London Poles to make visits to the United States 
and further complicate Washington's delicate relations with War-
saw.59 
The Polish referendum of June 30, 1946, conducted just four days 
after the surplus property agreement had been approved by the United 
States, provided the communist-dominated government with several 
political advantages. In view of the constant pressures from the 
United States and Britain concerning when and under what condi-
tions the promised elections would be held, the Warsaw government 
saw the referendum as an opportunity to placate the West and defer 
the elections. In Osobka-Morawski's words, the referendum would be 
"an initial step leading to these elections."60 The referendum also was 
an effective method to ascertain the strength of the PSL and to test 
the efficiency of the government's electoral machine. In Mikolajczyk's 
opinion, the referendum gave the PPR more time to continue its 
intimidation of the population and to rig the future elections.61 It was 
clear that as late as the summer of 1946 the PPR and the security 
police were still a long way from having sufficient control over the 
Polish nation; if they had, the regime would have conducted the 
elections instead of the referendum. 
The three issues which were to be decided by the referendum-
abolition of the senate, maintenance of the land and nationalization 
reforms, and establishment of Polish frontiers on the Baltic and the 
Oder-Neisse--posed some problems for the PSL. There was no doubt 
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that the PSL approved of the acquistions of the new lands in the West 
and the land and nationalization reforms. But the first question-the 
abolition of the senate-presented the PSL with a quandary. Histori-
cally, the party had favored a unicameral legislature and in less diffi-
cult times would have abolished the senate. This was the dilemma 
facing the PSL-to approve the abolition of the senate meant that the 
party was not in conflict with the policies of the communist bloc; 
to disapprove the issue meant an open challenge to the regime and its 
reliance on the security police to stay in power. The PSL's political 
committee did not favor a challenge to the regime on the referendum, 
preferring to husband resources until the elections. Stefan Korbonski, 
one of the members of the committee, wrote in his diary two days 
before the referendum: "Let us keep all our trumps for the elec-
tion .... Less damage will be done if we now vote 'three times yes' 
than if we stake everything on the referendum." 62 
Despite the fact that a majority of the PSL's supreme council also 
favored voting affirmatively on all three questions, Mikolajczyk inter-
vened, arguing that it was necessary to oppose the PPR during the 
referendum and not to wait until the elections. Mikolajczyk presented 
his reasons in a Delphic way, alluding to the possibility of support 
from the West. The political committee changed its position and 
recommended to the party's supreme council to vote against the first 
question in the referendum. 63 But not all members of the party agreed 
with Mikolajczyk on the matter, and some of them chose to vote with 
the PPR. For their breach of party discipline, they were booted out 
of the PSL and called themselves the PSL-Nowe Wyzwolenie (New 
Liberation). 64 
The referendum was conducted in an atmosphere of intimidation 
and even terror. The PSL was not allowed to publish the party's 
position on the matter in its own newspaper, Gazeta Ludowa, and 
even its posters could rarely be seen in the country in contrast to the 
widely publicized slogan of the PPR and PPS: "Three Times Yes." 
Lane reported that on polling day 3,000 members of the PSL were 
arrested in the Poznan area and were unable to vote. 65 Foreign news-
paper correspondents also reported on glaring irregularities. Derek 
Selby, Warsaw correspondent for the Sunday Times, said that Miko-
lajczyk had exposed "one of the greatest scandals in the history of 
Polish politics." Christopher Buckley, Warsaw reporter for the Daily 
Telegraph and the Scotsman, declared that he saw enough to invali-
date any figures that might be issued. H.W. Henderson, another jour-
nalist, personally witnessed "thuggery" and opined that if the future 
elections in Poland were not held under international supervision, the 
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same results could be predicted. 66 The New York Times, revealing 
that even reporters favorably disposed toward leftist regimes regarded 
the referendum as a sham, said: "The Government cannot lose, unless 
the vote is so heavily against it that even fraud cannot offset it. Yet 
in the larger sense the Government has already lost, irrespective of the 
vote, for it has lost in the confidence of the Polish people and of the 
outside world."67 
The government claimed that out of the 11,530,551 qualified ballots 
cast, 7,844,522, or approximately 68 percent, voted to abolish the 
senate. 68 Mikolajczyk, on the other hand, claimed that the referen-
dum had been defeated by almost 84 percent of the voters. Mikolaj-
czyk's claims were supported by the fact that in 2,805 districts where 
the ballot boxes had not been tampered with, almost 84 percent of the 
people voted against question one. 69 In Krakow, for example, where 
the electoral commission tabulated the votes before instructions had 
been received from the government to remove the ballot boxes for 
tabulation at the district commissioner's headquaters, the same figure 
emerged-84 percent were against abolition of the upper chamber.70 
The United States reacted mildly to the results of the referendum, 
apparently preferring to concentrate on the conditions it wanted to see 
in the future elections.71 The Warsaw government, no doubt im-
pressed by the timidity of the American response, coupled with the 
extension of credits before the referendum, dismissed the American 
protest as an infringement on Poland's sovereignty. In the weeks that 
followed, the Polish government through its embassy in Washington 
tried to convince Americans that Polish people who ordinarily did not 
take an active part in politics endorsed the referendum and deplored 
that it had become a pawn of international interests. 72 
The Polish referendum quickly lost its prominence in the western 
press when the Warsaw government announced that a pogrom had 
occurred in the city of Kielce. In view of Nazi crimes against the Jews 
during the war, it was understandable that the incident at Kielce 
received special attention in the American press. 
Anti-Semitism had existed in Poland between and during the war 
years. But there was a very great distinction between the anti-Semit-
ism of the Third Reich and that which existed in Poland. Few Poles 
committed violent acts against Jews; that was usually the work of 
extreme rightist groups, such as the NSZ. During the Second World 
War, Poles joined Jews in the gas chambers. Although some Poles as 
well as Jews collaborated with the enemy, most came together as 
never before because they shared a common tragic fate. 73 As Polish 
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and Jewish writers have pointed out, there would not have been any 
Jewish survivors in Poland, the only Nazi-occupied country where 
aiding a Jew was punishable by death, had it not been for the assis-
tance of Polish people. 74 Understandably, most of the Jews who sur-
vived-estimates range from 40,000 to 120,00075-were interested in 
emigrating from the country. 
The official policy of the government toward the Jews in the early 
postwar years was tolerant. Jews organized a network of central and 
local bodies in as many as 235 towns and villages. Major Jewish 
centers were located in Lodz, Warsaw, Krakow, Czestochowa, Kato-
wice, Bialystok, and in Wroclaw and Szczecin in the lands acquired 
from the Germans. Polish Jewry developed its own cultural institu-
tions and until1947 was free to remain in contact with Jews abroad. 
After that, Jewish political and other activities came increasingly un-
der government controi.7 6 
In the years immediately following World War II there were spo-
radic anti-Semitic outbreaks in Poland, most of which were the work 
of criminal elements associated with the nationalistic right wing of the 
Polish underground. The scope and effect of the attacks were exagger-
ated in the western press. Mikolajczyk, who was not an anti-Semite, 
pointed out that he was in Radom and Krakow at the time when the 
western press reported that pogroms had occurred in these cities. 
What he had witnessed, on the other hand, were political riots against 
the communists. 77 
In view of the large number of Jews who were members of the PPR, 
including the universally despised security police, it is little wonder 
that there was a revival of anti-Jewish feeling in postwar Poland. Since 
most Poles regarded the regime as an alien-imposed system, the obvi-
ous prominence of Jews within the government, along with those who 
returned to Poland from the Soviet Union after the war, created an 
extremely tense situation. The American charge d'affaires in Warsaw, 
Gerald Keith, described it this way: "It is a paradox that after a period 
of six years when Jews were more mercilessly killed off than any other 
race, this country finds itself under a very marked Jewish governing 
and industrial influence." And he added, "I consider it difficult to 
estimate what proportion of the resentment towards the government 
may be attributed to the part played by the Jews in the government 
and government-controlled industry, but it is surely of considerable 
consequence. " 78 
Polish officials were well aware that the anti-Jewish currents in 
postwar Poland represented an expression of hostility toward the 
Polish and Soviet regimes. Foreign minister Rzymowski himself ad-
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mitted that the outbreaks were "aimed primarily against the present 
regime in Poland and only in the second place against the Jews."79 
After the pogrom in Kielce in July 1946, an American Jewishjourna1-
ist visited the scene of the tragedy and conveyed his view that the 
attack had been directed against Jews "as an easier way of showing 
displeasure against the government than to attack the government 
directly."80 
On the morning of July 4, 1946, an attack against Jews occurred 
in Kielce, a charming old city in southeastern Poland. Before the 
outbreak vicious rumors had circulated about the Jews in the area, 
including the libel of ritual murder of Gentile children which was so 
characteristic of the Okhrana-organized pogroms in Russia. On July 
1, one day after the controversial referendum, an eight-year-old boy 
disappeared from his home, only to return two days later with a story 
of his alleged confinement in a Jewish home where he claimed he had 
seen the bodies of Christian children. His father took him to the police 
on July 4 where the boy told his story. Not long afterward, an ugly 
crowd assembled in the front of the house occupied by several Jewish 
families and the pogrom began, lasting most of the day. 81 
Predictably, press coverage of the referendum gave way to the 
pogromists of Kielce. As a result of the attack, forty-one Jews and 
four Poles were killed. Twelve people were convicted; nine received 
the death penalty and three received prison sentences. 82 Significantly, 
the government brought charges against members of the militia and 
the army, arresting the commander and deputy commander of the 
Kielce militia and the chief of the security police of the province. 83 
Although there were many discrepancies in the accounts of the 
tragedy, both communist and noncommunist sources, in Ambassador 
Lane's words, "admitted that it was not spontaneous, but a carefully 
organized plot. " 84 The government blamed the underground and the 
PSL with the crime because of their dissatisfaction with the results of 
the referendum. 85 Anticommunist sources charged the regime delib-
erately orchestrated the grim scenario to divert the attention of the 
United States and Britain from the fraudulent referendum and to 
discredit the PSL. 86 The evidence strongly suggested complicity of 
agencies of the regime, especially the security police, militia, and army 
in the Kielce tragedy.87 Though some controversial questions still 
remain to be answered about the incident, one thing soon became 
apparent: Kielce provided the government with an opportunity to 
escalate its assault not only upon the underground but also on the PSL 
and others who opposed the PPR. Equally clear was the understand-
able panic that gripped the surviving Jewish community in Poland. 
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Before the Kielce incident, Jews emigrated at the rate of about 70 per 
week. After Kielce, the figure jumped to 700 per day, creating a 
critical problem for authorities in the American zone of Austria where 
as many as 22,980 Jewish refugees arrived during the month of Au-
gust 1946.88 
The Polish government tried to offset the bad press it had received 
from these anti-Semitic incidents by featuring stories about the Jews 
and their rehabilitation within Polish society in Poland of Today, a 
magazine published in the United States by the Polish embassy. 89 
Despite the efforts of the Polish government to offer a more balanced 
view of Jewish life in Poland, the Kielce incident seriously marred the 
Polish image in the United States. And as subsequent events revealed, 
political and economic issues divided the United States and Poland so 
much that it appeared almost impossible to bridge the growing gulf 
between the two countries. 
IV Credits and Elections 
By the middle of 1946 American relations with 
Poland were seriously affected by Washington's tougher policy to-
ward the Kremlin. Soviet policies in Iran and Germany convinced 
American policymakers that it was necessary for the United States to 
take a firmer line toward the Soviet Union. Public confidence in Soviet 
willingness to cooperate with the United States continued to sag while 
Washington officials increasingly saw the primary motivation behind 
Soviet actions in terms of Marxist ideology. 
Little wonder that developments in Poland and America's growing 
problems with the Soviet Union convinced Washington not to extend 
additional credits to Poland before the Polish elections in January 
1947. The State Department made it clear to Polish officials that the 
manner in which the elections were conducted would have a signifi-
cant impact on United States-Polish economic relations in the future. 
In a remarkable about-face, Ambassador Lane, nearing the end of his 
term of service in Warsaw, urged that economic aid to Poland not be 
tied to political conditions. Lane belatedly came to the conclusion that 
economic aid without the attachment of political strings would help 
to bolster the PPS faction in the government coalition and thus pre-
vent a complete Polish slide into the Soviet orbit. 
Whatever hope the Poles had in the United States was undermined 
by Secretary Byrnes's speech at Stuttgart, Germany, in September of 
1946, when he challenged the permanency of the Oder-Neisse bound-
ary between Poland and Germany. Although he probably did not give 
much thought to the impact his speech would have on the Poles, 
Byrnes's action played into the hands of the communists, who could 
point with authority to their oft-repeated claim that the Soviet Union, 
not the United States, was Poland's only true friend. The impact of 
the speech on the PSL, which had been linked with the United States 
and Britain, was devastating. 
As many policymakers in the West had predicted, the Polish elec-
tions, conducted in a campaign of intimidation and harassment of the 
PSL, simply confirmed communist domination over the government 
and excluded the Polish Peasant party from cabinet positions. Signifi-
cantly, the United States did not develop a political strategy prior to 
the fraudulent elections-other than saying it was unwilling to extend 
more loans to Poland until the vote had been taken-aimed at 
strengthening the PSL and weakening the communists. 
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In the summer of 1946 the Poles resumed efforts to get additional 
economic aid from the United States. Rajchman's delegation in Wash-
ington painted a grim picture to American officials concerning Po-
land's ability to finance imports of food and raw materials in 1947.1 
A little later the Poles applied for a $600 million credit-$200 million 
slated for expenditure in 1947-from the World Bank. The Poles also 
hoped to get credits for cotton and tobacco from the Export-Import 
Bank.2 The Warsaw government, well aware of American desires to 
sign a bilateral aviation agreement with Poland, hoped to use the 
aviation matter as a lever to extract additional aid from Washington. 
In July 1946 Jozef Olszewski, director of the political department of 
the Polish ministry of foreign affairs, had implied to Lane that after 
the original Export-Import Bank credit had been finally implemented, 
the aviation agreement would probably be executed. But after that 
credit had been agreed upon, Lane's subsequent queries about the 
aviation agreement only brought evasive answers from the Poles. 3 
The United States did not respond favorably to Polish requests for 
more economic aid. By the early fall of 1946, Byrnes reassessed 
Washington's economic policies toward eastern Europe and urged a 
stiffer attitude. Byrnes told Will Clayton, assistant secretary of state 
for economic affairs, "The situation has so hardened that the time has 
now come, I am convinced, in the light of the attitude of the Soviet 
Govt and the neighboring states which it dominates in varying de-
grees, when the implementation of our general policies requires the 
closest coordination. In a word we must help our friends in every way 
and refrain from assisting those who either through helplessness or for 
other reasons are opposing the principles for which we stand. 4 " Byr-
nes's statement did not preclude financial assistance to Poland, pro-
vided the aid was tied to assurances that coal-poor western Europe 
received a share of Poland's coal exports. Byrnes told Acheson: "Cer-
tainly we should give no financial assistance to Poland without abso-
lute guarantees that a reasonable proportion of coal exports will be 
allocated to countries west of the iron curtain." Accordingly, Ache-
son informed the secretary that when the Poles applied for a loan to 
develop their coal-mining industry, the application would be carefully 
handled in line with Byrnes's wishes. 5 
The tougher economic policy toward eastern European countries 
expressed by Byrnes reflected the growing polarization in East-West 
relations. Clark M. Clifford, special counsel to Truman, submitted a 
report to the president at the end of September 1946 which articulated 
new political and economic policy lines to combat what Washington 
saw as the aggressive and imperialistic policies of the Kremlin. The 
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Soviet Union, said Clifford, should understand that the United States 
is a strong military power and will support democracies threatened by 
the Soviets. Expressing a view advocated by Lane, Clifford stated: 
"Only a well-informed public will support the stem policies which 
Soviet activities make imperative and which the United States Gov-
ernment must adopt. The American people should be fully informed 
about the difficulties in getting along with the Soviet Union, and the 
record of Soviet evasion, misrepresentation, aggression and militarism 
should be made public."6 However, Clifford's views on economic aid 
to Poland and other eastern European countries were tougher than 
those of Byrnes. Aid to these countries, Clifford bluntly declared, 
"will go to strengthen the entire world program of the Kremlin. " 7 
Lane could not have been more pleased by the new policy lines 
being developed in Washington. When he returned to Washington for 
consultations in October 1946 and saw that his views and those of his 
staff in Warsaw were close to those of Byrnes, Lane was elated. In a 
letter to Gerald Keith, charge d'affaires in Warsaw, Lane wrote: "The 
general attitude has stiffened a great deal since June .... The Russians 
and their satellites have been, according to reports, insulting in their 
attitude towards us, which of course is in line with the treatment we 
have been receiving in Warsaw." He added: "The most encouraging 
thing here is to know what a very strong line we are taking .... As 
you and I agree, this should pay dividends even as far as Warsaw."8 
Like Byrnes and other State Department officials, Lane opposed 
American economic aid to Poland until the Poles were prepared to 
settle some of the long-standing issues in Polish-American relations. 
In November 1946 he summed up for Byrnes some of the more 
important ones such as the refusal of the Polish government to allow 
American embassy officials access to people who claimed American 
citizenship, the lack of a satisfactory agreement to compensate Ameri-
cans for property nationalized by the Polish government, the hostility 
of the Polish press toward the United States, the continuation of an 
artificial rate of exchange fixed by Poland at 100 zloty to $1.00, the 
procrastination by Poland in signing a bilateral aviation agreement, 
and the refusal of the Warsaw government to acknowledge American 
observations respecting the holding of free elections as provided in the 
Yalta declaration on Poland. Unless these issues were addressed, Lane 
predicted "that Poland and not the United States will be the primary 
sufferer if our relations are permitted to continue to worsen."9 
In an effort to break the log-jam in Polish-American economic 
relations, Poland's minister of industry, Hilary Mine, personally came 
to Washington and took over the negotiations on the Polish side from 
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Rajchman, who, despite his wide contacts and ingratiating manner, 
had failed to get results. Displaying an impressive knowledge of statis-
tics and a keen sensitivity to America's concern that western Europe 
secure a sufficient supply of coal, Mine told his American counter-
parts that in 1947 Poland intended to produce approximately 60 
million tons of coal. Western Europe, he said, could receive 10 million 
tons or about 23 percent of its total coal imports for 194 7. But the Pole 
quickly added that increases in Polish coal production in the next 
three years-from 60 million tons in 194 7 to 80 million in 1949-
depended upon a $60 million loan for mining equipment and an 
additional amount from the Export-Import Bank to improve Poland's 
railway transportation system. 10 The implication was clear: without 
additional credits, Poland would not be able to deliver its coal to 
western Europe in amounts that it required. 
Mine sought to separate economic from political issues in United 
States-Polish relations. Like other Polish negotiators, he tried to 
impress American officials with Polish intentions to establish a more 
independent economic position between Poland and the Soviet Union. 
In a discussion on December 18, 1946, with Acheson, Mine met his 
match. The urbane Acheson was just as determined to link additional 
American aid with the forthcoming Polish elections as Mine was to 
avoid it. The Pole argued that elections were ephemeral phenomena, 
inevitably arousing emotions that soon subsided. Contrary to reports 
from many diverse sources, Mine claimed, the Polish government did 
not intend to interfere with the PSL, provided it conducted its activi-
ties in a peaceful way. "The Government wished to remove not the 
ballot but machine guns from the opposition," he declared in an 
obvious reference to the underground. 
Acheson told Mine that political factors were very much involved 
in American assessments of Poland and could not be divorced from 
the question of economic aid. In Acheson's account of his discussion 
with Mine, the undersecretary made it clear to the Polish minister of 
industry that future American economic aid to Poland was very much 
tied to the elections: "This country has been very deeply disturbed by 
three cynical exhibitions of the use of western democratic electoral 
machinery to produce the most autocratic and repressive results. 
These experiences had been the two elections in Bulgaria and the 
recent Rumanian election. If another such example occurred in Po-
land it would make it next to impossible for this Government to go 
forward with any extensive economic help for Poland." In a specific 
reference to the Polish American community, Acheson added: "This 
was true not only because of the general feeling in the United States 
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but also because of the large number of Poles and the not unimportant 
factor that many of these were located in Michigan, the Senior Sena-
tor from which state was the new chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee of the Senate." 11 
Mine did not realize it at the time but he had received support for 
his request for economic aid from a thoroughly unexpected source, 
the American ambassador to Poland. Lane had become converted to 
the claims of Polish socialists that they genuinely wanted friendly 
relations with the United States and that economic aid from Washing-
ton was essential to counteract the boasts of the Polish communists 
that the Soviet Union was Poland's only true friend. Since it had been 
apparent for some time that the PSL would lose the forthcoming 
elections, Lane thought it would be prudent if the United States did 
not put all its eggs "in Mikolajczyk['s] basket" and instead tried to 
drive a wedge between the PPR and the PPS. To Lane, the PPS was 
essentially a nationalistic party opposed to a police state and undue 
dependence upon the Kremlin. 12 Lane's sudden change of heart to-
ward the PPS has been described by one writer this way: "For that 
suspended moment in December 1946 the ascerbic Cold Warrior 
made a great deal of sense. The tragedy lies in the fact that Lane 
perceived these new alternatives and options too late."13 
Despite Lane's astonishing advice, the Poles received no satisfac-
tion from American officials concerning a request to the Export-
Import Bank for a cotton loan or to the World Bank for a loan to 
expand the Polish coal industry. But Mine's visit did produce a break-
through on the troublesome issue of compensation to Americans 
whose property had been nationalized by the Polish government. The 
agreement, providing for the establishment of a claims commission, 
paved the way for the release of Polish assets in the United States, 
including $27.5 million in gold of the Bank of Poland.14 Mine's 
mission also helped to work out a solution to the unrealistic exchange 
rate which had been arbitrarily pegged by Warsaw. 15 
As the wily Mine must have realized, his efforts in Washington to 
get more credit had been overshadowed not only by American atten-
tion to the promised elections and the way the government bloc 
conducted its campaign against the opposition but also by the impact 
of Secretary Byrnes's controversial speech, made in Stuttgart, Ger-
many, on September 6. 16 Byrnes's speech has been interpreted in 
different ways by historians. Some have seen it as a turning point in 
American postwar policy-one which was essentially anti-Soviet in 
intent. Others have seen the speech in far less menacing terms. Denise 
0. Conover, offers the most persuasive interpretation of the speech 
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and its place in the context of Byrnes's continuing efforts to reach an 
accommodation with the Soviet Union: "Rather than just a challenge 
to the Soviets, it represented an attempt to force issues out into the 
open, with the hope of clarifying the differences, as well as the simi-
larities, between the Russian and Western positions. It also aimed to 
provide a more intelligent basis for continued negotiations. Byrnes 
was not so pessimistic as to believe that the truncation of Germany 
was inevitable and cooperation with the Russians impossible. 17 
The major thrust of the secretary's remarks concerned Germany. 
In trying to pressure the Soviets and the French, he emphasized the 
need for the economic unification of Germany. He also indicated that 
the United States favored a provisional government for Germany and 
pledged an American presence there for as long as the occupation 
lasted. 18 In effect, Byrnes accomplished one of his major objectives: 
to counteract the Soviets who for some time had sought to create the 
impression that they were the champions of German unity and eco-
nomic recovery. 
Byrnes's strong bid for the support of the German people included 
an attempt "to smoke Molotov out" on an alleged Soviet plan "to give 
Polish territories to Germany."19 The secretary, completely ignoring 
the Polish position concerning the lands acquired from Germany, 
challenged the permanency of the Oder-Neisse boundary, thus forcing 
the Soviets to support the Polish position on the issue. The political 
cost to the United States of reopening this sensitive matter was enor-
mous, plunging Polish-American relations to their lowest point since 
the end of the Second World War. 
Predictably the Polish government reacted bitterly. President 
Bierut told the Polish diet that politicians who thought they could 
arbitrarily make changes in the national life of a people were "mis-
taken." He declared: "We have returned to the land where, centuries 
ago our historical, cultural, and state life took shape, to the land 
impregnated with the blood, sweat and tears of our fathers and moth-
ers, to the land every inch of which is covered with the sacred ashes 
of our forefathers. Who can deny us the right to this land?"20 Go-
mulka put it more bluntly: "Poland refuses to be any longer a football 
of other nations. The Polish people refuse to be a people of nomads, 
of eternal emigrants in search of bread in foreign countries. We wish 
to live, to work and develop on our own soil, we wish to govern and 
administer our country according to our needs, we wish to organize 
our recovered heritage in the west and north with the shortest de-
lay."21 
Olszewski summoned Lane to the foreign office and brusquely 
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demanded: "Telegraph to Mr. Byrnes and ask him whether his speech 
means that the United States has changed its policy toward Poland." 
Lane refused to oblige but agreed to take up the matter later when he 
himself had received an official copy of the speech. 22 The intense 
bitterness of the Poles came out in Glos Ludu, the PPR newspaper, 
which featured a cartoon showing Byrnes standing in front of an 
American flag that had swastikas and black heads instead of stars and 
stripes. Zycie Warszawy, another procommunist newspaper, suc-
cinctly summed up Polish perceptions of American policy when it 
asked: "What ... a German United States?"23 
Polish bitterness toward the United States resulted in a demonstra-
tion outside the American embassy in Warsaw. Although Mikolaj-
czyk claimed that the demonstration was staged, 24 there is no doubt 
that the Poles were outraged by Byrnes's challenge and were certainly 
capable of participating in that kind of anti-American demonstration. 
After all, even some priests denounced the United States from the 
pulpit. A former member of the Polish armed forces, who fought with 
the British and returned to Poland after the war, exclaimed: "I could 
not believe it! The United States opposing the Poles, who suffered so 
much at the hands of the Germans?"25 
Byrnes's speech seriously undermined the position of the PSL, 
which had been tied so closely with the United States in the mind of 
the public. The PPR and the PPS lost no time in portraying Mikolaj-
czyk's party as an enemy of the people. A week after the Stuttgart 
speech both groups published an open letter to the PSL asking for 
answers to several questions: "Are you prepared to protect our bound-
aries in opposition to Byrnes and Churchill? Are you prepared, in the 
name of our sovereignty, to protest against meddling of Anglo-Saxon 
reactionary circles in our affairs? Are you prepared to prosecute reac-
tionary bands and bandits? Do you accept our proposal for an elec-
toral bloc?"26 
Mikolajczyk, who was in Copenhagen attending a meeting at the 
time Byrnes gave his speech, disagreed with the American position, 
declaring that the lands acquired from Germany were "for Poland a 
matter of life and death." His statements, published in the Gazeta 
Ludowa and Zycie Warszawy, warned that if the great powers did not 
want to cause a shock to the Polish body politic, they will recognize 
the permanency of the Oder-Neisse line. 27 Czeslaw Wycech, a promi-
nent member of the PSL, commented: "History has taught us that to 
rebuild Germany is not to prepare for peace."28 
As expected, the Soviets came out in favor of the Poles. Molotov 
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replied to Byrnes saying: "The very idea of involving millions of 
people in such experiments is unbelievable, quite apart from the cru-
elty of it, both towards the Poles and the Germans themselves. "29 
Even Lane, who soft-pedaled the negative impact of the speech at the 
time and refused publicly to challenge the State Department's position 
on the boundary question, privately believed Byrnes had made a 
mistake and said later in his book that it was "one of the sorest 
questions plaguing our relations with Poland," which had "made a 
universally bad impression in Poland."30 
In retrospect, it is incredible that Byrnes had not anticipated the 
storm of criticism from Poland. After all, Byrnes himself had 
proposed at the Potsdam Conference the package deal of which the 
Polish-German boundary was a major component, though nominally 
requiring confirmation in a final peace treaty. In view of the elections 
which were scheduled for January, Byrnes's remarks could easily have 
been interpreted by the communists in Warsaw and Moscow as mean-
ing that the United States had written off Poland to the Soviets. 
After the controversial referendum, there were intensive discus-
sions between the PPS and the PSL concerning the terms on which 
the Peasant party would enter a government bloc. Wycech and Kier-
nik, both of whom were well known and ambitious leaders of the PSL, 
played a key role in these preelection discussions. Some elements 
within the PPS, anxious to reach an accommodation with the PSL, 
were prepared to offer up to 40 percent of the seats in a coalition 
government to the Peasant party.31 But after the return of the PPS 
and PPR leaders from talks with Stalin in Moscow, the socialists 
offered the PSL 25 percent of the representation while it would receive 
20 percent of the seats. The rest of the seats would go to the commu-
nists and the smaller parties under their control. Mikolajczyk rejected 
the offer and made some interesting counterproposals. The Peasant 
party leader was prepared to agree to a bloc list of candidates in 
eastern and western Poland but in the major sections of Poland, he 
insisted that free elections be held. In any case, Mikolajczyk wanted 
the three major independent parties-PSL, PPS, and SP-to receive 
a majority of the seats. 32 As one authority on the subject has ex-
plained, the major advantages for the PSL were that "it would enable 
[the] PPR to be admitted to the Sejm in larger numbers than if truly 
free elections were held, the principle of free elections would be ad-
hered to in at least part of the country, and the stipulation that the 
majority of the seats would be given to three parties would provide 
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a minimum guarantee that the agreement would be respected." It is 
uncertain whether Mikolajczyk's proposals were ever seriously con-
sidered either by the PPS or the PPR. 33 
By early October 1946 the PSL announced it would run its candi-
dates independently from the government bloc. The supreme council 
of the party, in an effort to dissociate itself completely from Byrnes, 
declared that "who is with the Germans is against us," and criticized 
the secretary of state's speech as "a blow at the foundation and the 
possibility of the development of the country of Poland." It endorsed 
full cooperation with the Soviet Union, called for an end to the attacks 
by the regime on the PSL, and warned that unless free elections were 
held, the strain in the country would deepen "and could plunge our 
country into indescribable chaos."34 
In a personal appeal to Stalin a few days later, Mikolajczyk tried 
to assure the Soviet chief that the PSL was well aware of the impor-
tance of Polish-Soviet friendship and described the activities of the 
PSL to foster that spirit. "This has some considerable results," Miko-
lajczyk said, "inasmuch as the Polish people have more confidence in 
the Polish Peasant party as compared to the other parties." The PSL 
leader emphasized that the intimidation and terror of the PPR against 
the PSL prejudiced a normalization of the political situation in Poland 
and created obvious difficulties in strengthening Polish-Russian rela-
tions.35 
After the fraudulent referendum, few Poles had any illusions about 
the fairness of the forthcoming election. As the election neared, Miko-
lajczyk talked about the need for international supervision, an idea 
rejected by Washington and London because it was extremely un-
likely Warsaw or Moscow would agree to it. 36 Moreover, even if some 
kind of international supervision were possible, the western govern-
ments probably doubted that the elections would be entirely free, 
leaving the United States and Britain open to charges of participating 
in a fraud. 
Failing to arouse American and British interest in international 
supervision, Mikolajczyk considered at one point a boycott, along 
with instructions to his followers to refuse to pay taxes and to supply 
food to the government. That inevitably would have brought severe 
communist countermeasures against the PSL and, as Mikolajczyk 
may have hoped, western intervention. 37 The boycott idea was re-
jected because, as Korbonski said, "The Poles might regard a boycott 
as a capitulation, and the rest of the world might interpret it as a 
refusal to let elections decide the struggle for our country's liberation. 
Moreover, the elections will definitely be held and will certainly be 
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fraudulent. But if we boycott them we will not even be able to assert 
that frauds had been committed, for the absence of our partisans will 
make it impossible to confirm this."38 
Mikolajczyk increasingly displayed all the signs of a frustrated 
leader, fighting for the survival not only of his party but also of his 
country. Overriding the advice of Washington, he endeavored to se-
cure great power intervention a month before the election by appeal-
ing directly to all of the Yalta powers-the United States, Great 
Britain, and the Soviet Union-who had guaranteed that Poland 
would have free and unfettered elections. In an impressive twenty-one 
page memorandum with twenty-six enclosures, Mikolajczyk cata-
logued in considerable detail the political conditions in Poland which 
militated against any free expression by the Polish people. His appeal 
brought Anglo-American protests to the Warsaw and Moscow gov-
ernments, which promptly rejected them. 39 
Mikolajcyk seems to have entertained some hope that once the 
elections took place and demonstrable fraud became obvious to diplo-
matic representatives and correspondents of the United States and 
Britain, the West might then be prepared to intervene rather than 
witness the civil war which he predicted. 40 In the final analysis, Miko-
lajczyk clung tenaciously to the belief that despite the intimidation of 
his party by the regime, the PSL would score well enough at the polls 
to impress the communists to force them to allow his party a viable 
place in the political life of Poland. 41 
As Mikolajczyk desperately searched for ways to prevent political 
disaster for himself and his party, the United States did not abandon 
the notion that somehow the PSL would still play a role in the 
political life of Poland. In the absence of any real policy, the State 
Department optimistically believed that the elections "would in some 
measure at least reflect the real situation in the country,"42 a weak 
reed, indeed, for Mikolajczyk and his party to cling to. 
Meanwhile, after two meetings in Moscow in August and Novem-
ber of 1946, representatives of the PPR and PPS firmed up a united 
front agreement providing for closer cooperation between the two 
parties during the electoral campaign and combating the PSL. As a 
sop to the long-standing criticism of the PPS, which had far greater 
popularity in the country than the PPR, that it did not have a fair 
share of positions in the government, Cyrankiewicz became minister 
without portfolio and Stanislaw Lesczycki became vice-president for 
foreign affairs.43 While in Moscow, the communist and the socialist 
leadership allegedly received personal instructions from Stalin con-
cerning how he wanted the elections conducted. Stalin is said to have 
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told his Polish proteges to keep up the barrage of propaganda that tied 
the PSL to the underground and the reactionaries. "If you repeat 
these charges often enough," Mikolajczyk quotes Stalin as saying, 
"some of the people in the United States and Great Britain will believe 
you, and they will refuse to join in the protests their government will 
make."44 Lane grumped, "And yet ... [the Russians] have the nerve 
to tell us that our notes on the elections are a violation of Polish 
sovereignty."45 Thus the so-called democratic bloc, consisting of the 
PPR, PPS, SL, and SO, faced an isolated and demoralized PSL. 
One western observer accurately described the Polish elections of 
January 19, 1947, as a "monstrous fraud."46 The bloc, headed by the 
PPR, used almost every conceivable method to compromise, harass, 
and intimidate the PSL. The attitude of the PPR was summed up by 
Roman Zambrowski, a member of the party's politburo, on the eve 
of the election: "Democracy can not mean freedom for the enemies 
of freedom. While powerful centers of political banditry are still ac-
tive, while these centers conduct open penetration of legal organiza-
tions like the state apparatus, there can be no privilege of democratic 
freedoms for some persons."47 
Before the elections, the regime created technical difficulties for the 
PSL in presenting its lists of candidates, accompanied by the names 
of their sponsors, to the commissioner general of the elections, 
Kazimierz Bzowski. The problem was complicated by the arrest of 
over seven thousand PSL members, including every member of the 
district and local party organizations. The consequence was that enor-
mous additional burdens fell upon the leaders of the PSL. Mikolaj-
czyk wrote: "I can say out of personal experience that none of us at 
national headquarters in Warsaw slept more than two or three hours 
a night for days thereafter. Party members dispatched through the 
country to see our candidates presented signatures and to inform their 
sponsors of their district numbers were often arrested before they 
could complete their missions." The party managed to prepare its 
slate of candidates and, expecting to use their immunity from arrest, 
sent forty members of parliament with the lists to fifty-two district 
commissions. But the ploy was not entirely successful; the immunity 
of several members was violated and they were arrested. 48 
Arrests and intimidation of members and supporters of the PSL 
were commonplace. Christopher Buckley, correspondent for the 
Daily Telegraph, reported that after a speech by Mikolajczyk in Lub-
lin, crowds demonstrated for him, yelling, "Long Live Mikolajczyk." 
Shortly afterward the PSL supporters were arrested and carried away 
in army trucks. Even people who had sought sanctuary in churches 
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were dragged out. 49 During the last week of December 1946 Lane 
revealed that 75 out of 854 PSL candidates for election to the Polish 
diet had been arrested and the names of 40 others had been stricken 
off the electoral list. 50 
To be sure the army and security police were widely used in a 
campaign to intimidate the electorate to vote for the bloc. The Polish 
army established defense-propaganda groups to get into the most 
remote villages to propagandize for the regime and against the PSL. 
Orders to these army groups stated: 
The PSL must be attacked along these lines: members do not 
pay taxes or offer public rehabilitation services; they support the 
underground gangs; they soon will be liquidated by the Govern-
ment. The question period must be very short. Organizers must 
prevent discussion or any effort to tum the questions into a line 
sympathetic to the PSL. If a questioner becomes too brave and 
asks undersirable questions he must be immediately attacked as 
an instigator, provocator and hostile towards the Government 
and the State.51 
According to Lane the security police forced people to sign endorse-
ments of the government bloc or else risk losing their jobs or places 
of residence. When arrest or intimidation failed, people were tortured 
and even murdered. Mikolajczyk estimated that 130 PSL members 
were liquidated prior to the elections. 52 
The PSL had tremendous difficulties in getting its message to the 
people because freedom of the press did not exist. The circulation of 
the party's newspaper, Gazeta Ludowa, was arbitrarily limited to 
75,000 copies, even though 300,000 copies could have been sold if the 
regime had allowed it. Copies of the newspaper were in such great 
demand that people were willing to pay more than three times the 
normal cost. It was not unusual for cafe and bar owners to buy two 
or three copies of the Gazeta Ludowa and charge their customers five 
zloty for half an hour's reading time. Censorship, which had been 
severe before the election, became even more drastic during the elec-
tion campaign. Femand Gigon, a French journalist, personally ob-
served how the censor's blue pencil emptied the proofs. 53 Lane 
commented grimly, "It was indeed saddening to reflect that, although 
Mikolajczyk's party might number millions, no more than a compara-
tive handful could be told what was going on."54 
The situation was no better in other forms of communication. The 
government controlled the radio and allowed Mikolajczyk only two 
ten-minute periods on the air. Yet, when he did speak, the regime 
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ordered loudspeakers throughout the country to be turned off. In at 
least one case, thanks to the enterprise of a pro-PSL stalwart in 
Radomsk, the people heard the Peasant party leader's entire speech. 
To be sure, Mikolajcyzk's speeches were severely censored-his refer-
ences to the reign of "rifle, bludgeon and jail" and the bloc's "ven-
omous greed for power" were expunged from his text. Despite the 
censorship of his speeches, to which he had to submit as a condition 
to receive radio time, Mikolajczyk's speeches were well received by 
the listening audience. Sidney Gruson, then a correspondent for the 
New York Times, observed that "M. Mikolajczyk got over a powerful 
appeal."55 By raiding and destroying the party's presses, the opposi-
tion prevented the PSL from publishing a large amount of campaign 
literature to appeal to the voters. Little wonder that on election day 
posters of the PSL were conspicuously absent while those of the 
opposition were everywhere. 56 
The communists used various methods to confuse and delude the 
electorate. The day before the polls opened, they sent thousands of 
telegrams to PSL officials announcing the death of Mikolajczyk in a 
plane accident. 57 Another ruse, intended to draw away some voters 
from the PSL and to demonstrate to the West that the regime allowed 
independent Catholics to express themselves politically, was to permit 
a new party-the Catholic progressives-to run in a few electoral 
districts. This so-called independent party was headed by a reaction-
ary who did not enjoy the support of the Catholic church, which 
endorsed the PSL instead. 58 
The PPR believed that one of the most effective ways to scare the 
electorate was to stage a few spectacular trials of individuals who were 
allegedly involved in antistate activities and to link them with the 
PSL. The trial of Colonel Jan Rzepecki, commander of WIN, began 
onJanuary4, 1947,just a few weeks before the elections. 59 And a little 
over a week before the elections, Count Ksawery Grocholski, a friend 
of Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, the British ambassador to Poland, was 
tried on charges of underground activities and conveying secrets to 
the British. There seems little doubt that the Grocholski trial, which 
western correspondents were encouraged to attend, was a deliberate 
effort to divert attention from the communist campaign of intimida-
tion and fraud to win at the polls. Moreover, as one western newsman 
observed, "The staging of the trial at this time has been effective in 
confining to Warsaw several foreign correspondents who have arrived 
to report on the conduct of the elections." Grocholski and two other 
men were found guilty and sentenced to death. 60 
Before the elections, the communists expected to benefit from the 
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provisions of the new electoral law, passed in September 1946, which 
had disenfranchised approximately one million people on the grounds 
that they had collaborated with the enemy during the occupation or 
were connected with fascist organizations. The law provided the legal 
basis for the PPR to eliminate not only potential support for the PSL 
but also the party's candidates in the elections. 61 
As election day neared, the PSL discovered there was virtually no 
end to the devices the opposition used to prevent the elections from 
being honest. In Warsaw, the PSL was supposed to have observers at 
the 166 boards of election. Korbonski, a leading PSL official, had 
personally handed the appropriate documents to members of the 
party who were to serve as observers. But all PSL members in Warsaw 
had been denied entry to the polling centers because they did not have 
"certificates of morality," an obvious trick to reduce the number of 
PSL observers on election day. In order to acquire the certificates, the 
observers had to get letters from the security police. Predictably only 
twenty-two PSL members were permitted to the polling centers in 
Warsaw and of these, only six were allowed to remain to the end of 
election day. 62 
Despite the fact that the regime had arrested PSL candidates, de-
prived a substantial part of the electorate of the right to vote, monopo-
lized the communications media, intimidated voters by public trials, 
arrests, and murders, the PPR-dominated bloc was still not entirely 
certain whether it could win the elections. Obviously fearful that if 
most Poles voted secretly, they would vote for Mikolajczyk's party, 
the regime embarked upon a campaign of "open voting" as a demon-
stration of loyalty. Marguerite Higgins reported that on a 250-mile 
drive through the country, she personally witnessed the practice at 
every polling station she visited. But in the cities and in many country 
districts, large numbers of people insisted upon voting secretly. When 
confronted by a stubborn voter, the ubiquitous security police did not 
force people to show their ballots. In Warsaw, Gruson reported that 
almost everyone he saw voted secretly. 63 However, as Higgins wit-
nessed, it was not always easy to exercise the right to cast a secret 
ballot: 
There were no screens around the voting booths in any of the 
precincts. Persons who wished to vote secretly had to tum their 
backs to the election board and slip their ballots into the en-
velopes. Some desiring a secret vote folded their ballots in ad-
vance (each voter brought his own ballot from home). This still 
did not afford much secrecy, since those who did not vote openly 
in this district were automatically considered to be against the 
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government, a political view which most Poles, in these days of 
the security police, like to keep to themselves. 64 
One Pole wryly summed up the balloting process: "You put Miko-
lajczyk in the box but lo and behold, when the votes are counted, out 
comes Gomulka."65 The PSL was allowed only thirty-six witnesses, 
according to Mikolajczyk, at the 5,200 polling places to observe the 
counting of ballots. Significantly, all the local electoral chairmen were 
communists. 66 There were several obvious cases of fraud--everything 
from throwing away ballots marked for the PSL to substituting ballot 
boxes which were stuffed with slips for the government bloc. 67 
Under these circumstances it was not surprising that the govern-
ment, releasing the results of the election within forty-eight hours of 
the closing of the polls, claimed an overwhelming victory for the 
democratic bloc, winning 444 seats to the PSL's 28 seats in the Sejm. 
The PPR publicly claimed that the bloc took 80 percent of the votes 
while the PSL won only 10 percent. 68 There was one man who wanted 
to know the true results of the election-Stalin. He told the PPR, "I 
want to see how influential you actually are." According to Mikolajc-
zyk, the PPR informed Stalin that the PSL had actually garnered 79 
percent of the mandates. 69 
With the Polish elections of January 1947 the provisional govern-
ment ended and the communists and their allies moved rapidly to 
institutionalize their power: a new all bloc cabinet took over the reins 
of power and an interim constitution, called the "Little Constitution," 
was adopted by the diet. The major result of the election was the 
elimination of the PSL-Mikolajczyk, Kiernik, Wycech-from the 
new cabinet. Although there were changes in thirteen ministries, the 
major difference between the new cabinet and its predecessor was the 
absence of the PSL. In effect, the new cabinet became essentially what 
it had been before the provisional government was constituted-a 
coalition of the PPR and other left-wing groups which had received 
political life from the Soviets when the Lublin committee was consti-
tuted on July 21, 1944. 
In the new cabinet the PPS took seven ministries, one more than 
in the previous government. The major change was the replacement 
of Osobka-Morawski as premier by Cyrankiewicz. The PPR had five 
ministries in the government, losing two seats from the previous 
cabinet but still holding the major ones in its hands-western territo-
ries, industry, public security, and education. Besides, the five posi-
tions held by the PPR included a part of the area of the seven former 
ministerial posts because the ministry of industry was expanded by 
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transferring to its jurisdiction that offoreign trade and supply, previ-
ously under the ministries of navigation and foreign trade and of 
supply and commerce. As before, the PPR controlled ministries not 
headed by communists through undersecretarial positions. 70 
The other parties in the bloc, all of which were artificial creations 
of the communists and unable to claim a mass following, picked up 
the remaining lesser portfolios in the cabinet: 6 went to the SL, 2 to 
the SO, and 2 to the SP. Within two months, however, one of the 
positions acquired by the SF-information and propaganda-was 
abolished and most of its functions were assumed by Berman, the 
communist undersecretary of state of the council of ministers and still 
Poland's eminence grise. One American government report noted: 
By the presence in the Cabinet of these three parties (Peasant, 
Democratic and Labor), the Communist-Socialist ruling group 
maintains that the peasant masses, the middle-class intellectu-
als, and the Christian social movement, respectively, participate 
in the Government on equal terms with the representatives of 
the industrial proletariat. The fact that the Government is 
firmly controlled by the Communists and Socialists, however, is 
evident from the list of the 64 ministerial and undersecretarial 
posts, 42 of which are held by members of those two parties and 
only 22 by all other groups combined. 71 
Attempts by the PSL to condemn the elections in the new diet in 
February brought only jeers from the opposition. Mikolajczyk, lead-
ing his small group of twenty-eight representatives, condemned the 
newly elected bloc: "This group ... has no right to introduce legisla-
tion that will affect the fundamental rights of the citizens." Noting 
that the mention of God had been taken out of the oath of office that 
Bierut would take as president of Poland, Mikolajczyk queried, "May 
I then ask to whom the new President will be swearing?"72 Perhaps 
the most impassioned condemnation of the elections was delivered by 
Zygmunt Zulawski, an elderly socialist of aristocratic bearing. In his 
speech to the diet, he condemned the way the elections had been 
conducted and drew analogies between the repression of the commu-
nists and the prewar regime of the Sanacja: 
Pilsudski said that the Poles were a nation of morons, and that 
in their own interest he was justified in educating them by means 
of the whip. To-day's ruling elite, the best men of our nation, 
will also say confidentially that, were they to resign from power, 
terrible things would happen to Poland-white terror and the 
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blackest reaction. But who has the right to suspect this nation, 
composed in overwhelming majority of laboring men, of peas-
ants, intellectuals, and workers, of being reactionary merely 
because it wants to apply its own judgment to questions of social 
justice, equality, freedom, representation in the Diet, and gov-
ernment?73 
Only the PSL representatives applauded Zulawski when he finished 
his memorable address. Commenting on the fact that the old socialist 
leader suffered from heart disease, Korbonski noted in his diary, 
"This had been the voice of a man at the grave's edge, and this fact 
doubled the impact of the address which, from a rhetorical stand-
point, was the best heard thus far in the Diet."74 
Displaying a keen sensitivity to tradition and the forms of legality, 
the new government decided to draft a new charter that would accom-
plish two purposes-to codify the economic and social changes made 
in the country since 1944 without reducing the power of the bloc, and 
to make certain that the new constitution would bear at least a superfi-
cial resemblance to the democratic constitution of 1921 which the 
communists claimed they were trying to defend. The "Little Constitu-
tion," adopted on February 19, 1947, ostensibly an interim charter, 
established a government apparatus which replaced the constitution 
of 1921 and made the executive branch supreme over the diet. The 
"Little Constitution" provided for a Rada Panstwa (Council of State), 
composed of a cabal of six men headed by president Bierut, which 
effectively ruled the country while the diet was limited to two brief 
sessions annually. 75 The Rada Panstwa represented a continuation of 
the Presidium of the National Council of the Homeland which had 
existed from July 1944 to February 1947 and had served as the 
permanent executive of the provisional government. 
The Polish elections precipitated a crisis in the PSL, resulting in the 
expulsion of the former minister of education, Wycech, and several 
of his fellow dissenters who favored reaching an accommodation with 
the communists. Wycech was an opportunist who had joined Miko-
lajczyk in 1945 in the belief that the PSL would remain a major factor 
in Polish political life. When the fortunes of the Polish Peasant party 
declined and finally evaporated in the elections of 1947, Wycech 
joined JozefNiecko, another ambitious politician with a penchant for 
underhandedness, and other left-wing dissenters in the PSL in an 
effort to replace Mikolajczyk as head of the party and to lead the PSL 
to a political agreement with the regime. The harried Mikolajczyk was 
up to the challenge, however. He asserted his authority and succeeded 
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in booting out Wycech, Niecko, and their followers from the PSL in 
March 194 7. Mikolajczyk received wide support for his action from 
local PSL organizations which opposed compromise with the bloc. 
The ousted faction, calling themselves the PSL-Lewica, held its first 
conference as a separate party in Warsaw on April18 and adopted 
a program of cooperation with the government. The new group also 
published its own newspaper, Chlopi i Panstwo (Peasant and State). 76 
After the elections, the PSL had only a handful of deputies in the 
diet. Reduced in size and demoralized, the PSL felt it must continue 
to play some role, albeit a limited one, in the new legislature. The PSL 
saw its future role as the conscience of the nation: "The role of the 
PSL deputies' club in the present Sejm may, however, be fruitful 
through the quiet and dispassionate application of criticism to the 
activities of the Polish Government, which are continually applauded 
by the majority."77 The PSL had no other acceptable option open to 
it than this limited parliamentary role. Denied any real influence in 
the political affairs of Poland, the PSL limped along in the months 
after the election as a minor obstacle to the drive of the PPR to 
consolidate its power. 
The demoralization in the ranks of the PSL was largely due to the 
profound disillusionment most Poles felt, owing to the lack of any real 
assistance from the West. "I must state frankly," Korbonski wrote, 
"that one of the causes of this disintegration is loss of faith in the 
miraculous recipe for the, liberation of Poland that Mikolajczyk 
brought from London." He added bitterly, "We have been left to our 
own devices, and now it looks either that Mikolajczyk was cheated 
by the West or that he has deceived us."78 
As has been seen, there had never been a "recipe" providing for 
American intervention to prevent a communist takeover in Poland. 
At no time did the United States mislead Mikolajczyk and the PSL 
to expect intervention on their behalf. Even Lane, who made no secret 
of his sympathy for the PSL and its political fight against the PPR, 
was careful to explain to his Polish contacts the limitations of Ameri-
can power in the political situation in Poland. Mikolajczyk was well 
aware of the fact that he could not expect much more than moral and 
diplomatic support from the United States and Britain when he de-
cided to accept a seat in the provisional government. For a long time 
he believed that the PSL could go it alone, even though he was less 
than candid with his followers about the possibilities of western assis-
tance in the future. But the closer the election came, and with it the 
increased attacks by the bloc against the PSL, Mikolajczyk had sec-
ond thoughts about the ability of the PSL to survive and tried to get 
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the United States and Britain to intervene in the political situation. 
The United States and Great Britain regarded the Polish elections 
as unsatisfactory and declared that the Yalta commitment concerning 
free and unfettered elections had not been executed. But neither coun-
try challenged the position of the Warsaw government that Yalta was 
no longer a relevant political question so far as Poland was con-
cerned. 79 The American reaction to the elections was more of an 
explanation of what had happened than a condemnation of the Polish 
government.80 Only one major political figure in the United States, 
Senator Arthur Vandenberg, completely repudiated the elections and 
called for a Big Three meeting to consider the question of the Polish 
government honoring the Yalta pledge concerning free elections. 81 
The British were especially eager to put the Polish elections behind 
them. The British foreign office said it would gauge its future policy 
toward Poland "by the performance of the new Polish government." 
The British recognized in a de facto way the fraudulent elections when 
it concluded a trade agreement with Poland on April 27, 1947.82 
Mikolajczyk, angered by what he considered the hasty recognition of 
the results of the elections, told a British correspondent: "But I did 
feel that you needn't have gone out of your way to give it your 
blessing, so to speak. "83 
A few days after the elections, Ambassador Lane asked to be trans-
ferred to another diplomatic post or be allowed to retire. He ex-
plained: "For all practical purposes, my mission to Poland is ended, 
and I believe that I could do more in educating American public 
opinion through the writing of articles as a private citizen, or as an 
envoy in some other country than I can remaining here, where my 
continued presence would-in the unquestioned absence of publica-
tion of our views in Poland-be considered as tacit acquiescence in 
the recent fraud." 84 The State Department asked Lane to return to 
the United States where he resigned from the diplomatic service. Lane 
told Truman he could do more for the cause of relations between the 
American and Polish people if he became a private citizen "and thus 
be enabled to speak and write openly, without being hampered by 
diplomatic convention, regarding the present tragedy of Poland." 
Lane wrote that Truman "approved my course."85 Obviously, Tru-
man could not have been very pleased when Lane spent his time 
attacking Roosevelt and the Yalta agreement and later endorsed 
Thomas E. Dewey in the 1948 presidential campaign. 
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The Polish elections were an important element in the 
growing split between East and West and left the United States with 
few if any options to prevent the complete satellization of the country. 
The Polish government, still very much in need of American eco-
nomic aid, tried to put the best possible face on Polish domestic 
developments and to emphasize the importance to both countries of 
Poland's ability to establish a more independent economic position 
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. But except for a few individuals in the 
administration, the United States was no longer seriously interested 
in extending credit to Poland and even eliminated the Poles as recipi-
ents of food assistance under the Foreign Relief Program, despite the 
fact that Poland had been one of the countries most devastated by the 
war. Relations between the two countries also continued to plummet 
because of Washington's insistence on keeping open the question of 
the permanency of the Oder-Neisse boundary between Poland and 
Germany. 
The deterioration in Polish-American relations was matched by the 
grim situation in Polish domestic politics. The defeat of the PSL by 
the communist-dominated bloc eliminated Peasant party representa-
tion from the government and it was only a matter of time before 
Mikolajczyk and other leaders of his party-all of whom feared for 
their lives-were forced to flee the country. With the PSL removed 
as a political threat, the PPR began a campaign which called for the 
absorption of the PPS into a united Polish worker's movement, the 
final political stage leading to one-party dictatorship. 
To offset the negative impact of the fradulent elections, the Polish 
government appointed Joseph Winiewicz as ambassador to the United 
States. Winiewicz's apppointment was also intended to remove a long-
standing bone of contention in United States-Polish relations-
namely, the presence of the unpopular Oscar Lange who served as 
Poland's first postwar ambassador to Washington. Lange, a Polish-
born former professor of economics at the University of Chicago, had 
been perhaps the most eminent representative of a small, though 
articulate, group of Polish Americans who criticized the policies and 
leadership of the Polish government-in-exile and urged close United 
States-Soviet cooperation during World War II. Stalin had invited 
Lange, along with the Rev. Stanislaw Orlemanski, a Catholic priest 
who had organized the pro-Soviet Kosciuszko League, to visit the 
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Soviet Union in the spring of 1944. Both men accepted the invitation 
and returned enthusiastic supporters of a Soviet solution to the Polish 
questior:t which had divided the Big Three during the war. The Lange-
Orlemanski visit provoked widespread criticism among Polish Ameri-
cans because it implied that the United States had changed its policy 
of support to the London Poles. After the war, Lange renounced his 
American citizenship and accepted the post of Polish ambassador to 
Washington. Polish Americans were outraged by the appointment of 
a man they considered a traitor. 1 Lange, who also served as Poland's 
representative to the United Nations, was not an effective ambassador, 
and even the Polish government admitted that it had probably made 
a mistake in appointing him. 2 
In contrast to the aloof Lange, Winiewicz tried to cultivate closer 
relations with the State Department. Bright and candid, Winiewicz 
embarked on an ambitious but hopeless task of attempting to correct 
what he perceived as a distorted impression Americans had about his 
country. Winiewicz was an erudite man who came from Poznan 
where he had edited a newspaper before the war. He later worked in 
the ministry of education of the Polish government-in-exile before he 
became associated with the Polish provisional government. A realist 
who believed that the Poles had to cooperate closely with the Soviets, 
Winiewicz also shared the views of many socialists who felt that it was 
also important for Poland to maintain close contacts with the West. 
Ambassador Lane, impressed by the new Polish appointee, told a 
State Department official shortly before he himself resigned as ambas-
sador to Warsaw: 
Winiewicz is a very likeable person, with understanding of the 
other man's point of view, and I feel sure that he will make 
friends easily in the United States and should do a lot to make 
for himself a good position with our Government, the American 
press and his diplomatic colleagues. Whether or not he will be 
forced to follow the Communist line only time can tell, but I 
believe him to be independent enough in his political thinking 
so that he will cooperate wholeheartedly with the Department. 3 
Despite the new ambassador's obvious assets, there was little he 
could do to change the course of Polish-American relations. His first 
meeting with Truman set the tone for the remainder of his mission 
in Washington. The President bluntly told him that the recent Polish 
elections were violations of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements. Tru-
man acknowledged that the United States wanted to be on friendly 
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terms with Poland but the Polish government, he said, would have to 
make that possible. Then, according to Stanley Woodward, chief of 
protocol who was present at the meeting, "The President thereupon 
arose and terminated the visit, something which I have never seen him 
do before."4 
The new American ambassador's experience in Warsaw was not 
much better. Stanton Griffis, born into a Boston Congregationalist 
family, was a self-made financial tycoon who had no diplomatic expe-
rience before Truman summoned him from Palm Beach, Florida, and 
asked him to represent the United States in Poland. 5 Bespectacled and 
balding, Griffis was hopelessly naive about Poland and American 
policy toward it. Before his confirmation by the Senate, Griffis aston-
ished even the most optimistic observers in the Department of State 
by asserting that Poland would not become a communist nation. 6 To 
be sure, Griffis's views were appreciated by the Warsaw government 
which could not help but contrast the new ambassador with Lane who 
was so disliked by Polish officialdom. Shortly after Griffis arrived in 
Warsaw, Zycie Warszawy observed: "Mr. Stanton Griffis has won us 
with his benevolence, his evident good-will and sincere desire to repair 
everything which Mr. Bliss Lane spoiled so long, so perseveringly and 
so passionately."7 Griffis, who had a sense of humor, had the strange 
notion that the application of humor could accomplish significant 
diplomatic results, despite the failures of his own attempts to be 
lighthearted with Polish officials. He wrote that if Slavs "could learn 
to laugh they could more nearly understand us and we might live 
together in peace and understanding."8 
Griffis's optimism concerning the possibilities of improvement in 
United States-Polish relations was quickly tempered by the education 
he received into the realities of the situation by the American embassy 
staff in Warsaw and by Polish officialdom itself. After only a short 
time in Warsaw, Griffis said: "Altogether the atmosphere is sur-
charged with nervousness and fear and walking through the streets of 
Warsaw at night one almost has the feeling that the planes should be 
overhead any minute now."9 A short time later, Griffis told a friend: 
"I doubt that in the history of diplomacy any ambassador can point 
to a more perfect score with the Government to which he has been 
accredited. So far as I can see, the curve of degeneration in Polish-
American relationships has been unbroken since the day of my arrival 
until the present date."10 
An important barometer of the deterioration in United States-
Polish relations was the enormous attention and unrestrained attack 
by the Polish press on the United States at the very time Warsaw was 
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asking Washington for more economic help. Even Ambassador Wi-
niewicz was embarrassed by the extremism of Polish editors who, he 
admitted, "are of inferior mentality and experience, are anxious to 
curry flavor with the Government and oftentimes, assume a policy 
more anti-American than even the Government itself desires." 11 
Griffis was so upset that he took the Polish press to task for it. He told 
Janusz Zoltowski of the Polish embassy in Washington that his col-
leagues in Poland should try to make friends with the United States 
"instead of continuing ... [a] constant campaign of invective and 
vituperation." Like Winiewicz, Zoltowski agreed: "I agree with every-
thing you say. The fact is they really want to be friendly but they don't 
know how to do it." 12 
The tone of the press attacks was exemplified by a large front-page 
cartoon that appeared in Szpilki, a Polish weekly, on June 3, 1947. 
It depicted the Statue of Liberty in a Ku Klux Klan robe. Liberty held 
an American flag adorned by swastikas instead of stars and stripes in 
its right hand and a lash, a bag of dollars, and a tablet in its left hand 
that read: "Laws Against Workers." Uncle Sam stood in the fore-
ground and was tearing up a sign labelled "UNO" (United Nations 
Organization). The caption under the cartoon said: "Yankee Risk 
Taker-Truman Government Against the Achievements of Democ-
racy and Behind the Back of UNO Carries Military Help to Military-
Fascist Greece."13 The cartoon was rather typical of what appeared 
in the daily and weekly tabloids and magazines. On October 20, 1947, 
Griffis wrote to a friend and condemned "this kind of tripe." He 
added: "The one I have before me from this morning's tabloid shows 
President Truman first dressed as Alexander the Great, later as Julius 
Caesar, Ivan the Terrible, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and finally 
as a haberdasher selling neckties on the street for 5 cents each. The 
cartoon is headed 'President Truman's dream and reality.' " 14 
By 194 7, especially after the bogus elections, the American press 
had become increasingly critical of the Warsaw government, but it 
was not preoccupied with Poland as it had been during the war 
years. 15 Unquestionably, the most unrestrained attacks against the 
Polish communists came from the Polish American press, which had 
never made any secret of its hostility toward the communist world. 16 
Polish Americans anticipated the shift in attitudes toward the Soviet 
Union and its satellites that embraced so many important segments 
of American public opinion-the church, unions, business-by 1947. 
While Griffis complained about Polish attacks on the United States, 
Winiewicz had some justified complaints of his own. The attacks on 
him in the United States were as severe as those leveled on his prede-
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cessor, Lange, who had been described by one Polish American con-
gressman as a "quisling" ambassador. One Detroit newspaper 
described Winiewicz as "a dangerous emissary" and likened him to 
Citizen Genet who "grossly affronted" American hospitality. "In the 
light of incontrovertible facts, under the conditions of a determined 
and unscrupulous political offensive by Communist despotism against 
American democracy," the paper stated, "the only effective tactics 
Mr. Winiewicz's masters can adopt is to call him home." In an article 
entitled "I Do Not Shake Hands with Agents of Hangmen" in Nowy 
Swiat, a conservative Polish American newspaper long known for its 
extreme hostility toward Polish and Russian communists, the author 
criticized a Polish American bishop for welcoming Winiewicz on a 
visit to Detroit and attacked the ambassador and his predecessor for 
attempting to break the united front of America's Polonia against the 
communists. 17 
In one of the Polish American Congress's press organs, the commu-
nist Poles were attacked as thieves, cheats, and terrorists. In an article 
entitled "How Can You Do Business with Bierut," the Polish Ameri-
can Congress asked rhetorically: "Would you care to make a profit 
dealing with people whom you accuse of immorality, ofbeing Soviet 
fences, of breaking promises and obligations?"18 Another Polish 
American newspaper described the political leaders of Poland in this 
fashion: "It must be acknowledged that probably no European coun-
try has had such rulers in at least the last thousand years. Even the 
licentious morality of the condottieri of the Renaissance was without 
doubt on a higher plane." 19 
Since relations between the two countries had deteriorated so badly 
after the elections, there was little that either Winiewicz or Griffis 
could do to improve the situation. The time for imaginative bold 
diplomacy on both sides had long since passed. Griffis and his staff 
therefore preoccupied themselves with the long and tortuous business 
of processing the hundreds of applications of Poles who claimed 
American citizenship, had relatives in the United States, or wanted 
to emigrate.20 Griffis betrayed a waspishness concerning American 
efforts to repatriate children born in the United States but who re-
turned to Poland with their parents. Only "through this geographical 
accident," he wrote, were these people Americans but "few, if any of 
them can speak over half dozen words of English." He wrote that 
"none of them have any understanding of the nation which gave them 
birth but 'here they come.' " 21 He left little doubt about his elitism, 
offering to finance personally an orphanage for fifty children so long 
as he was permitted to screen the children and, in his words, "select 
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only the sons and daughters of the intelligentsia such as of artists, 
writers, or others having a background susceptible to development by 
both physical and hereditary gift."22 
One of the most bizarre, yet humorous, incidents that happened to 
Griffis in Warsaw was, as he described it, "my battle with the squat-
ters." Seven Polish families had moved into the property of the 
embassy and refused to leave. Appeals to the Polish government 
brought amused grins but no willingness to remove the settlers. Griffis 
placed four radios in rooms adjoining the squatters and literally 
blasted them with all kinds of music in six or seven languages twenty-
four hours a day. After five weeks of that, all but one of the unfortu-
nate people left the compound. But there was an ironic footnote to the 
episode. The Bulgarian ambassador calmly asserted that the chan-
cery, occupied by the Americans, belonged to Bulgaria, not to the 
United States. 23 Oddly enough, the Americans were regarded-at 
least by the Bulgarians-as squatters too! 
Throughout 1947 the Poles repeatedly pressed for favorable action 
on their request for a loan from the World Bank in order to expand 
their coal production. Even though prominent individuals in and out 
of the State Department urged that some financial aid be extended to 
Warsaw, the growing rift between East and West deterred Washing-
ton from acting decisively on an issue which would have benefited 
America's allies in western Europe. Griffis broke with some of former 
ambassador Lane's lieutenants in the Warsaw embassy and joined the 
secretary of state for economic affairs, William Clayton, in supporting 
the Polish request for credits from the World Bank. Like Clayton, 
Griffis saw an increase in Polish production as an important element 
in the economic rehabilitation of Europe. But he also saw something 
else-"a very substantial tie between East and West will have been 
developed. " 24 
The World Bank sent a team to Poland to investigate the Polish 
request and concluded that a loan of $47 million would support a 
large increase in Polish coal production. The vice-president of the 
World Bank, Robert L. Gamer, advised that even if the Poles de-
faulted on the loan it was worth the risk because of the importance 
of coal to western Europe. There were significant political benefits to 
be gained too. Gamer said that if the World Bank turned down the 
loan "it will greatly strengthen Russian propaganda claims that Po-
land and other similarly situated countries have nowhere to tum 
except to Russia."25 But hard-line State Department officials such as 
Charles Bohlen and Llewellyn Thompson opposed the loan, and it 
was never granted. 26 Nor was the long-standing Polish request for a 
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$20 million cotton loan favorably acted upon. That forced Warsaw to 
get its cotton from the Soviet Union. Little wonder the Warsaw 
government dragged its feet in finalizing the agreement to compensate 
Americans whose property had been nationalized. 27 
Poland's need for economic aid initially brought a favorable re-
sponse from Warsaw to Secretary of State George Marshall's speech 
at Harvard University in which he outlined the essence of the Eu-
ropean Recovery Program. The Polish position was quite consistent 
with the independent line Poland had followed on economic and 
social matters in the United Nations.28 Premier Cyrankiewicz de-
clared: "Poland will spare no efforts to strengthen her friendly rela-
tions and cooperation with the United States, which in tum may 
contribute toward a lasting peace and toward economic rehabilita-
tion."29 The Poles had been prepared to send a delegation to the Paris 
meeting to discuss details on the Marshall Plan when, because of 
Soviet pressure, they abruptly changed their position. The official 
Polish explanation for the reversal was contained in a note on July 9, 
1947, in which Poland criticized the intention of the United States to 
give Germany a dominant role in the reconstruction of Europe. 30 As 
one Warsaw newspaper put it: "The American policy wishes to have 
a strong Germany-stronger than all her neighbors. It wants Ger-
many to become the greatest industrial power of Europe."31 The 
ascerbic Korbonski, explaining the reason for the change in the Polish 
position, wrote in his diary: "We were to receive several hundred 
million dollars for nothing, and they reject it! We soon learned the 
reasons behind the decision. Cyrankiewicz had received a telephone 
call from Moscow, which he answered at attention and repeating 
continually, 'Yes, sir,' whereupon he sent his note of 9th July."32 
No issue better dramatized just how far relations between the two 
countries had deteriorated than Washington's reluctance to extend 
further relief aid to the Poles after the conclusion of the activities of 
the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
(UNRRA) in Poland. 33 The Poles argued that they required addi-
tional shipments of grain to avert a crisis before the fall harvest. 34 The 
figures submitted by Polish officials to representatives ofUNRRA and 
the American embassy concerning the anticipated yield of grain in 
Poland often contained discrepancies, but UNRRA's own estimates 
convinced Charles Drury, who headed the UNRRA mission in Po-
land, that Poland's need for additional relief for the remainder of 1947 
was very real. Drury believed that if the Polish government was 
unable to secure supplies of grain from outside sources it would 
compel the regime to force deliveries on a large scale from the peas-
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ants which could provoke a "minor civil war."35 According to a 
report of a special technical committee which studied Poland's post-
UNRRA relief needs, Poland would require in 194 7 assistance 
amounting to $294 million, of which $173 million should be food. 
"These facts mean," the spokesman concluded, "that unless Poland 
has assistance in meeting her relief needs, she will be unable to provide 
the special foods needed to maintain the health and growth require-
ments of her children and mothers."36 As it turned out, UNRRA's 
estimates of Polish needs proved to be more accurate than that of the 
American embassy in Warsaw, and Poland ended up getting $11 
million from the Emergency Food Program early in 1947. Food ar-
rived in April and May of 1947 and averted a threat of hunger. 37 
American embassy officials in Warsaw did not share UNRRA's 
views that additional relief be sent to Poland. Gerald Keith, who ran 
the American embassy before Griffis arrived in Warsaw, opposed 
more relief to Poland by the American government, though he fa-
vored the activities of private relief groups. In April 194 7 Keith wrote 
that since data from the Polish government "have almost always 
proved to be underestimated," there was no compelling need for 
additional grain shipments to Poland. Besides, even if Poland really 
needed more grain, he argued that it could not possibly be bought, 
shipped, milled, and distributed before the end of the summer. And 
by then the Polish crop would become available. 38 Keith told Mar-
shall: "I believe a line should be drawn between granting relief to 
alleviate distress which can be endured and that which might be 
granted to prevent serious malnutrition or starvation." He left no 
doubt in what category he placed Poland. In the opinion of senior 
officers of the American embassy, granting aid to alleviate hardship 
deserved sympathy. But it was clear Keith and his American col-
leagues tied such aid to political objectives: 
That aid to Poland would temporarily improve the standard of 
living and lighten the suffering of many people is undeniable as 
would be the case in almost any recipient country. If however, 
the assumption is correct that funds with which to provide 
assistance are not without limit it would then seem essential to 
determine when aid should be restricted in order to protect 
American interests. To request American people to aid where it 
is not imperative may prejudice support for relief elsewhere such 
as in Greece and Turkey where it may be required for our 
protection. 
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Leaving no doubt about where he stood on the matter, Keith stated 
bluntly: "The granting of aid to Poland would in effect result in 
increasing the power of the Soviets which bitterly oppose us and our 
way of life."39 
Keith's comments were echoed in Congress, where there was strong 
opposition to giving relief to Poland and other countries dominated 
by communists. In the debate on House Resolution 153, which pro-
vided relief to the people of countries devastated by war, Congress-
man John E. Rankin of Mississippi said he did not intend "to vote a 
single dime to feed communism throughout the world, if I can help 
it." Congressman William M. Colmer, also of Mississippi, offered a 
substitute amendment which provided that no funds be authorized for 
relief to "those countries whose governments are dominated by the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." Colmer felt that the nation had 
to be "coldly realistic," oppose communism "on all fronts," and "fight 
it with its own weapons." Congressman Joseph R. Bryson of South 
Carolina, convinced that Americans faced a worldwide threat from 
communism, felt that the United States should do nothing to support 
it anywhere. 40 
Secretary of State Marshall, who succeeded Byrnes in the office, 
believed the United States should furnish relief "to prevent suffering 
or serious malnutrition" in Poland. If Polish needs could be ascer-
tained, Marshall favored assistance to Poland, provided Warsaw ac-
cepted the tough requirements, including full publicity inside Poland 
concerning the source and purpose of the aid, in House Joint Resolu-
tion 153 pending before Congress.41 Marshall sent Colonel R. L. 
Harrison, special assistant to the secretary of agriculture and an au-
thority on food matters, to Poland in July of 1947 to determine what 
Polish relief needs were. After only four days in Poland, obviously too 
short a time to evaluate the situation properly, Harrison concluded 
that the Poles could meet their minimum needs without aid from the 
United States. 42 The superficial investigation surprised even Griffis 
who asked Harrison how he reached his conclusions in so short a time. 
Griffis said, "He [Harrison] answered ... it was very simple. He 
simply went to the four parts of Poland and looked at the behinds of 
the citizenry, male and female." The ambassador added, "Confiden-
tially, they are uniformly large."43 The Department of State quickly 
accepted Harrison's recommendations and abandoned plans for fur-
ther relief to Poland. If Washington had indeed offered aid to Warsaw, 
one questions whether the Polish government would have ever ac-
cepted Congress's tough qualifications which required that Americans 
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control the distribution of relief and insisted that aid be given to all 
people in need, rather than limiting it to those who made the greatest 
contribution to the reconstruction of the nation, the method practiced 
by Polish authorities.44 
The Polish government was astonished by the American action. 
Gazeta Ludowa complained "our effort and our work are the reasons 
why aid on a broad scale is being refused us. We feel this is inconsis-
tent with economic logic." Rzeczpospolita argued that at least 400,000 
tons of rye would be needed in 1947 to avert a food shortage, while 
Zycie Warszawy talked about the severe shortage of cattle. The com-
munist daily, Glos Ludu, scored the "definite contradictions in [the] 
Harrison report."45 Rzeczpospolita summed up Polish feelings on the 
question when it said that the Polish people "had a right to expect 
help by reason of their contribution to the cause ofvictory."46 Ambas-
sador Winiewicz conveyed the same attitude when he somewhat 
apologetically remarked to State Department officials that, as 
Churchill had said, an ally should not be ashamed to ask another for 
necessary assistance. 47 
The Poles tried to convince American policymakers to reverse their 
decision. Winiewicz emphasized Polish need for grain during the first 
six or seven months of 1948, a claim endorsed by Trygve Lie, secre-
tary-general of the United Nations.48 Since even Harrison did not 
deny the need for food supplements for children and the destitute, 
Winiewicz worried whether Poland would be able to purchase food 
in the United States.49 The Red Cross estimated that there were 
approximately 2 million people-300,000 were children-to whom 
the Polish government had not given adequate relief, a claim the 
American embassy in Warsaw did not dispute. According to the 
representative of the War Relief Services of the National Catholic 
Welfare Conference, less than 10 percent of Poland's 6 million chil-
dren were healthy, 90 percent were underweight, and every fifth child 
had active tuberculosis. 5° Edward Iwaszkiewicz, Poland's expert on 
relief matters, drily offered a fairly accurate summary of the Polish 
relief picture: "In 1947, Poland commenced grain purchases in US out 
of meager foreign exchange reserves and will have to continue pur-
chases during coming months in order to cover minimum require-
ments of grain during fall sowing campaign. This fact is [the] best 
evidence [of] how essential post-UNRRA help was to Poland." He 
made a telling point when he said that any appraisal of Polish food 
requirements should be cognizant of the fact that the Polish nation 
had been undernourished during six years of Nazi occupation. 5 1 
No postwar issue divided Poland and the United States more than 
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the question of the Oder-Neisse boundary between Germany and 
Poland. Despite the severe repercussions in Poland following Byrnes's 
Stuttgart speech, Washington chose to continue a policy that chal-
lenged the permanency of the line without any real possibility of 
changing it. Secretary of State Marshall reopened the controversial 
question at the council of foreign ministers which met in Moscow in 
April of 1947. There Marshall declared that Poland should receive 
territorial compensation from Germany for land ceded to the Soviet 
Union. "But in deciding what compensation she is entitled to we must 
consider what territory Poland needs and can effectively settle," Mar-
shall said. "We must avoid making a settlement which would only 
create difficulties for Poland and for Europe in future years." Mar-
shall worried about the economic impact on Germany of Poland's 
controlling an area that he claimed had contributed 20 percent of 
Germany's prewar food supply. That, he said, would force Germany 
to be industrialized to an even greater degree than the West would like 
to see. Marshall saw an analogy to the political situation after World 
War I. He thought that if Poland continued to control lands long 
under German ownership, it would create an irredenta "which might 
discredit the democratic forces of Germany and give militant nation-
alist groups the chance to gain a hold on another generation of Ger-
man youth." Therefore Marshall recommended that Poland receive 
southern East Prussia and Upper Silesia but that a boundary commis-
sion be established to recommend a permanent German-Polish fron-
tier before a final conference on a peace treaty with Germany. 52 
Marshall reiterated the American position again later in the year at 
the council of foreign ministers in London. 53 
American policy toward Poland and the communist world had 
crystallized between the fall of 1946 and the spring of 194 7. By then 
the United States had written off Poland in favor of Germany. As 
Walter Bedell Smith cogently put it, Washington officials considered 
that the major question was one of Germany versus Poland: "From 
our ... point of view ... it seems more important to keep Germany 
headed West than to prevent a general tum to the East on the part 
of Poland."54 By supporting Germany over Poland, however, Mar-
shall and his lieutenants provided an issue to Polish and Russian 
communists to continue to attack the United States and to contribute 
to a feeling of hopelessness on the part of the great majority of pro-
West Poles who felt there was no alternative but to give in to commu-
nist and Soviet influence. The curious thing about the American 
position was that there was no genuine means to change the boundary 
without the agreement of the Soviets who supported the Poles. Even 
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if there had been a way to return some of the disputed territory to 
Germany, it would without doubt have ended up in Soviet hands, 
giving Moscow control of a greater portion of Germany than before. 
Upon his return to the United States from Warsaw, former ambas-
sador Lane eloquently argued against the American position on the 
matter, but he failed to convince Marshall, who bluntly told him that 
he would resent Lane's public criticism on the subject. Lane promised 
to refrain from doing so. 5 5 But the next day, May 10, 1947, he wrote 
a bitter letter to the secretary, criticizing the Department of State for 
arriving at an important policy without consulting with the American 
embassy in Warsaw or, for that matter, with the office of Eastern 
European affairs of the State Department, which supported Lane's 
position. He complained that men like General Lucius Clay in Berlin 
and Robert Murphy, the political adviser in Germany, had too great 
a role in shaping American polcy. To Lane and senior officials in the 
American embassy in Warsaw, the United States should not alienate 
the Poles over a boundary issue because when war with the Soviets 
broke out-and Lane was certain it would come-it would be impor-
tant for the United States to have the Poles on its side. 56 
Polish reactions to Marshall's policy statements were predictable. 
The official Polish response to the secretary's statement of April 9, 
1947, was chillingly correct: the Polish government considered the 
question of its western frontier "as being decided and finally settled." 
To attempt to change Poland's western frontiers, it declared, would 
impair a "just and peaceful solution." The Polish press, however, 
more accurately represented the feelings of most Poles, including 
those unsympathetic with the communist-controlled government. 
Tydzien, a Warsaw weekly, depicted Marshall in a cartoon as a "Geld 
Marshall," successor to a German "Feldmarschal." The caption over 
the cartoon reflected a common theme in the Polish press about 
American policy: "Germany's providential men. The latest statement 
by Marshall, the U.S. representative, at the Moscow Conference has 
disclosed the true sense of German anxiety: it consists in the common 
interest of imperilled international capital."57 Gomulka made an 
emotional speech in which he affirmed that "the land is ours and it 
will always remain the boundary of the Polish nation." He touched 
the hearts of most Poles when he said that to those who hold different 
views, "We reply in the words of our poet, Maria Konopnicka, Nie 
rzucim ziemi skad nasz rod" ("We shall not desert the land of our 
forefathers"). 5 8 In a rare display ofagreement·with the Warsaw gov-
ernment, even the London Poles criticized American policy. 59 Am-
bassador Griffis was not exaggerating very much when he wrote: "It 
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is literally not fanciful to say that the determination to occupy and 
hold these lands is such that even the pitiful Polish Army might take 
to the field if the United States, the Great Powers, or any human 
agency attempted to return them to German control."60 
There was another emotional issue that deepened Polish resentment 
toward its wartime ally. Attempts by the Warsaw government to 
secure the extradition of former officers of the SS and the Wehrmacht, 
especially those connected with the suppression of the Warsaw Upris-
ing of 1944 and the subsequent destruction of the Polish capital, were 
denied by American authorities on the grounds that these men were 
needed in the West for an indefinite period. Among those the Poles 
wanted repatriated were SS Gruppenfuhrer Heinz Reinefarth, who 
played a major role in the pacification of Warsaw, General Nikolaus 
von Vormann, commander of the 9th Army, General Smilo von 
Luttwitz, who succeeded von Vormann, and SS Brigadefuhrer and 
Major General of the Waffen SS, Ernst Rode. 61 
The deterioration in United States-Polish relations was matched 
by the eclipse of the PSL and its leader, Mikolajczyk, as a viable force 
in Polish political life. By the summer of 1947, some of the leaders 
of the PSL urged that the party dissolve itself in order to avoid inevit-
able arrest and prosecution. Presumably the ideas and traditions 
of the PSL would be kept alive abroad where the top leaders would 
emigrate. Another wing favored replacing Mikolajczyk and electing 
a new executive council to collaborate closely with the communist 
bloc. Still others endorsed the status quo, believing that the PSL could 
function independently at least through those members who were 
deputies to the Sejm and were protected by parliamentary immu-
nity.62 
Meanwhile, the regime escalated pressure on the PSL, convicting 
two top PSL leaders-Kazimierz Baginski and Stanislaw Mierzwa-
on charges of treason, subversion, and espionage. Baginski, a survivor 
of the Moscow trial of sixteen Polish leaders in 1945, had been rear-
rested and sentenced to prison in April1947. He was later pardoned 
by Bierut. Mierzwa, another victim of the Moscow trial, had received 
an amnesty in 1946, only to be arrested again by Polish authorities 
in the summer of 1947. He was tried with seven other Poles in the 
so-called Krakow Trials in September and convicted on charges of 
having given information to the American and British ambassadors 
in Warsaw.63 
Under these circumstances, it was understandable that there was 
widespread speculation in and out of Poland concerning the fate of 
Mikolajczyk himself. In his own account, he related that attacks 
92 BITTER LEGACY 
against him in the Sejm got increasingly more sinister. "What had 
been inclined to be half-said, or hinted at," he wrote, "was now 
coming into the open. This kind of attack could only mean that my 
days were now plainly numbered."64 By the fall of 1947, the State 
Department believed that Mikolajczyk would probably be executed 
just as Nikola Petkov, the peasant party leader of Bulgaria, had been. 
The State Department recognized that the United States had a moral 
responsibility to help Mikolajczyk because it was largely owing to 
American and British pressure that the Polish leader had accepted the 
Yalta formula and had agreed to join the provisional government in 
1945.65 
Korbonski, who had reliable intelligence sources in the country, 
apprised Mikolajczyk of the intention of the regime to arrest members 
of the executive committee of the PSL and suggested a plan of escape 
for the top leaders of the party. Before the leadership left Poland, 
Korbonski recommended that the PSL be dissolved in order not to 
give the communists an opportunity to take over a de facto party and 
exploit it to their advantage.66 "Mikolajczyk," Korbonski said, 
"wanted to be a hero and told me he would stay and sacrifice his life 
in Poland."67 Korbonski believed that if Mikolajczyk remained in 
Poland, "Possibly we may derive considerable political advantage 
from it, for it will open the eyes of the West to what is happening in 
Poland. The news that a former premier and vice-premier had been 
imprisoned and even executed by a firing squad, would arouse the 
world's conscience."68 
But Mikolajczyk later changed his mind and decided to escape too. 
His decision was influenced by information he had received that he, 
along with other PSL leaders, would be arrested at the next session 
of the Sejm, scheduled to open on October 27, 1947. The death 
sentence was a foregone conclusion. Mikolajczyk now believed that 
his death would serve no useful purpose. 69 Rather, as he told a British 
audience a month after his escape, it might provoke his supporters to 
seek revenge, which would provide the communists with "the chance 
to drown the people's opposition in blood."70 
Mikolajczyk came to his decision on or before October 17, 1947, 
the day he asked George D. Andrews, first secretary of the United 
States embassy, for American assistance to get him out of the coun-
try. 71 Andrews reported Mikolajczyk's request to Griffis who did not 
hesitate to extend help. "He was our man, our duty was clear," Griffis 
said, "and we were not long in aiding him." He added: "We had 
arranged and fostered his return to Poland, he was the hope of the 
great democratic nations, and it seemed to all of us that, diplo-
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matic hanky-panky notwithstanding, we had to save this man from 
death."72 
Officials of the American and British embassies worked quickly and 
suggested several possible methods and routes of escape for the Polish 
leader. Andrews returned to see Mikolajczyk and offered three alter-
natives: first, smuggling him out in an empty coffin in an American 
convoy which was to return the bodies of American airmen who had 
been shot down over Poland during the war; second, carrying him in 
the trunk of Griffis's Chrysler to the Czechoslovakian frontier; and 
third, helping him to get to Gdynia where he would board a British 
ship. Mikolajczyk chose the last alternative. On October 20, 1947, 
carrying only a toothbrush and a revolver and wearing a crumpled 
American raincoat and slouch hat that Griffis had given to him, 
Mikolajczyk got into the back of a truck which took him to Gdynia. 
Despite the long and dangerous trip-the truck passed nine control 
points and had several blowouts-Mikolajczyk made it to the Polish 
seaport where he boarded the Baltavia, which sailed early the next 
morning for England. 73 
Before his flight, Mikolajczyk had pleaded with Griffis to allow 
Maria Hulewicz, who the American ambassador erroneously claimed 
was the wife of the Polish leader, to accompany him, but Griffis 
refused, saying later, "I could not run the risk of permitting a double 
hazard."74 But if Hulewicz made it to Czechoslovakia, the United 
States military attache in Prague was prepared to assist her from 
there. Unfortunately, Hulewicz, who tried to escape with W. Bryja, 
treasurer of the PSL, and M. Dabrowski, were caught at the Czecho-
slovakian frontier. 75 Baginski and his wife, taking another route, 
reached the American zone. Shortly after Mikolajczyk's departure 
from the Baltic coast, Korbonski and his wife also managed to escape 
from Gdynia for Sweden on a Swedish ship. Korbonski was most 
critical of Mikolajczyk for not revealing to his followers his plans to 
escape and for urging Korbonski to delay his own departure in order 
to insure the success of his escape. "All this indicated cold and ruth-
less calculation and complete absence of any human feeling," Karbon-
ski later wrote bitterly. 76 
The departure of Mikolajczyk and other opposition leaders no 
doubt brought a sigh of relief from the Warsaw regime which now was 
spared the problem of liquidating them. As Piotr W andycz has said, 
"It is likely that the Communists viewed Mikolajczyk's flight as good 
riddance."77 The regime, which rapidly assumed control of the PSL 
through such willing tools as Wycech, Banach, and Niecko, took 
special delight in making a point of Mikolajczyk's "shameful" flight 
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and his loss of followers in Poland. 78 Glos Ludu called for the liquida-
tion of the remainder of Mikolajczyk's followers "once and forever 
from the political life of the country."79 In the Sejm Mikolajczyk was 
described as "Poland's best export."80 
The officials of the PSL who had failed to escape and were appre-
hended at the Czechoslovakian frontier revealed the involvement of 
the American embassy in Warsaw in Mikolajczyk's flight. Griffis flatly 
denied helping Mikolajczyk, who once he got to London labeled the 
Warsaw government's allegations "a pack of lies."81 Mikolajczyk 
even wrote a fictional account of his escape in his book, The Rape of 
Poland, published in the United States in 1948, and carefully avoided 
any reference to American or British involvement in his escape. But 
Ambassador Griffis set the record straight by giving an essentially 
accurate account of the episode in his book, Lying in State, published 
four years later. 82 
The Warsaw government had sufficient evidence implicating not 
only Andrews but also Monroe W. Blake, the second secretary of the 
American embassy, in the operation. Andrews had been transferred 
to another diplomatic post, but Blake, who was still in Warsaw, was 
declared persona non grata in a note handed to Griffis by the Polish 
foreign minister. The Poles agreed to withdraw the note after Griffis 
promised to transfer Blake, whose tour of duty in Warsaw was nearly 
over anyway. 83 
With the leadership of the PSL safely in the hands of reliable 
proteges of the regime, the PPR escalated pressures on the PPS for 
a merger, a proposal that had been given major public expression in 
an address by Gomulka on May Day, 1947. Despite communist pres-
sures, however, the Socialist Party Congress, meeting in Wroclaw on 
December 14, 194 7, was not very receptive to the idea. The PPS 
argued that it could play an important role as an independent party, 
especially as a link between leftist socialists in western Europe and the 
communists. But Stalin had other ideas and pressured Cyrankiewicz, 
head of the PPS, to reverse himself and press for union with the PPR. 
After purges within the two parties had been completed, the merger 
finally occurred in December of 1948 with the creation of a new party, 
now called the Polska Zjednoczona Portia Robotnicza (PZPR) (Polish 
United Worker's party).84 
The departure of Mikolajczyk from Poland meant that, with the 
exception of Czechoslovakia, the last major opposition leader in east-
ern Europe had been forced out of the political arena. His escape 
provided an epilogue to the elections of 194 7 which had belied the 
hopes and expectations of the United States that Poland could some-
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how be prevented from becoming entirely a Soviet satellite. Griffis 
summed up the limited role of American diplomacy in Poland at the 
end of 1947 when he wrote home, "Under all the circumstances, it is 
difficult to see any justification for the maintenance of an Embassy or 
Consular Service here except for (a) the use of the Embassy merely 
as a symbol of indestructible American friendship for the Polish 
people and as a listening post; (b) the maintenance of a Consular 
Service for the protection of bona fide American Citizens and inter-
ests."85 
VI Relief and Repatriation 
One of the most visible and rewarding areas of 
American contact with Poland in the immediate postwar period was 
through the relief assistance that had been sent to the Polish people. 
In view of the tense political relations between Warsaw and Washing-
ton, it was inevitable that even relief would become politicized by both 
sides. Nevertheless, millions of Poles benefited from American relief 
provided through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Ad-
ministration (UNRRA) and several major private agencies, including 
the Red Cross, War Relief Services of the National Catholic Welfare 
Conference, the American Relief for Poland, and the American Joint 
Distribution Committee. 
Closely tied to relief was the related question of repatriation which 
affected thousands of Poles in displaced persons camps and soldiers 
who had fought with the western allies during the war. In many ways 
the repatriation issue was even more political than relief because a 
large number of Polish civilian and military refugees abroad were 
staunchly anticommunist and refused to return to Poland. Although 
the repatriation question was eventually resolved, there were many 
people who, despite their preference to live in the West, reluctantly 
ended up back in Poland. 
Plans to extend relief to the Poles began during the summer of 1944. 
UNRRA negotiated with the Polish government-in-exile, whose rep-
resentatives played an important role in the early sessions of the 
organization. But the creation of the Polish committee of national 
liberation in July 1944, and its recognition later as the government of 
Poland by the Soviet Union, immediately raised a political issue con-
cerning UNRRA aid to the people of Poland. In response to an 
invitation from Osobka-Morawski to Herbert H. Lehman, director 
general of UNRRA, to send technical experts to Poland, Lehman 
announced early in October of that year that a delegation under the 
leadership of John P. Gregg would be sent to Poland. The delegation, 
consisting of experts in the fields of supply, public health, displaced 
persons, and welfare, was to form the nucleus of an operating mission 
when UNRRA began to send supplies and provide services to Po-
land.1 
Gregg was an excellent choice for the position. He had served for 
a year in Poland with the American Relief Administration after 
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World War I, and came to UNRRA from the War Production Board 
with an experienced background in supply and production. In an-
nouncing the appointment of Gregg's delegation, UNRRA, anxious 
to maintain a scrupulous neutrality in the political struggle between 
the London Poles and the Lublinites, issued a carefully worded press 
release stating, "The proposed relief operations for the people of 
liberated Poland, the director general stated, are being undertaken in 
accordance with the desires of the Polish Committee of National 
Liberation in Lublin and the Polish Government in London."2 Unfor-
tunately, the Lublin Poles did not grant the necessary entry visas to 
the UNRRA group, provoking Gregg to resign in despair. 3 
In March of 1945 Lehman appointed Mikhail A. Menshikov, dep-
uty director general of the headquarters bureau of areas of UNRRA, 
to succeed Gregg. Menshikov's appointment was a disappointment 
not only to Ambassador Lane but also to many Poles.4 Lehman may 
have believed that the appointment of a Russian would cut through 
bureaucratic red tape and facilitate the UNRRA aid program to 
Poland. But unfortunately Menshikov's appointment simply under-
scored to the Poles the dominant role of Moscow in their country and, 
for that matter, in eastern Europe. 
Menshikov was to negotiate a formal agreement with the Polish 
provisional government, establish a permanent mission, survey condi-
tions within the country, and ascertain the relief needs of the Poles. 
Only after the United States and Great Britain extended diplomatic 
recognition to the reconstituted Warsaw government did the 
UNRRA mission receive its visas to enter Poland. Menshikov proved 
too accommodating in his dealings with the Warsaw government, 
giving the Poles complete control over the distribution of supplies, 
agreeing to unrealistic limitations on the size of the UNRRA staff, 
and assuring Polish authorities that no regional offices for the orga-
nization would be needed. This naturally limited the ability of 
UNRRA officials to monitor the distribution of supplies adequately 
at a time when Congress was considering further appropriations for 
the organization. 5 
The first shipment of UNRRA supplies to Poland arrived in April 
1945 at Constanza, Rumania, from where goods had to be shipped by 
rail. Pilferage was a problem until Polish guards began in August to 
accompany the rail shipments. It was not until September that the first 
ship, the S.S. Nishmaha, arrived with UNRRA supplies at Gdynia. 
Even Ambassador Lane was there for the historic event, underscoring 
the American role in the aid program to Poland. Rail facilities had 
been so badly destroyed by the war that it took approximately one 
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month for the goods to make their way to Warsaw, only 250 miles 
away.6 With the opening of Gdynia and Danzig the much more 
time-consuming overland route was no longer used. 
Menshikov was succeeded by Charles M. Drury, a Canadian, who 
became head of the permanent UNRRA mission to Poland in Septem-
ber 1945. Without waiting for visa clearance, he flew to Warsaw with 
his staff the following month so that Lehman could honestly assure 
the United States Congress, then considering further appropriations 
for UNRRA, that UNRRA's Polish mission was in full operation. 7 
Educated at the Royal Military College, Drury was a pragmatist who 
avoided politics and dedicated himself to overseeing the aid program 
to Poland. He got along well with Polish officials, especially Mine. He 
persuaded the Poles to remove the limitations on the size of the 
UNRRA staff agreed to earlier by Menshikov and to open six regional 
offices-Katowice, Krakow, Lodz, Poznan, Gdynia, and Warsaw-
in January 1946. A seventh office was established in Stettin that 
September.8 
State Department officials were not very fond of Drury. Lane sug-
gested that Drury's wife had "communistic tendencies and that Drury 
himself, being personally ambitious and weak, has permitted himself 
to follow her lead." Ray Atherton, the American ambassador to 
Canada, dubbed Drury an "ardent," if naive, propagandist for the 
communist-dominated Warsaw government. 9 
UNRRA aid to Poland became an emotional issue, exploited by 
Warsaw and Washington to serve their own political interests. Early 
in 1946 UNRRA was forced to cut back on grain shipments because 
of shortages. Gomulka claimed that the reductions were politically 
motivated, a charge Polish historians have tied to alleged American 
efforts to influence the Polish elections. 10 
The reductions in grain deliveries were exploited by Gomulka and 
other communist leaders, who insisted that hungry people were in no 
position to vote intelligently and that the promised elections would 
therefore have to be postponed. Even Drury, who was described as 
getting along "like a house on fire" with Polish officials, admitted that 
the entire grain question was used by the communists "to discredit, 
insofar as possible, Mr. Mikolajczyk and the Peasant Party." Both the 
PPR and the PPS encouraged the belief among urban workers that 
the peasants were hoarding stocks of grain and suggested that bands 
of workers be organized and, war communism style, raid villages and 
confiscate the grain. Drury deplored the strategy, arguing that esti-
mates of indigenous stocks of grain by the ministry of supply were 
"entirely out of line with reality" and were confusing to UNRRA 
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officials. When he complained to officials that his mission needed the 
"real figures" concerning the local wheat situation in order to formu-
late recommendations, Drury succeeded in getting the Polish govern-
ment to admit that there was no foundation to the allegations of 
hoarding. As a matter of fact, peasant stocks of seed for planting in 
the spring were extremely low, but that played politically into the 
hands of the communists because Mikolajczyk's ministry of agricul-
ture was responsible for providing the seed. Drury told Lehman "that 
the current political situation has not made the provision of food to 
the people of Poland any easier." 11 
Neither the Poles nor the Soviets were willing to accept UNRRA's 
explanation that food deliveries were tied to world grain shortages and 
that cutbacks affected all recipient countries, not only Poland. The 
Soviet ambassador to Poland, Viktor Lebedev, bluntly told Lane: 
"Let's not be diplomatic. You know as well as I that the person who 
pays is the person who controls. It is absurd that the poor United 
States has not enough grain for Polish needs." He added that if the 
United States sent more grain to Poland, he and Gomulka would call 
the American ambassador, "Tovarich Lane."12 
UNRRA officials in New York were angered by Polish charges. 
Senior Deputy Director General R.G.A. Jackson told his staff that it 
was unfortunate for the Poles "to bite the hand that is feeding them." 
The new director general, Fiorello LaGuardia, a staunch advocate of 
relief to the Poles, said, "Here I am fighting to get more help for 
Poland. This kind of talk may be good politics at home, but it is very 
bad for getting food .... I am too good a friend of Poland to stand 
for any kicking around like this." The Polish government soon real-
ized it had gone too far, and so later changed its position by publiciz-
ing UNRRA's explanation of the food situation and took the 
unprecedented step of allowing the mission in Poland to review 
before publication subsequent Polish statements concerning UNRRA 
aid. 13 
As East-West tensions increased in 1946, the American public did 
not look favorably upon UNRRA, preferring a unilateral relief pro-
gram to replace it. Congressional sentiment for continuing UNRRA 
had eroded so much that one government official had to promise 
Congress he would not return after 1946 for additional funding, even 
though he was well aware that the need for relief in Europe in 1947 
would continue. 14 
Administration officials were unsympathetic with UNRRA too. 
Stimson claimed Lehman "never got hold of the reality of the job." 
Lane, who had once strongly endorsed UNRRA aid, later attacked 
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it because it benefited the communists, a theme repeated by his succes-
sor in Warsaw. Acheson saw UNRRA supplies going "to the wrong 
places and were used for wrong purposes." Former president Herbert 
Hoover, who had visited Poland in March of 1946 and was appalled 
by the grim situation that faced the Polish people, had recommended 
aid to the Poles. But by the end of the year he also favored an end 
to UNRRA operations. 15 
Truman, whose attitude toward UNRRA had cooled shortly after 
he came to the presidency, had no intention of providing more funds 
-the Untied States paid almost 75 percent of the cost-to UNRRA 
after December 1946. After that date Washington would do what the 
State Department had urged for a long time-namely, act unilater-
ally, rather than through an international organization in its relief 
activities in Europe. 16 
The major burden of the criticism in the United States against 
UNRRA concerned aid to countries which were largely under com-
munist control. Since Poland was the largest single beneficiary of 
UNRRA aid the operation of the aid program there predictably came 
in for special scrutiny. During the months ofUNRRA's operation in 
Poland there were constant references to the existence of pilferage, 
black-marketing, and discrimination. 17 
These problems, though exaggerated by some critics, were inevita-
ble in a program under which distribution was entirely in the hands 
of the Polish government. Although the Polish government had 
pledged to UNRRA that it would not discriminate according to race, 
religion, or political opinion in doling out the aid, the ration card 
system, established by Warsaw, favored some groups over others. For 
example, holders of a class one ration card, which called for the 
highest allowances, included bureaucrats, government employees, 
and employees of private industries which sold 75 percent of their 
output to the government. Lower rated ration cards went to older 
people, pensioners, and employees of private industries which sold 
smaller percentages of their goods to the state. More than half of the 
population-people who lived on farms and were considered self-
sufficient and those who ran their own businesses or worked in private 
industries which did not sell to the state-did not benefit from the 
UNRRA aid. Yet the situation in the Polish countryside was often 
worse than in the cities. People within the Kielce bridgehead, for 
example, lived in mud huts and desperately needed relief. LaGuardia, 
who visited one of the hundreds of villages in the area, was so shaken 
by what he had seen that he told his son who accompanied him, 
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"Never forget what you're seeing here. If you ever think you're badly 
off, remember how these children lived." 
Polish authorities claimed that food and other scarce commodities 
should be shared on the basis of the amount and nature of the work 
performed. Also, they claimed that the rationing system should be 
used as a wage subsidy, apportioned according to the wages the 
individual earned. As Drury explained, "The necessity for this system 
is that 20 percent of non-agriculture manpower working in the nation-
alized section of the economy receive low controlled wages while the 
80 percent working under free enterprise are paid on higher but 
widely differing wage scales. The large agriculture community, sup-
plying their own food and selling their surplus products in the free 
market at high prices, are outside the rationing system because of their 
privileged position and free market profit." Drury's explanation, how-
ever, did not contradict the position of critics who argued that the 
Polish government used the UNRRA supplies to subsidize itself. 18 
Moreover, the system conspicuously ignored some groups most in 
need of relief, among them the sick, aged, children, and repatriates. 
After pressuring Polish authorities, the UNRRA mission in Warsaw 
managed to convince the regime to give a daily milk allotment to all 
children under twelve years of age in Warsaw and to provide supple-
mentary rations for pregnant women and nursing mothers. 19 
Even Drury did not deny that some abuses existed. One criticism 
he did not deny was that bureaucrats received free food allotments out 
of UNRRA supplies, but he claimed that when abuses were brought 
to the attention of the Polish authorities they were usually corrected. 
According to the official historian of UNRRA, only four hundred out 
of five thousand complaints concerning the misuse of UNRRA aid 
were considered well founded and referred to the Polish government 
for action. Drury flatly denied the oft-repeated criticism that commu-
nism or cryptocommunism was a criterion in determining an individ-
ual's eligibility for receiving UNRRA goods, a view contradicted by 
Ambassador Lane. 20 
Much was made in the American press over the appearance of 
UNRRA goods on the free market. Life magazine strongly criticized 
the fact that UNRRA goods were peddled on Warsaw's streets and 
hotels. "At Warsaw's Hotel Polonia," the article said, "if you are 
willing to pay the price, you can drink vodka cocktails made with 
UNRRA grapefruit juice intended for Poland's undernourished chil-
dren." The fact was that ration card holders could and did resell any 
item they wanted. Fruit juices, a novelty to Poles at that time, were 
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eagerly sold for bread. A quart of juice brought ten pounds of bread, 
four pounds more than even a package of American cigarettes. 21 
An episode involving LaGuardia and Lane perhaps best illustrated 
just how politicized UNRRA had become. LaGuardia, a colorful but 
tactless politician, told the press shortly before the Polish elections in 
1947, "There has been meddling on the part of diplomatic representa-
tives in Poland. I have always stated that it would be far better if 
ambassadors would look after the interests of their own country rather 
than interfere in the politics of the country to which they are accred-
ited." After the Polish elections, in response to a question from a 
correspondent from the New York Herald Tribune who asked him if 
he thought the Poles had a fair and free election, LaGuardia snapped, 
"Better than anything ever held in South Carolina, North Carolina, 
Virginia, Georgia, Alabama and Tennessee; there is no comparison. 
Better in every way." To be sure, Lane took issue with LaGuardia's 
indirect criticism of him. "What I regret very much is that a person 
of your experience, particularly because of your having headed a great 
humanitarian project which was designed not to have any political 
connotation whatever, should take it upon yourself to express a politi-
cal opinion quite contrary, to use an understatement, to the facts."22 
Lane reminded LaGuardia that when he had visited Poland in 
August of 1946 he had promised to write a letter to the Polish premier 
concerning treatment of American citizens in Poland, yet he never 
did so. Instead, when the question of the status of Poles who claimed 
American citizenship was later brought up by a correspondent, La-
Guardia bluntly replied, "Everybody in Poland who has ever been to 
the United States claims American citizenship." Lane politely wrote 
him, expressing "regret" that as "a champion of human rights [you] 
did not fulfill your promise to me." When quizzed later by an Asso-
ciated Press representative who referred to Lane's contention that 
LaGuardia had welshed on his promise, the Little Flower yelled: 
"He's a goddamn liar!"23 
Poland received over $480 million worth of aid from UNRRA 
during the period 1945-1947, making it the largest single beneficiary 
of this international program. Foodstuffs accounted for more than 40 
percent of the relief, though UNRRA also sent large amounts of 
clothing, textiles, medical and sanitation equipment, and agricultural 
and industrial goods. 24 For example, UNRRA provided more than 50 
percent of all the trucks in Poland, $11 million worth of seed, $5 
million worth of nitrate and phosphate, 151,000 horses, 17,000 
cattle, 2,685 box cars, 871 gondolas, and 105 locomotives.25 
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One of the more unusual episodes that occurred in connection with 
the UNRRA program involved a white stallion. The horse, later to 
be known as the "White Stallion of Gdansk," had broken loose at the 
dock. He found a duckboard lying over a drainpipe and played seesaw 
on it. The workers sent the horse thirty miles away from Gdansk, only 
to find him back on the seesaw a short time later. After a few more 
attempts to locate the horse elsewhere, the stallion always found his 
way back to his favorite seesaw. He was allowed to spend his days as 
the UNRRA mascot at Gdansk. 26 
One of the unique contributions by UNRRA to Poland was the 
provision of modem apparatus for the Madame Curie Institute for 
cancer research. This included x-ray machines, equipment for labora-
tories and operating rooms, and grams of radium.27 
Polish officials were unanimous in their expressions of gratitude for 
UNRRA aid. Berman candidly admitted that UNRRA assistance 
had been a major factor in the economic revival of the country. 
Rusinek, unveiling a plaque at a ceremony commemorating UNRRA's 
aid, was poetic: "Here was a friend and here were good men. There 
was a crime and here was assistance; there was devastation and here 
construction." The Soviet ambassador, Lebedev, dolefully said that 
when UNRRA ended, "it will be a sad moment indeed for the Poles, 
as U.N.R.R.A. has been doing great work in helping this country, 
especially at the most desperate period immediately after liberation." 
Mikolajczyk was even more complimentary: "Without UNRRA and 
the unflagging determination of the Polish people to rebuild even a 
country dominated by a despotic alien rule, Poland would have per-
ished."28 Minister Mine told the UNRRA council, 
It can be said that UNRRA was the first international organiza-
tion which brought real and substantial assistance to humanity 
suffering as a result of the war. Obviously, it is possible to 
criticize the activities of UNRRA; but without these activities, 
famine would have prevailed in many European countries, if not 
throughout the world. As far as my country is concerned, the 
fact that we have revived our industry, which has today reached 
71 percent of pre-war production; the fact that we have partially 
reconstructed our ports, so that their activity is now 58 percent 
what is was of pre-war; the fact that it has been possible to sow 
two-and-a-half millions of hectares of uncultivated land; all this 
we owe to the industry and courage of the Polish population, but 
also to the generous help given by the friendly nations and by 
UNRRA.29 
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There seems to be little doubt, too, that most Poles were well aware 
of the American role in the UNRRA program. Since most items 
carried a ''made in U.S.A." or "shipped from U.S.A." label on them, 
it is not very surprising that the aid was popularly referred to as 
"UNRRA-Amerikanski." As one American observer in Warsaw said 
at the time, the Polish people "talk of the new Poland and the 'won-
derful America' which is sending UNRRA ships."30 
In retrospect, it is difficult to see how American involvement in 
UNRRA could have been continued beyond 1946-1947. Public opin-
ion in the United States no longer supported a program that even 
apologists for it have not denied buttressed communist regimes in 
eastern Europe. 31 Little wonder, then, that in a day of rising Cold War 
passions the United States decided to end its support of this interna-
tional relief agency and to follow a unilateral program of aid. It would 
be presumptuous to assume that the United States could or should 
have remained oblivious to the political currents that buffeted 
UNRRA since it was established in 1944.32 
Apart from UNRRA, a large number of private relief organizations 
operated in Poland after the war. Unlike UNRRA, these organiza-
tions provided supplies and services directly to the beneficiaries of the 
aid or through reliable Polish groups such as the Polish Red Cross, 
Caritas (Catholic Charities), and the YMCA. To be sure, the total 
amount of relief by these organizations did not bulk as large as that 
provided by UNRRA. But the relief activities of these groups did 
meet needs unfulfilled by UNRRA and continued after the end of 
UNRRA operations in Poland. The largest American relief organiza-
tions which operated in Poland after the war included the American 
Relief for Poland, American Red Cross, War Relief Services of the 
National Catholic Welfare Conference, and the American Joint Dis-
tribution Committee. In 1945-1946 these organizations had sent ap-
proximately $20 million worth of aid to Poland, consisting primarily 
of foodstuffs, clothing, medicines, and hospital supplies. 33 
The American Relief for Poland had been established in the spring 
of 1938 as the Rada Polonii Amerikanskiej (the Polish American 
Council). The Rada, which brought together several Polish American 
fraternal organizations, was a relief organization that unified the hu-
manitarian effort in the United States on behalf of the Polish war 
victims. The organization underwent two changes in name-first to 
Polish War Relief when it became a member agency of the National 
War Fund and, after the war, to the American Relieffor Poland. The 
organization embraced virtually all Polish American groups in the 
United States, including the three major fraternals-the Polish Na-
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tional Alliance, Polish Roman Catholic Union, and the Polish Wom-
en's Alliance. 34 
During the war years, the Rada was unable to conduct direct relief 
in Poland, but it did make arrangements with the Red Cross for the 
distribution of medicines and drugs in Poland. Thousands of food 
packages, too, were sent to needy people in Poland and to Polish 
soldiers in prisoner-of-war camps. The organization also provided 
clothing and medicines for Polish refugees in Africa, India, the Near 
East, and Mexico, made contributions for the care of members of the 
Polish armed forces by the Polish Red Cross and Polish YMCA, and 
gave funds for the purchase of a mobile hospital and the maintenance 
of the Paderewski Hospital in Edinburgh, Scotland. 
After the war, the American Relief for Poland operated through 
five regional offices centered in Warsaw, Poznan, Krakow, Gdynia, 
and Lublin. It maintained its own warehouses in Poland and a fleet 
of sixty trucks to distribute the aid. Actual distribution was carried 
out by Polish organizations-Caritas, Cekos, and the Polish Red 
Cross.35 
Like UNRRA, the American Relief for Poland did not entirely 
escape political attacks at home and abroad. One long-time critic, 
KNAPP, disapproved of the idea that the organization even sent 
representatives to Poland because it implied that Polonia accepted the 
Yalta political settlement regarding Poland, something these conser-
vative Polish Americans adamantly refused to do. KNAPP was a 
persistent critic of the way the organization was run, arguing that "all 
of Polonia should have a voice in matters concerning the activities of 
the Rada Polonia." 
Rather than support an organization that gave legitimacy to a 
communist-dominated regime, KNAPP urged Polonia to embark on 
other projects, such as pressuring the American government to deter-
mine whether the thousands of aid packages Polish Americans had 
sent to Poland actually got to their addressees. 36 The State Depart-
ment was flooded with complaints from Polish Americans that few if 
any of the packages reached their relatives in Poland. No doubt part 
of the explanation was the fact that not many Poles could alford the 
tariff which the Polish government levied on the packages from the 
United States. Senator Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts agreed 
with Polish American criticism that the United States had not done 
enough to help American citizens maintain mail and parcel post 
contact with their relatives. 37 
The first shipload of aid to Poland after the war from the American 
Relief for Poland was delayed until the end of 1945 because ofbureau-
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cratic red tape, much of which was Warsaw's fault. But this did not 
prevent Michael Szyszko, vice-minister of agriculture, from suggest-
ing that the aid had been delayed deliberately because of "persons 
under the influence of the Polish London government" within the 
organization. Since the Rada received some of its funds from the 
United States government, one American apologist for the Warsaw 
regime urged that Congress investigate the long delay in supplies 
raised by the Rada reaching Poland. 38 
Under the leadership of Henry Osinski,the American Relief for 
Poland cooperated with other relief agencies in the country and in the 
opinion of both the American embassy in Warsaw and the Poles 
themselves made a significant contribution toward meeting the needs 
of the Polish people. In addition to its operations in Poland the 
American Relief for Poland also carried out an extensive program of 
aid to Polish displaced persons in Germany, France, Switzerland, and 
elsewhere. 
By the end of August 1946 almost $4 million worth of aid had been 
received by Poland. In 1947 the American Relief for Poland prepared 
a budget calling for $12.5 million, half of which was to be cash and 
the balance in gifts-in-kind. The organization's funding came from 
several sources-the National War Fund, War Relief Services of the 
National Catholic Welfare Conference, and voluntary contributions 
of affiliated groups and individuals. 39 The organization was fortunate 
in drawing the support of many prominent Americans without blood 
ties to Poland such as Hugh Gibson, former minister to Warsaw who 
served as honorary chairman of the organization, Arthur Bliss Lane, 
Clare Boothe Luce, James A. Farley, Cardinal Francis J. Spellman, 
and Cardinal Samuel A. Stritch. 40 
Like UNRRA and the American Relief for Poland, the American 
Red Cross experienced delays in getting clearance from Polish author-
ties to enter Poland. It was not until September 1945 that two Red 
Cross officials accompanied Ambassador Lane on a flight to Warsaw, 
even though they still had not received entry visas. 41 The Red Cross 
worked closely with the American Relief for Poland, even allocating 
supplies to it for distribution. By September 1946 the dollar value of 
Red Cross aid which had arrived in Poland from the United States 
exceeded $6.5 million. The aid consisted primarily of clothing, shoes, 
medical supplies, and bedding. 42 
The War Relief Services of the National Catholic Welfare Confer-
ence under the direction of George Szudy in Poland made all of its 
distributions through Caritas, the Polish Catholic welfare organiza-
tion which operated through twenty-five district offices in Poland. By 
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September 1946 nineteen shipments valued at $2,577,684 had arrived 
in Poland. An additional $1.5 million had been spent to purchase 
relief supplies for Polish refugees in the period from August 1943 to 
September 1946. By February 1947 War Relief Services reported to 
its headquarters in New York that the organization's aid had reached 
5.4 million needy people. Of special significance was the organiza-
tion's priority to aid Poland's children, 2 million of whom were home-
less. 43 War Relief Services could take pride in the fact that it had 
responded to the plight of children and the aged, groups who were 
discriminated against by Polish authorities when they allocated 
UNRRA supplies. Szudy's organization reported, "our relief ship-
ments are reaching 490 orphanages serving 24,500 children; 945 pre-
school feeding programs that reach 46,800 children; 220 old age 
homes that serve 15,400 aged; approximately 230 kitchens that serve 
warm meals to 2,243,893 persons; 600 clinics and 300 hospitals that 
are making excellent use of the medicines you are sending to Po-
land."44 
The American Joint Distribution Committee, first headed by David 
Guzik and later by Wilhelm Beim, was an American Jewish agency 
which assisted not only Jews but also Christians. In the seven-month 
period extending from June to December of 1946, the committee had 
contributed approximately $6 million in cash or kind. 45 Other Ameri-
can agencies or groups with a strong American component included 
the Anglo-American Quaker Relief Mission, which was committed 
especially to providing food supplements to children; the Cooperative 
for American Remittances to Europe, which facilitated the dispatch 
of relief parcels to Poland; the Unitarian Service Committee, which 
specialized in giving medical advice and care; the General Conference 
of Seventh Day Adventists, which collected funds in the United States 
to purchase food for distribution in Poland;46 and the YMCA, which 
not only fed and clothed thousands of people but also cared for fifteen 
thousand boys. An additional six thousand children were looked after 
in YMCA day camps. 47 
Ambassador Lane was correct when he stated that beyond the . 
material assistance which these private agencies gave to the needy 
people of Poland they helped to rebuild "the bridge of understanding 
and affection between the American and Polish peoples, which had 
been closed to traffic during the Nazi occupation."48 
World War II had resulted in major migrations of the Polish people 
which took the form of mass expulsions and voluntary movement of 
refugees. After the Nazi invation of Poland in 1939 thousands of 
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soldiers and civilians fled to Hungary and Rumania, and from there 
many went to France where General Wladyslaw Sikorski had tempo-
rarily established a Polish government-in-exile prior to its departure 
for England. Most Poles, however, were victims of German and Soviet 
policies that expelled or forcibly transferred them from their homes. 
In 1939 and 1940 1.5 million Poles were expelled from western Po-
land, which was incorporated into the Third Reich. About the same 
time, approximately 1.5-2 million Poles and Jews who lived on the 
Soviet side of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Line were deported to the 
Asiatic provinces of the Soviet Union.49 A small portion of them, a 
little over 100,000 soldiers and civilians, managed to leave the Soviet 
Union in 1942 for Iran under General Wladyslaw Anders.50 Then 
there were 3.5 million Poles deported to Germany as slave laborers. 5 1 
By the time the war ended in Europe the bulk of Polish refugees were 
in western Europe and the Soviet Union, though thousands of Poles 
were also scattered in Africa, India, the Middle East, and Mexico. 
Little wonder, then, that the problem of repatriating the Poles in the 
West constituted a major issue in Poland's relations with the United 
States. 
Most Polish refugees in the West decided to return home after the 
war. Between November 1945 and June 1947, 569,727 Poles, most of 
whom came from the American and British occupation zones of 
Germany, had been repatriated.52 Polish sources claim that more 
than 2 million people returned home from the West between 1944 and 
1949. Most of the refugees-85 percent-returned in the period 1945 
-1946.53 Approximately 40 percent of the Polish intelligentsia who 
were in Great Britain decided to return home. 54 Many of these intel-
lectuals, though unsympathetic with communism, wanted to return 
and help rebuild their country. In view of the high losses suffered by 
the Polish professional class during World War II, it is easy to under-
stand why the Polish government encouraged these people to return. 
Still, as late as February 1947 UNRRA cared for 335,117 Polish 
refugees, most of whom were in the Allied occupation zones of west-
em Germany. A large proportion of them refused to return home. 55 
Many had originally come from eastern Poland and had bitter memo-
ries of the treatment they had received at the hands of the Russians. 
As one observer pointed out, these Poles "would commit suicide 
rather than return to Poland."56 
The United States and Great Britain were agreeable to the repatria-
tion of Poles who wanted to return to Poland. And as the flood of 
displaced persons (DP's) clogged the communications system and 
strained the food resources of the West, Washington and London 
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became increasingly anxious to oblige the Warsaw government. War-
saw mistakenly charged that the Americans and British refused to 
allow Polish citizens to return home. And when queried by the West 
about the need for early and fair elections in Poland, the Polish 
government was quick to tie the repatriation issue to it. The sooner 
the repatriation of Polish refugees took place, Warsaw said, the sooner 
the elections would be held. 59 
In fact, American authorities were so eager to oblige the Warsaw 
government that by August of 1945 the United States wanted to 
repatriate ten thousand DP's a day but Polish authorities could only 
handle half that number. No doubt part of the problem was the refusal 
of the Soviets to provide enough gasoline for the trucks transporting 
the Poles out of Germany to Poland. Once the repatriation of Rus-
sians from the West had been completed-and they had priority over 
other groups-American authorities suggested foot marching as 
many Poles as possible out of the western zones in Germany before 
the end of 1945.58 
American eagerness in expediting the repatriation of Poles east-
ward gave rise to charges that contrary to its official policy the United 
States forced refugees to return to Poland. By the end of 1945 reports 
circulated that Polish citizens had been involuntarily repatriated from 
the American zone in Germany. One report claimed that an entire 
Polish regiment had been involuntarily sent back from France. 59 
Understandably, Polish Americans took an active interest in the fate 
of their kinsmen. KNAPP, an affiliate of the Polish American Con-
gress, was one of the first Polish American organizations to become 
actively involved in the problem, devoting many issues of its Biuletyn 
Organizacyjny to the question and enlisting the aid of Senator Arthur 
Vandenberg. Vandenberg proposed to the State Department that a 
special representative who enjoyed the confidence of Polonia be sent 
to the American occupation zone in Germany and to Poland itself to 
deal with repatriation matters. The State Department did not like the 
idea, noting that the issue came under the purview of the American 
ambassador to Poland. 60 Besides, Byrnes told Vandenberg that if 
incidents of involuntary repatriation did occur, "I can assure you that 
they have been exceptions rather than the rule in the administration 
of clearly defined military directives in pursuance of United States 
policies."61 
Vandenberg, satisfied that there was no convincing evidence to 
prove conclusively that involuntary repatriation of Poles was prac-
ticed, rejected suggestions from KNAPP that a congressional investi-
gation of the matter be launched. In a letter to KNAPP's president, 
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Walter Cytacki, Vandenberg said, "I am very sure that our insistent 
inquiry (both here and in Germany) will result in extreme care by the 
State Department and by the army that there will be no involuntary 
repatriation hereafter .... But we must continue to be vigilant."62 
Cytacki dropped the matter for the moment and then appealed to 
Vandenberg to do something to see that postal and parcel post com-
munications between Polish Americans and their families and friends 
in DP camps in the American zone in Germany were established. 
Vandenberg apprised Byrnes ofPolonia's concerns, and by the end of 
November of 1945 postal and parcel post contact between the United 
States and Polish citizens in the American zones in Germany and 
Austria was inaugurated. 63 
The question of involuntary repatriation was also a major issue of 
concern to the Polish American Congress, headed by Charles Roz-
marek, an able if sometimes demagogic leader who also was president 
of one of Polonia'a major fraternals, the Polish National Alliance. 
One of Rozmarek's strengths was that he was bilingual, unlike many 
Polish American leaders who did not feel comfortable speaking En-
glish.64 Moreover, he had broad contacts within the large Polish 
American community. 
Throughout the latter part of 1945 the Polish American Congress 
unleashed a constant barrage of criticism against involuntary repa-
triation of Polish refugees. To force these people to return to a com-
munist-dominated Poland, Rozmarek said in August, "would be a 
cruel injustice and a flagrant violation of our American tradition of 
justice and humanity." Rozmarek claimed that "hundreds of thou-
sands of Poles" were arbitrarily classified as Soviet citizens and re-
turned to the Soviets, a charge some students of the subject today 
confirm. 65 But after Rozmarek visited the DP camps in Europe, his 
organization altered its attacks and emphasized the conditions in 
these camps which convinced Polish refugees reluctantly to accept 
repatriation. 
Rozmarek, accompanied by Ignacy Nurkiewicz, vice-president of 
the Polish American Congress, and Charles Burke, who later headed 
the office of the Polish American Congress in Washington, D.C., went 
to Germany and visited DP camps in the American and British zones 
of occupation in the late summer and early fall of 1946.66 Rozmarek 
later recounted that "we went there with open minds, expecting a 
certain amount of distress, but wholly unprepared for the indescriba-
ble conditions we encountered." The Polish American leaders blamed 
UNRRA for making Polish DP's endure conditions "in which life 
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itself becomes unbearable" and for becoming "an instrument of coer-
cion and a political weapon employed by Soviet Russia to force repa-
triation on Displaced Persons to serve its own selfish purposes." The 
indictment by the Polish American leaders called attention to the not 
too subtle methods of officials to discourage the Poles to remain in the 
DP camps. Rozmarek declared "UNRRA has embarked on a course 
to make life so miserable for Displaced Persons that they will accept 
repatriation as the lesser of two evils."67 Nurkiewicz said much the 
same thing: "We came away with the conviction UNRRA policies 
were deliberately designed to force the inmates of the camps to go 
back to Poland, even though many of them would do so at peril of 
their lives. " 68 
Food was used as a political weapon-cutting down rations and 
offering little or no variety was apparently a common practice. 69 At 
the time the Polish Americans were in Germany, UNRRA embarked 
upon another strategy-promising to give Polish DP's in Germany 
who returned to Poland before the end of 1946 two months extra food 
rations. This was part of LaGuardia's campaign to get as many Polish 
DP's home as soon as possible. 
Even the United States military establishment in Germany, headed 
by General Joseph T. McNarney, supported the pressure tactics on 
the Poles. McNamey stated: "I urge all Polish displaced persons in 
the U.S. Zone of Germany to take advantage of this new plan for a 
60-day food ration, available to all who return to Poland during the 
period from October 1 to December 31, 1946. The U.S. Army and the 
American people firmly believe that your future lies in Poland, help-
ing to rebuild your devastated country." McNamey went on to ad-
monish the Poles that they faced worse economic conditions if they 
remained in Germany than if they returned to Poland, 70 a view con-
tradicted by the large number of Poles who returned or tried to return 
to the West after having been repatriated. As one observer at the time 
noted, once the Polish DP's learned of the poor food situation in 
Poland, "repatriation . . . dropped over night.'m McNarney, not 
shrinking from scaring these unfortunate people who had already 
been victimized by so many for so long, told the Polish DP's: "It is 
impossible for the United States to continue operating assembly cen-
ters and camps indefinitely. Emigration to another land holds little 
hope for fulfillment at present, although the United States has at-
tempted to initiate international action. Conditions for resettlement in 
any country will not be easy. Substantial improvement in your eco-
nomic conditions in another country over economic conditions in 
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Poland is very doubtful. Poland needs you. Again, I urge you to return 
to your homeland while several months of moderate weather re-
mains."72 
Once the Poles decided to accept the inducement of additional 
rations, the head of the UNRRA mission in Warsaw told the Polish 
DP's that UNRRA employees "are now packing this food at Dziedice 
and Szczecin, and will personally deliver it to the repatriates as they 
arrive."73 The LaGuardia-sponsored food offer did not produce the 
desired results because he did not understand that the Poles who 
refused to return home either feared political reprisals or did not want 
to live under a system of government installed by the Kremlin. No 
wonder so many Polish refugees regarded UNRRA's offer as an 
insulting attempt to trade on their misery. 74 
Apparently UNRRA officials believed that the less attractive hous-
ing conditions were the more likely the Poles would go home. Roz-
marek complained that as soon as the DP's made a more decent life 
for themselves by planting a garden and starting a school for their 
children, they were shifted to another camp "where bare walls and 
ruined barracks are the only things left by the previous occupants."75 
Under these circumstances, deep-seated resentments by Polish ref-
ugees toward UNRRA officials were inevitable. 
Polish camp leaders were convinced that a well-organized cultural 
life was the last thing UNRRA officials wanted to see developed 
because it encouraged the DP's to remain in Germany. Rozmarek 
reported on one camp that had schools, a theater, choir, library, 
pharmacy, and a mimeographed newspaper. He related, "Before mov-
ing the inmates to another camp, UNRRA confiscated text books, 
school supplies, sporting and recreational equipment, music sheets 
and sewing machines, presented to the camp by a relief organization. 
The departing Poles were permitted to take only clothing and bedding 
with them." Rozmarek's claim was supported by a directive from 
UNRRA's Stuttgart office which read: "Effective October 1st, 1946, 
all educational, recreational and other cultural activities are to be 
discontinued in all camps caring for one hundred or more Polish 
Displaced Persons."76 
In the feverish campaign to induce the Poles to leave the DP camps, 
UNRRA officials directed that Polish refugees should not be em-
ployed. One office memorandum declared: "Do not employ Poles-
repatriate them, as they must go home ... no such thing as a unrepa-
triable Pole. . . . Hire outsiders, even Germans, to replace essential 
Poles, but fire Poles and get them home.'m 
What especially concerned the delegation of the Polish American 
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Congress was the large number of Polish youths who fled from Poland 
after the war but were not accorded DP status. Apparently many of 
these men had belonged to the Polish underground during the war. 
Rozmarek charged that "when caught out of bounds by American or 
British military police, they are handed over to Soviet authorities and 
they disappear never to be heard of again."78 
UNRRA denied the claims of the Polish American leaders, but the 
denials were not entirely convincing. When LaGuardia took issue 
with the attacks, the Narod Polski noted that "the cocky LaGuardia 
denied" what the Polish American leaders had said. But, it added, 
"We believe the delegation of the Polish American Congress which 
was there and LaGuardia was not and saw that which LaGuardia did 
not see."79 Rozmarek's charges were borne out by William Henry 
Chamberlin who also had visited the DP camps in Germany. Cham-
berlin wrote: 
Although there has not been forced repatriation, except in a few 
borderline cases, Nery strong pressure is being put on the Poles 
to return to their Soviet-dominated country. People in the 
camps are denied any semblance of the Four Freedoms. They 
are permitted to read only the propaganda of the Soviet puppet 
government. Independent Polish newspapers are not allowed to 
circulate in the camps. 
There is continual shifting from one camp to another. Schools 
and recreation grounds are arbitrarily closed. Those Poles who 
are performing guard duty, under American command, are 
given very inferior conditions, as regards pay and rations, com-
pared with those of American soldiers. 80 
Although Rozmarek and Chamberlin stopped short of charging 
that Polish DP's were forcibly repatriated to Poland, it is clear that 
only a fine distinction exists between physically forcing individuals to 
do something against their will and creating intolerable conditions 
that induce them to choose an alternative they would not normally 
select in less intimidating circumstances. 
One issue which became a source of considerable controversy was 
the use by American military authorities in Germany of liaison offi-
cers whose loyalty was to the Polish government-in-exile in London, 
not to Warsaw. The Polish government, supported by the Kremlin, 
wanted the London Poles expelled and liaison officers appointed by 
Warsaw to replace them. UNRRA believed that the officers represent-
ing the London Poles hindered the repatriation of Polish DP's. But 
American military authorities were quite satisfied using the London 
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Poles as liaison officers. "These men," LaGuardia said, "have stated 
that they are not going to return home. It would have been better for 
the Polish Government to have had their own liaison officers in the 
Displaced Persons' Camps, who could have dispelled their doubts, 
concerning a decision to return home."81 
Frank Januszewski of KNAPP condemned the suggestion that the 
London Poles be replaced by "murderers and spies" who would bring 
"methods of political criminal terrorism by that government." He did 
not understand why the United States was treating Warsaw as a 
permanent de jure government. "In other words," he told Vanden-
berg, "by treating the provisional Government in Warsaw as a regular 
Government, we are violating the Yalta agreement ourselves."82 On 
his part, Rozmarek suggested but he did not follow up a proposal that 
an American adviser be appointed to act as a liaison between Polish 
DP's and military authorities in Germany and Austria to represent 
the interests of the Poles. 83 
Despite the fact that UNRRA Resolution 92 recommended "that 
only those persons who have been properly nominated by presently 
recognized governments shall be accredited to the occupying author-
ities and military authorities, and permitted to serve as liaison offi-
cers," American military officials in Germany and Austria did not 
completely implement it with respect to the London Poles who con-
tinued to exert considerable influence in the DP camps. Assistant 
Secretary of State Clayton, who headed the American delegation to 
UNRRA's Fifth Council session in August 1946, complained that the 
current role of the London Poles "is certain to be a cause of continuing 
embarrassment to the United States Government and exerts a retard-
ing influence on repatriation of Polish displaced persons." Clayton 
admitted that the Warsaw government had been lax and even uncoop-
erative in providing liaison officers in sufficient numbers, which he 
implied may have required continued use of the London Poles. But, 
he said, the "United States will be blamed in large measure for [the] 
ineffectiveness of Warsaw Polish liaison officers and nonrepatriation 
of large numbers of Poles as long as our military authorities maintain 
[their] present unfriendly attitude toward Warsaw Poles in contrast 
to [their] friendly attitude toward London Poles." 
Clayton wanted Washington to send a strongly worded directive to 
American military authorities in Germany and Austria depriving 
officials of the former London Polish government of any influence 
whatsoever with respect to Polish DP's. 84 By the middle of August 
1946 the War Department instructed its officers in Germany and 
Austria to eliminate any influence of the London Poles and to invite 
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the Warsaw government to provide liaison and welfare officers to 
promote the repatriation of Polish refugees from the West. The 
United States political adviser for Germany, Robert Murphy, told 
Secretary of State Byrnes that the State Department's intention to 
remove the influence of the London Poles would also affect the super-
vision of guard and labor companies and that it would take more time 
to reorganize them. Murphy had high praise for the loyalty and 
efficiency of the Polish officers from London who, he said, would still 
be of great value to screen, select, and influence nonrepatriable DP's 
to resettle in other countries. "In that operation, when it arises," 
Murphy noted, "we can expect little or no assistance from [the] 
Warsaw Poles."85 
The most controversial group of Polish refugees in the West that 
the Warsaw regime wanted repatriated was the Polish army which 
had fought with the British after the Germans overran Poland in 
1939. The Polish army, which had also fought in France before its 
collapse in June of 1940, was reorganized in Scotland. Polish naval 
and air units were reorganized too, and, as is well known, Polish 
fighter units fought with distinction during the Battle of Britain. After 
Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, the Soviet and Polish government-in-
exile came to an understanding, allowing the creation on Soviet soil 
of a Polish Army, composed of men and officers in Soviet internment 
camps, under the command of General Wladyslaw Anders. Stalin 
never really wanted armed Poles in the Soviet Union and so allowed 
Anders to evacuate approximately 115,000 troops and civilians to 
Iran in 1942.86 These troops, combined with the Carpathian Brigade 
which had fought at Tobruk, were organized into the Polish II Corps, 
which played a major role in the Italian campaign from the capture 
of Cassino to the fall of Bologna. Meanwhile, British-based Polish 
troops participated in the liberation of France, Belgium, and Holland. 
After VE Day, the Polish II Corps under Anders's command re-
mained in Italy as part of the British army of occupation. 
The official position of the United States and Great Britain concern-
ing the repatriation of members of the Polish armed forces was no 
different from their position toward civilians. Both governments offi-
cially opposed forced repatriation and stood by the Potsdam under-
standing of the Big Three that veterans who decided to return to 
Poland "shall be accorded personal and property rights on the same 
basis as all Polish citizens."87 For all the claims by the Warsaw 
government that it wanted Polish veterans repatriated, there was a 
curious lack of cooperation with the British to effect a speedy and 
efficient return of those men who wanted to return. Mikolajczyk and 
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Lane claimed---<:orrectly as it turned out-that the Polish govern-
ment was apprehensive about having a large number of soldiers from 
abroad in Poland at the time of the elections. It was reported that 
those who had already returned home were kept out of Warsaw.88 
General I. Modelski, head of the Polish military mission sent to 
Britain to negotiate the repatriation of Polish soldiers under British 
control, himself admitted that Warsaw deliberately intended to slow 
down the process of repatriation. Warsaw insisted that all men who 
elected to return to Poland be subjected to a screening process. The 
British, on the other hand, favored sending as a group all men who 
wished to return as soon as possible without the time-consuming 
process of screening.89 Obviously the Warsaw government hoped to 
screen out older veterans who might be less sympathetic with the 
regime than younger, more adaptable men. Then, too, Warsaw proba-
bly feared a large military influx which might constitute a political 
threat to a government not yet completely controlled by the commu-
nists. It was not an idle fear; after all, Mikolajczyk himself favored a 
return of Polish veterans as units so that they could act as a demo-
cratic corps in the Polish army to offset the men who had been 
indoctrinated by the Soviets. 90 
The Polish government was especially concerned about the contin-
ued presence under arms of the Polish II Corps in Italy. These battle-
experienced veterans, most of whom came from eastern Poland, 
which the Kremlin absorbed into the Soviet Union, hated the Rus-
sians, and few of them chose repatriation to Poland. Warsaw claimed 
that Anders's corps carried out subversive activities against the Polish 
government. Polish communists were convinced that Anders's units 
aided the antiregime underground and claimed that the Polish civil 
war would end once Anders and his troops were disbanded. On 
February 6, 1946, foreign minister Molotov made a speech in which 
he alluded to the maintenance of "anti-Soviet armies" in central 
Europe, which threatened world peace.91 At one point, the Soviets 
tried to cripple Anders's forces by demanding that the British turn 
over 30,000 of his men on the grounds they were really Soviet citizens. 
The British refused. The Soviets even included Anders's men among 
those who fought with the Nazis against the allies and demanded their 
return on that basis. Secretary Byrnes, not very well informed about 
the contribution of Anders's men to the Allied victory in Italy, weakly 
challenged the Soviet assertion and reiterated the Anglo-American 
position against involuntary repatriation. 92 
Early in 1946 the Soviet delegate to the United Nations, Andrei 
Vyshinsky, voiced Yugoslavian charges that Polish troops in Italy had 
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moved toward the Yugoslavian frontier and had recruited anti-Tito 
groups in Italy into their units. Vyshinsky characterized the actions 
as "a possible future threat to peace, calm, and order on the Yugoslav-
Italian frontier." British foreign secretary Bevin denied the charges.93 
In retrospect, it appears that the Yugoslav-Soviet claims were part of 
a carefully orchestrated attack at a time when Yugoslavian troops 
moved into the Venezia Giulia area. 
Of the 249,000 members ofthe Polish armed forces abroad in 1945, 
105,000 chose to return to Poland. General Anders opposed repatria-
tion.94 "All our rights as-a nation are being wiped out," he declared. 
Homebound soldiers, he said, would "go not to Poland but to Russia, 
not to a free life, but to captivity." Despite the fact that Anders had 
promised not to interfere with those who decided to return to Poland, 
men in his command who chose repatriation were made to feel as 
though they were traitors. 
Major General Klemens Rudnicki, commander of the Polish 1st 
Armored Division in occupied Germany, threatened: "We shall re-
turn to Poland-but only with arms in hand."95 Anders and most of 
his staff were anxious to preserve the nucleus of a Polish military force 
which would return, Pilsudski-style, to Poland in a war between the 
West and the Soviet Union that most Poles in western Europe believed 
was inevitable. 
The Polish II Corps had become a political embarrassment to 
Britain, so the units were recalled to Britain in the summer and early 
fall of 1946 and disbanded. Although the British government -pre-
ferred that the veterans return home, it pledged itself to help those 
who remained in the West to resettle. To help the Poles build a future, 
the British established a Polish Resettlement Corps in which they 
received training in agricultural and industrial activities which helped 
them return to civilian life. 96 At first, the Polish government con-
demned the resettlement corps as "a military organization under 
military discipline." Using a law of 1920 which authorized the govern-
ment to take away Polish citizenship from soldiers who joined a 
foreign organization, the Warsaw regime applied it to General Anders 
and seventy-five of his staff officers. Enrollment in the Polish Resettle-
ment Corps began in January 1947, and 103,000 Poles joined it.97 
Although several European governments expressed a willingness to 
admit former Polish veterans into their countries, the United States 
was slow to respond to the needs of this group of refugees, which was 
consistent with the apathy and, in some cases, the hostility of Ameri-
can public opinion on the issue. Even Polish Americans were slow to 
call for congressional efforts to provide a home for these former Allied 
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troops. 98 It was not until late in 1946 that the Polish American 
Congress mounted a campaign that Polish veterans be permitted 
either to enlist in the United States army of occupation and be granted 
American citizenship or to join Polish civilian refugees in settling in 
A1aska.99 Later, when Congress considered passage of the Stratton 
Bill which provided for the entrance of 400,000 DP's into the United 
States over a four-year period, Rozmarek appeared before the House 
immigration subcommittee and pleaded that an amendment be added 
to provide for former Polish soldiers who, he said, were entitled to 
enter the United States "if only as a reward for the invaluable service 
they rendered America as our gallant fighting allies." It was not until 
1950 that H.R. 4567, amending the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, 
allowed 18,000 former Polish veterans to enter the United States. 100 
To be sure, the Polish American Congress was equally interested 
in the fate of the thousands of Polish civilians who refused to go back 
to Poland and wanted to find a home somewhere in the West. After 
the return of his delegation from Europe in 1946, Rozmarek made 
several recommendations aimed at opening the doors of the United 
States to Polish refugees. He called for revision of immigration laws 
that would allow unused quotas during the war to be filled by DP's. 
While still in Europe, Rozmarek had recommended to secretary 
Byrnes that 150,000 Polish DP's be admitted to the United States. 
"For its participation in Yalta, which deprived displaced persons of 
a free homeland," he declared, "the United States must accept its full 
responsibility in this challenging crisis on moral as well as on human-
itarian grounds." Leaving no doubt about his views concerning the 
Big Three settlement on Poland, he added a stinging rebuke: "If there 
had been no Yalta in 1945 there would be no Displaced Persons 
problem in 1947."101 
It was not until Apri11947 that the American Committee for the 
Relief of Polish Immigrants was incorporated. Popularly known as 
the Polish Iminigration Committee, the organization made its head-
quarters in New York City and received assistance from the Polish 
American Congress and the American Relief for Poland. Before the 
passage of the Displaced Persons Act of June 25, 1948, the organiza-
tion's activity was confined to assisting a number of DP's who had 
relatives in the United States to fill Poland's unused wartime immigra-
tion quotas, helping Poles born in America or naturalized Americans 
who were in Poland or other parts of Europe and had been unable to 
return to the United States during the war, and influencing the pas-
sage of private bills by Congress to allow several hundred Polish war 
victims to remain in the United States. 102 
vn Polish Americans and the Polish Question 
During World War II most Polish Americans 
supported the Polish government-in-exile and regarded the Soviet 
Union as an atheistic despotism which intended to force the commu-
nist system upon the Polish people. From May 1944 most Polish 
Americans were organized in the Polish American Congress, which 
represented approximately 6 million Americans of Polish ancestry. 
Through the Polish American Congress, they tried but failed to influ-
ence American policy toward the Soviet Union over the questions of 
Poland's postwar boundary in the east and the complexion of the 
future government of Poland. President Roosevelt had misled not 
only the Polish American Congress but also Polish officials in London 
that he intended to do far more for Poland than he was willing or able 
to accomplish. 
When Polish Americans became aware of the results of the Yalta 
Conference, which confirmed the cession of a large chunk of Polish 
land east of the Curzon Line and provided for the framework of a 
coalition government dominated by communists, the Polish Ameri-
can Congress was the first major bloc of anti-Soviet Americans to 
condemn the Yalta agreements and recommend that the administra-
tion take steps to deal with the Polish situation. For all its attacks 
against the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, the Polish American 
Congress did nevertheless support Polish land acquistions to the Od-
er-Neisse line and criticized secretaries Byrnes and Marshall for sug-
gesting revisions in favor of the Germans. 
But the zealous fervor of the Polish American Congress in 1945 and 
1946 in condemning the Soviets and criticizing American policies 
toward the Polish and Soviet governments did not find a responsive 
audience either in Washington or in the American public at large. 
The proposals of the Polish American Congress in dealing with War-
saw and Moscow were seen as too extreme and even dangerous until 
the American public came around later in the 1940s to share many 
of the views advanced by Polish Americans. That is why the Truman 
administration maintained an aloof attitude toward Rozmarek and 
other leaders of the Polish American Congress and its affiliates. 
Predictably during these years, the Polish American Congress drew 
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closer to officials associated with the Polish government-in-exile, criti-
cized American loans to Warsaw, had misgivings about the distribu-
tion of UNRRA aid in Poland, welcomed Mikolajczyk when he fled 
from Poland to the United States, and launched a major attack on the 
communists through the Committee to Stop World Communism. 
No issue had unified the Polish American community as much as 
the Yalta decisions concerning Poland. Polish Americans perceived 
American policy on the Polish question as a cynical disregard of the 
ideals contained in the Atlantic Charter and a deliberate effort to 
appease the Soviet Union, which they regarded as the inveterate 
enemy of the entire free world. Since almost every Polish American 
family had a relative in Poland, a country that had lost lands to the 
Soviets and from which a large proportion of Polish Americans had 
emigrated to the United States, it is not surprising that they were very 
bitter about the wartime settlements concerning Poland. 
The Yalta decision on Poland had provoked immediate and sharp 
criticism from the Polish American Congress. Rozmarek called Yalta 
a "moral abdication of the Atlantic Charter" and implied that Roose-
velt and Churchill were as guilty as Stalin in delivering a blow to 
Poland. Dziennik Zwiazkowy (Alliance Daily), the widely read publi-
cation of the Polish National Alliance, bitterly criticized Roosevelt 
and Churchill for abandoning western ideals and sacrificing Poland 
at Yalta. In one issue of the newspaper a cartoon showed Stalin's 
police whipping Poles who trudged off to labor camps in the Soviet 
Union. The Poles passed a sign ostensibly bearing the words of the 
Big Three at Yalta: "We will create a strong, free and prosperous 
Poland." 1 The Polish American Congress Bulletin bitterly declared: 
"We want to be on record in claiming that America has lost her way, 
that we have again missed, miscalculated, squandered, frustrated, and 
deeply hurt the heart and soul of America."2 
When Truman assumed the presidency, Polish Americans hoped 
that he would take a tougher stand against the Soviet Union on behalf 
of Poland. But it became increasingly apparent that once the govern-
ment in Warsaw was reconstituted according to the Yalta formula, 
Washington paid less attention to the Polish problem. One of the 
persistent themes which characterized the Polish American press was 
that the Truman administration no longer really cared about Poland 
and that Polonia should act in defense of the interests of the Polish 
nation. "So long has the Polish question taxed the diplomatic brains 
and the conscience of the world, that from sheer exhaustion, perhaps, 
this lamentable settlement has been accepted with something akin to 
relief," the Polish American Congress said. "The world is too weary 
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to protest. And for Poland, justice sleeps."3 Late in October of 1945 
officers of the Polish American Congress issued a statement saying, 
"As Poland's independence is being strangled by a Soviet military 
noose, there is not a single word of protest from our government. This 
silence only intensifies the mental, physical and spiritual anguish of 
the people of Poland."4 
Following a series of articles which described the difficult and often 
brutal conditions the Polish people had to endure, Narod Polski, 
published by the Polish Roman Catholic Union, asked: "Why Doesn't 
the United States Interest Itself More in Poland?" No longer was this 
influential Polish American newspaper optimistic as it once had been 
that the United States would help free Poland from communism. 
Narod Polski joined Zgoda in boldly suggesting that somehow Po-
lonia could save Poland. 5 To that end, the Polish American Congress 
launched a "Million Dollar Drive" to propagandize the Polish cause. 
Since the Polish nation could not act as its own spokesman, the Polish 
American Congress declared: "we must speak for them and plead 
their cause before the bar of public opinion." Interestingly enough, the 
campaign was at least partially intended to combat discrimination 
against Polish Americans in the United States. With headquarters in 
Gary, Indiana, the campaign hoped to raise $1 million, most of which 
would be used to purchase advertisements in newspapers. General 
Bor's visit to the United States and his extensive speaking tour was 
a part of the "Million Dollar Drive."6 When Rozmarek's delegation 
left the United States to inspect DP camps in Europe, Zgoda de-
scribed the trip as "the first act in defense of the Polish Nation." It 
added: "Thanks for this help of Polonia-the struggle for freedom, 
independence and sovereignty-the Polish people shall win."7 Fi-
nally, in order to be able to exert greater political pressure, delegates 
of the Polish American Congress authorized funding for the purchase 
of a building in Washington, D.C., for the national headquarters of 
the organization and voted to have its national convention in the 
nation's capital in May 1948.8 
The Truman administration was unwilling to take measures which 
would insure that the promised elections in Poland would indeed be 
free and unfettered. Rozmarek urged Truman to insist upon guaran-
tees that would enable allied supervision of the Polish elections. 9 No 
such guarantees had been provided for at Yalta and Truman did not 
press the matter at Potsdam. 10 As has been seen, whatever opportu-
nity may still have been left to alter the conditions that would make 
Poland more independent was lost at the Potsdam Conference when 
the United States failed to link its agreement to the Oder-Neisse line 
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with concessions from the communist side concerning the political 
future of Poland. 
To Polish Americans the Big Three meeting at Potsdam simply 
confirmed the partition of Poland that condemned millions of unwill-
ing people into the Soviet sphere of influence. The pledge ofthe Polish 
provisional government of national unity to hold free and unfettered 
elections as soon as possible did not impress Polish Americans. Speak-
ing on behalf of the Polish American Congress, Rozmarek saw little 
hope for free elections unless they were supervised by the allies and 
the Russians withdrew their troops from the country. Even the Big 
Three agreement permitting the Warsaw government to administer 
former German territories up to the Oder-Neisse line was regarded by 
the Polish American Congress as an extension of Soviet frontiers 
westward "unless Poland is rehabilitated to a free democratic life of 
her own." In its August-September 1945 Bulletin, the Polish group 
bitterly declared: "It was not Russia but America that broke Po-
land."11 
Speaking on behalf of the Polish American Congress, Rozmarek 
told Truman on October 20, 1945, that the United States was not 
bound by Roosevelt's agreements at Tehran and Yalta because they 
were made without the knowledge or approval of the United States 
Congress and the American people. He criticized Truman, too, for 
recognizing the Warsaw government before the promised free and 
unfettered elections had actually been held, instead of "merely prom-
ised." Rozmarek returned to an oft-repeated Polish American theme 
-"If Russia would only withdraw its armies and stop interfering in 
Poland's internal affairs, Poland's troubles would come to a swift 
end." 12 The position of the Polish American Congress was endorsed 
by Congressman Thomas S. Gordon of Illinois, a Polish American 
who chaired a congressional investigating committee that had re-
cently returned from Poland. Gordon told a Pulaski memorial rally 
that "all the Poles want is to get rid of the Soviet Army and the 
government backed by Soviet bayonets." He added, "They want 
America and the whole world to redeem the pledges which were given 
to them and become a free, democratic and independent nation." 13 
Convinced that the promised elections would have no value without 
adequate guarantees, Rozmarek asked the administration to with-
draw recognition from the Warsaw regime and reestablish relations 
with the former Polish government, still in exile in London, until free 
elections under Allied supervision were possible. 14 By the end of 1946 
the Polish American Congress refined its position by proposing that 
the United States withdraw recognition from the Warsaw regime and 
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extend recognition to the president of the Polish republic in London 
as the only legal representative-of the Polish nation until free elections 
were held under the supervision of the United Nations. Picking up on 
a theme implied earlier in the Polish American press, Rozmarek's 
organization also recommended that meanwhile the Polish American 
Congress should serve as a trustee of the rights of the Polish nation. 15 
Rozmarek appears to have had little real hope that the free elections 
would ever be held in Poland and apparently believed that if Truman 
withdrew recognition from Warsaw and extended it to the London 
Poles at least the "moral blunders" of Yalta and Potsdam would be 
redressed. 16 
Rozmarek's views were echoed by other leaders within the Polish 
American community. The Rev. A.A. Skoniecki, a prominent and 
articulate leader of the Coordinating Committee of American-Polish 
Associations in the East, pointed out that the Polish people "out of 
fear and hunger will vote the way they are told." A leader in New 
England's Polonia at the time later observed, "No reasonable Polish 
American expected free elections in a country occupied by Soviet 
troops and police. Most Polish Americans strongly endorsed Roz-
marek's call to withdraw United States recognition from the Warsaw 
regime as the legal government ofPoland."17 But the Truman admin-
istration had no intention of withdrawing recognition from the War-
saw government and disingenuously told the Polish Americans that 
the current regime in Poland had been established "by the Poles 
themselves and was not imposed upon the Polish people by the United 
States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union." 18 
Rozmarek's stance came increasingly closer to that of KNAPP's 
leadership who stubbornly refused to accept the legality of the Yalta 
agreement, continued to recognize the London Poles as the legal 
political representatives of Poland and condemned Mikolajczyk for 
his willingness to participate in the Warsaw government. KNAPP 
deplored what it described as American weakness in the face of Soviet 
aggression and wondered disapprovingly if the "home of the brave" 
was to become "the home of cowering appeasers." 19 
KNAPP's interest in the fate of General Leopold Okulicki high-
lighted the organization's conviction that the United States had an 
obligation to protect individuals formerly associated with the Polish 
government-in-exile, a government Washington had once recognized 
as the legal representative of the Polish people. Okulicki was the 
former commander of the Armia Krajowa (Home Army) and one of 
the underground leaders who had been arrested and tried by Soviet 
authorities in the summer of 1945. Januszewski appealed to General 
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Dwight D. Eisenhower to intervene on behalf of Okulicki "to do 
whatever is within your power as the former Supreme Commander of 
the United Nations Forces in order that one of our most loyal generals 
and comrades at arms be assured humane treatment dictated by com-
mon decency." The State Department said the United States could 
not do anything for Okulicki because of the Kremlin's policy of not 
entertaining requests about people who were citizens of another coun-
try. Januszewski was not satisfied; he told the State Department: 
The United States Government, however, has not only the right 
but also a duty to intervene in the above matter. The United 
States Government deprived General Okulicki and his com-
rades of protection under their legal Government by withdraw-
ing recognition from the Constitutional Government of the 
Republic of Poland in London. In withdrawing recognition the 
United States assumed an obligation of safeguarding General 
Okulicki and his comrades from persecution for their activities 
undertaken under orders from the legal Polish Government at 
a time when the said Polish Government was recognized by the 
United States and allied with the United States. 
The State Department did not want to pursue the matter, provoking 
an irate Januszewski to tell it "that the present Administration is 
evading in a manner deserving the sharpest criticism, action in behalf 
of its Polish ally, when it is definitely committed to such action."20 
KNAPP was equally outraged by the refusal of the State Depart-
ment to grant a visa to General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, former com-
mander-in-chief of the Polish army, to enter the United States to 
speak to Polish American audiences. Sosnkowski, a brilliant intellec-
tual, was a follower of the Pilsudski political school and shared the 
old Polish dictator's hatred of the Soviets. Since KNAPP's member-
ship was ultranationalistic and Russophobic-some of its leaders were 
former "colonels" in Pilsudski's government-it is not surprising that 
the organization espoused the cause of Sosnkowski so zealously. 
KNAPP angrily told the secretary of state, "If this man and his army 
were good enough to fight with us thru all the war, why can't he be 
good enough to come to our country now?"21 The New York division 
of the Polish American Congress labeled the refusal to grant the 
general a visa an "outrage," especially in view ofthe fact that the State 
Department allowed communist leaders to enter the country "to de-
stroy democracy."22 
Polish Americans reacted bitterly to the Polish elections of January 
1947. Rozmarek sent a telegram to Secretary of State Marshall and 
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urged the .United States to repudiate the elections and to withhold 
recognition from "the counterfeit government" in Warsaw. He called 
for the ouster of Poland from the United Nations and demanded an 
immediate investigation by the United Nations of the situation in 
Poland. Echoing a theme that the Polish American Congress had 
repeated since the end of the war, Rozmarek described the election 
as "a warning of destiny that annexation of all Europe, Asia and 
eventually of America will take place by similar methods as in Poland, 
unless stem and effective measures are adopted by the United States, 
the only country capable of stopping Russia's ruthless drive for world 
domination."23 The Narod Polski bemoaned the elections as the 
"blackest" day in the history of the Polish people, while the editor of 
Zgoda wrote, "The Polish nation went through another painful and 
bitter tragedy." The day after the elections, the Dziennik Zwiazkowy 
headlined its issue: "There Were No Free Elections in Poland. Miko-
lajczyk Demands Annulment."24 
Polish Americans saw the political situation in Poland as part of 
a scenario of Soviet expansionism that would sooner or later engulf 
the entire world. Increasingly the rhetoric of the Polish American 
Congress and its affiliates become more shrill and extreme, a conse-
quence of the bitterness, frustration, and hopelessness so many 
Americans of Polish ancestry felt at this time. The Polish American 
Congress believed that it had a duty not only to inform the American 
public about the situation in Poland but also to instruct Americans 
in the dangers of continuing to placate a menace that it considered 
even worse than Nazi Germany. 
After Rozmarek's trip to Europe, his rhetoric became more alar-
mist, offering solutions to Soviet expansionism that the administration 
had no intention of adopting. Shortly after his return to the United 
States in the latter part of 1946, Rozmarek confided that he was 
pessimistic about the chances that peace would last very long. "Nur-
tured by Moscow, the cancerous growth of communism is spreading," 
he said. "It is painfully evident that Russia is playing an evil role in 
the postwar world. Already two-thirds of Europe, with a population 
exceeding that ofthe United States, is encoiled by the Red Octopus." 
He claimed that what astonished democratic elements in Europe was 
not Soviet aggression but the failure of American leaders "to summon 
enough courage to call off the Soviet bluff about American imperial-
ism by turning the tables to point an accusing finger at the only 
instigator of a new war-Soviet Russia."25 Rozmarek claimed that 
European statesmen told him that the United States did not have to 
lose a single soldier because it had a monopoly on the atomic bomb, 
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"the only thing that can convince Russia that criminal aggression 
does not pay." Rozmarek approved of a policy of atomic diplomacy 
against the Kremlin and rejected schemes to control America's mo-
nopoly of the weapon. 26 Later he said, "The threat of the atomic 
bomb can be used successfully to force Russia to remove her armies, 
puppet governments and fifth columnists from territories not held by 
her after the first world war." He added, "The atomic bomb is the only 
thing that can check war."27 
Concern in Polish American circles about communist expansion-
ism also focused on the alleged threat at home. Rozmarek told a 
Polish American audience during a celebration of Polish Constitution 
Day on May 5, 1946, that "we wholeheartedly endorse the move to 
purge all communists, and those of the same mind as communists, ... 
from our government payrolls! Washington has too long been under 
their destructive influence."28 The Narod Polski urged Secretary of 
State Marshall shortly after his appointment to fire communist advis-
ers in the State Department and to appoint some Polish Americans 
who had a realistic understanding of the world situation. In February 
1947 the Polish American Congress voted to set up its own "Commit-
tee on Un-American Activities" to ferret out and publicize all foreign 
agents who sought to destroy America and strongly supported the 
work of the House Un-American Activities Committee.29 
When Truman announced aid to Greece and Turkey early in 1947 
Polish Americans for the first time since the end of World War II 
rallied to the administration and heartily endorsed Washington's 
tougher foreign policy toward the Kremlin. Rozmarek told fifty thou-
sand Americans of Polish descent during a celebration of the 156th 
anniversary of the Polish Constitution in May 1947 that the Polish 
American Congress was in full agreement with the Truman Doctrine 
and boldly suggested that it be applied to Poland, which he reminded 
his listeners was "the first victim of combined Nazi and Communist 
aggression. " 30 
Rozmarek's proposal was echoed by some of the Polish American 
Congress's most articulate affiliates-the Polish Roman Catholic 
Union and KNAPP. 31 Henryk Kogut, the head of KNAPP, told 
Truman that the president's announcement of aid to Greece and 
Turkey opened a new chapter in history that canceled the mistakes 
of Yalta. Kogut warned, however, that Soviet aggression would not 
be stopped until the United States understood that its security lay on 
the Niemen.32 For all the administration's talk about stopping Soviet 
expansionism, Rozmarek was disappointed that Washington did not 
repudiate the Yalta agreement. If Washington disavowed the Yalta 
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agreement, Rozmarek felt that it would destroy the legal basis for 
Soviet claims to eastern Poland and provide the foundation to restore 
freedom to the countries of eastern Europe. 33 
American policy concerning the German-Polish boundary ironi-
cally found most Polish Americans in agreement with the Warsaw 
government which they had anathematized since its recognition by 
the United States. Secretary Byrnes's speech at Stuttgart in September 
of 1946, just two months before the congressional elections, had a 
major impact on the Polish American community. Rozmarek labeled 
Byrnes's suggestion to revise the Oder-Neisse boundary "a horrible 
miscarriage of justice." He asked sardonically, "Why weren't the 
Poles informed in the first place that territory assigned to them at 
Potsdam was only for the purpose of giving it back to the Germans 
and making the Polish settlers face the pitiful tragedy of eviction?"34 
Like most Polish American leaders, Rozmarek believed that Polish 
acquisitions from Germany did not compensate the Polish nation for 
losses to the Soviets in the east. In fact, a spokesman for one major 
Polish American organization, the Coordinating Committee of 
American-Polish Associations in the East, considered Poland's post-
war boundary with Germany ifl reality a Soviet frontier "because all 
of Poland belongs in fact to Russia."35 KNAPP attacked Byrnes for 
building up Germany and sacrificing Europe. 36 
The Polish American press, reflecting the deep emotional commit-
ment of Polish Americans to the existing Polish-German frontier, 
scored Washington for suggesting even the slightest revision in the 
boundary. On September 10, 1946, Dziennik Zwiazkowy published a 
cartoon showing a large ugly woman who represented Germany being 
courted by Byrnes and Molotov, both of whom were offering Polish 
land to her. The following day the same newspaper featured a cartoon 
with the headline, "Another Blow to the Polish People." It depicted 
a man-who represented the Polish people-lying on the ground 
between one boulder on his legs and another one about to fall on his 
body. The rock on his legs represented lands in the east taken by the 
Soviets while the other, representing Byrnes's proposal made at Stutt-
gart, carried the caption: "New Partition of Poland for the Benefit of 
Germany."37 In 1947, when Secretary of State Marshall picked up on 
Byrnes's suggestion concerning a revision of the Polish-German fron-
tier, Polish Americans again made it unmistakably clear that they 
considered Washington's policy on the issue "regretable and pain-
ful."as 
Despite Mikolajczyk's urging that the United States extend credits 
to the Polish government, the Polish American Congress opposed it, 
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believing that employing American economic wealth without exacting 
a quid pro quo from Warsaw was unwise. In May 1946 Rozmarek told 
a Polish American audience in Chicago that his organization disap-
proved of promised loans to Poland without securing a commitment 
from Warsaw concerning the holding of free elections. Since the 
credits had been approved without restrictions, Rozmarek asserted 
that the United States was bound to send an investigating team to 
Poland to insure that the money was used for the benefit of the Polish 
people and "not for the purposes of financing the enemies of Polish 
freedom."39 
As has been seen, the Polish American Congress had severely criti-
cized UNRRA procedures and operations in connection with the care 
and welfare of Polish refugees in DP camps in Germany and Austria. 
Though it favored continued aid to the Polish people, the Polish 
American Congress urged that American officials supervise the distri-
bution ofUNRRA aid, thereby preventing the Warsaw regime from 
using political criteria in granting relief.40 However, most Polish 
Americans appear to have favored the continuation of relief to Poland 
and probably agreed with Congressman George Sadowski of Michi-
gan when he criticized the Truman administration for ending Ameri-
can support of the UNRRA program: "It is said 'but they 
(Communist Satellites) have a government that we do not like.' And 
I say in reply, so what? The people of that nation also may not like 
their government, but governments come and governments go, but 
nations and people live forever."41 
Still, not all Polish Americans were anticommunists. A minority of 
Americans of Polish ancestry supported the Warsaw government and 
defended Soviet policies in eastern Europe. During the war years the 
Kosciuszko League, organized by the Rev. Stanislaw Orlemanski in 
November 1943, and the American Polish Labor Council, organized 
a few months later, were pro-Soviet and endorsed Stalin's policies in 
Poland. Leo Krzycki, who headed the American Polish Labor Coun-
cil and the American Slav Congress, was the major spokesman in the 
United States for the postwar Warsaw government. In fact, when the 
Lublin committee was organized by Stalin, Krzycki described himself 
as its leading representative in the United StatesY He echoed the 
Warsaw government's charges that General Anders's army encour-
aged terroristic bands in Poland, criticized the reception General Bor 
had received in the United States in the spring of 1946, and urged 
Washington to follow a friendly policy toward Warsaw by giving 
"economic help in the form of a loan to Poland." Krzycki's appeals 
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and letters to the State Department were widely publicized by the 
Polish press in Warsaw.~3 
Krzycki, described by!Rozmarek as a "completely misguided indi-
vidual,"44 toured Poland and the Soviet Union in 1945 and 1946,and 
later published his experiences in a pamphlet entitled What I Saw in 
the Slavic Countries. He had a lengthy interview with president 
Bierut, who awarded him one of Poland's most coveted awards, the 
Polonia Restituta. After his meeting with Bierut, Krzycki came away 
with the conviction that Poland was not a lackey of Moscow. He later 
met Stalin, whom he compared to Abraham Lincoln. 45 
The dissatisfaction of Polish Americans with the failure of the 
Truman administration to prevent communist domination over Po-
land made them vulnerable to Republican party strategy which ex-
ploited the issue in the congressional elections of 1946. Januszewski, 
a long-time Republican, encouraged Senator Vandenberg and other 
Republican leaders to wage a campaign directed at the voter with 
eastern European ties. He told the senator, "We must win elections 
by taking away the votes of those Democrats who comprehend the 
suicidal trend of the present administration's international policy." 
Januszewski added emotionally, "The Republican party [can] save 
itself in the next election by saving America. There is one positive way 
to save America from catastrophe: Save Europe and Asia from slav-
ery!"4s 
Vandenberg, regarded by Polonia as "a proven friend of Poland and 
the Polish people,"47 acknowledged the fact that Americans of Polish 
ancestry were well organized, but he had doubts about their political 
wisdom and sophistication. Instead of repudiating the Yalta agree-
ment, Vandenberg believed that it was far more prudent to insist that 
the Warsaw and Moscow governments fulfill the decisions reached at 
the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. 48 He shared the views of other 
Republican leaders who refused to repudiate the Yalta agreement. 
Vandenberg, bristling at the suggestion that he was not tough enough 
in postwar dealings with the Soviets, told Januszewski that if he was 
defeated in the November elections, that would confirm the Soviet 
allegation that his views did not "reflect the opinion either of my 
country or my large Polish constituency."49 
The attitude that the Roosevelt and Truman administrations had 
betrayed Poland was a pervasive one in Polish American circles. 
Byrnes's Stuttgart speech, which received wide coverage and com-
mentary in the Polish American press, had a significant impact on 
reinforcing the belief that Washington had written off Poland to the 
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Soviets and now favored Germany. One prominent Polish American 
leader in Massachusetts, commented, "I could not believe my ears 
when I read what Byrnes had said in Stuttgart. It was another sell-
out."50 
Dramatic evidence of Polish American disaffection with the Demo-
cratic party in 1946 came shortly before the elections when Republi-
can candidates were asked for the first time in thirty years to speak 
to a meeting of a politically important civic organization in the heart 
of northwest Chicago's Polish section. Even Polish American con-
gressmen were criticized by some of their kinsmen for joining "in the 
betrayal of free Poland by their silent approval of the Truman leader-
ship." Chicago's War Veterans Committee completely disavowed the 
Democratic party and urged Polish Americans to vote Republican. 51 
To be sure, the Republicans made every effort to appeal to the 
ethnic voter, especially those with eastern European roots, by charg-
ing that the Democrats were soft on communism and talking con-
stantly about their "betrayal" of Poland. State Department officials 
even complained about the embarrassing questions that were raised 
during the campaign concerning American credits to the Polish gov-
ernment. 52 
Ironically, contrary to some claims, 53 the president of the Polish 
American Congress, Charles Rozmarek, did not endorse any congres-
sional candidates in the elections. Possibly Rozmarek's inexperience 
in partisan politics and his fear of jeopardizing support within the 
Polish American community may have influenced his decision to keep 
the Polish American Congress neutral in the 1946 elections.54 One 
experienced Polish American leader astutely observed that even 
though many leaders within Polonia favored the Republicans over the 
Democrats in 1946, they realized that the Democratic party was still 
widely regarded as "the poor man's party" and were reluctant to 
endorse, at least openly, Republican candidates. 55 
The results of the elections revealed the degree to which tradition-
ally Democratic-voting Polish Americans had turned away from the 
Democrats. In the Polish American second congressional district of 
Chicago, a Republican, Richard Vail, defeated the incumbent, Wil-
liam Rowen. In the Polish American seventh congressional district, 
the Republicans won by 46,000 votes. Polish American support for 
Democratic candidates in the Illinois at-large congressional seat 
showed a significant decline since the early 1940s. In Pennsylvania, 
Republicans took away seats from Democrats in counties with large 
numbers of Polish voters. In Detroit, Republicans took two Demo-
cratic house seats, revealing considerable defection by Polish Ameri-
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cans from the Democratic party. 56 In Detroit, the share of the 
Democratic party's vote dropped dramatically-19.1 percent-com-
pared to its previous vote in congressional elections or to the Demo-
cratic vote in non-Slavic wards. 57 There is little doubt that Polonia's 
ironclad allegiance to the Democratic party was broken by the Repub-
licans in 1946. It appears equally true that American foreign policy 
played a major, if not decisive, factor in the number of Polish Ameri-
cans who shifted their votes to the Republican party. 
After Mikolajczyk's escape from Poland, he went to England before 
coming to the United States at the end of 1947. He was well aware 
of the divisions within Polonia concerning his association with a 
government that had been legitimized by the Yalta agreement. The 
Polish American right wing, represented by KNAPP, was the most 
aggressive in attacking Mikolajczyk for forsaking the Polish govern-
ment in London and joining a regime it considered composed of Soviet 
agents. The attacks against Mikolajczyk were especially severe in such 
right-wing newspapers as Nowy Swiat and Dziennik Polski. 58 
Though Rozmarek's position was close to that of KNAPP and the 
London Poles, he, like Mikolajczyk, also appreciated the need for 
unity among various groups of Poles in what was now perceived as 
a long-term struggle against communism. Despite KNAPP's attacks 
against Mikolajczyk, Rozmarek was keenly aware of the role a states-
man of Mikolajczyk's stature could play in Polonia's crusade against 
communism. As a realist, Rozmarek understood too that Mikolajczyk 
would have to make peace with Polish Americans who found it diffi-
cult to accept his association with the Warsaw regime. In order to do 
that Mikolajczyk would have to condemn the Yalta agreement. Only 
then would Polonia accept him with open arms. Early in December 
1947 Dziennik Zwiazkowy warned that anyone who did not repudiate 
the Yalta agreement could not expect cooperation from Polish Ameri-
cans.59 
Mikolajczyk, accompanied by Korbonski and Baginski, who were 
also prominent leaders ofthe PSL leadership in exile, went to Chicago 
and met with leaders of the Polish American Congress in December 
194 7. During the discussions there, officials of the Polish American 
Congress talked almost exclusively in terms of the Yalta agreement 
and the need for its repudiation. It was equally clear that Mikolajczyk 
and his colleagues believed that the American Polonia placed too 
much emphasis on the agreement. They emphasized the fact that the 
validity of the Crimean decisions concerning Poland was a matter 
which should be left up to the American government. Mikolajczyk 
argued that those who agreed to participate in the reconstituted post-
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war Polish government were not party to the agreement; they simply 
tried to execute it. Besides, the PSL leaders pointed out, to challenge 
the Yalta decisions raised serious questions about Poland's bounda-
ries, including Poland's substantial acquisitions in the West. At one 
point, Baginski, obviously annoyed by the unrealistic views of Polo-
nia's leaders, astutely observed, "Why is there so much talk about 
Yalta and not about more important matters such as the loss of 
[Polish] independence?"60 The implication was clear-if the Yalta 
agreement had been fulfilled, Poland would be an independent nation. 
After two days of discussions on December 15 and 16, 194 7, the 
leadership of the Polish American Congress and the PSL in exile came 
to an agreement which called for the unification of all forces to try 
to restore Polish freedom and to combat communism, condemned the 
Warsaw government as an alien agency "foisted" upon Poland 
through false elections, labeled the Yalta agreement "an evil," and 
proclaimed "the duty" of all Poles to defend Poland's western fron-
tiers. By this understanding, Mikolajczyk and his colleagues recog-
nized the work of the Polish American Congress on behalf of the 
Polish cause, and likewise Rozmarek and other leaders of the congress 
welcomed the PSL leaders to the United States with the expectation 
that cooperation between both groups would benefit a free Po1and.61 
Although the Rozmarek-Mikolajczyk agreement met with wide 
support within the Polish American community,62 the Polish Ameri-
can right wing did not accept the understanding. KNAPP withdrew 
from the Polish American Congress, regarding Rozmarek's agree-
ment with Mikolajczyk as a major blunder, equaled only by his en-
dorsement of Roosevelt for the presidency in 1944. Shortly thereafter, 
the Polish Roman Catholic Union, which resented Rozmarek's dic-
tatorial methods, also left the Polish American Congress. For a long 
time many members and leaders had bristled over Rozmarek's admin- · 
istration of the Polish American Congress, criticizing his reluctance 
to accept suggestions and initiatives which originated from the leader-
ship of affiliate organizations. 63 
The united front between the two Polish groups did not last long. 
Mikolajczyk, who could be disingenuous, fell out not only with his 
PSL colleagues but also with the leadership of the Polish American 
Congress, preferring to be the unchallenged spokesman for a free 
Poland. Mikolajczyk, who had a somewhat condescending attitude 
toward Polish American leaders like Rozmarek and other Polish 
leaders in exile, including the London Poles, was interested in linking 
himself with other exiled peasant party leaders from eastern Europe 
and was encouraged to do so by the State Department. 64 In fact, the 
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State Department's single-minded attention to Mikolajczyk annoyed 
other prominent Polish emigres who were involved in political activi-
ties in the United States. Juliusz Lukasiewicz, former Polish ambassa-
dor to the Soviet Union and France before World War II and himself 
an emigre, complained that the "Voice of America" and the BBC 
focused only on Mikolajczyk and ignored the activities of other Polish 
leaders. 65 One historian observed that Mikolajczyk "played a lone 
hand, organized and dismissed his own committee, and carried on his 
own policies in second exile."66 
The views of the Polish American Congress concerning the menace 
of communism were shared by the former ambassador to Poland, 
Arthur Bliss Lane, who also hoped that the differences among Poles 
and Polish Americans could be overcome in order to serve the inter-
ests of a free Poland. After his resignation from the diplomatic service, 
Lane, like Rozmarek, became obsessed with the threat of communism 
to the free world. He toured the United States and spoke to audiences 
on the theme. He wrote a popular book, I Saw Poland Betrayed, 
published in 1948, criticizing American policies toward the Kremlin 
which had resulted in a communist government in Warsaw. "Al-
though the principal responsibility for Poland's fate must be placed 
on the Nazi and Soviet governments," Lane wrote, "certainly the 
United States and Great Britain cannot escape a share in the tragic 
betrayal."67 American liberals had to bear responsibility too, Lane 
said in a radio broadcast in April 1947, "in condoning under Soviet 
domination what they formerly castigated under Nazi domination."68 
It was natural that Lane, a former ambassador to Poland during 
one of the most critical periods in its history and a man who strongly 
believed in the threat of communism to the United States and the rest 
of the free world, should support the efforts of Rozmarek and other 
leaders of the Polish American Congress in organizing a committee 
whose major objective was to stop the advance of world communism. 
In the winter of 1947 Lane joined Judge Blair F. Gunther to serve as 
cochairman of the Committee to Stop World Communism. Gunther 
was a prominent Polish American leader who was censor of the Polish 
National Alliance and president of the western Pennsylvania division 
of the Polish American Congress. 69 
The objectives of the Committee to Stop World Communism were 
to alert the American public to the dangers of communism in Poland 
and other eastern European countries and to encourage public sup-
port of policies that would check it, to unify Americans of eastern 
European ancestry to fight against the spread of communism in the 
United States and abroad, to support democratic elements in Poland 
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and other communist-dominated countries through welfare services, 
information, and moral support, and to expose communist fifth-
column infiltration in the United States, especially in labor groups. 70 
The committee expected to achieve these objectives through a mas-
sive information campaign, focusing especially upon educational pro-
grams among workers and ethnics because, in the opinion of the 
committee, "these are key areas of attempted communist penetration 
and trickery." The committee observed, "Of great value in this will 
be the help of patriotic organizations like the Polish American Con-
gress, whose members have long recognized the dangers of communist 
expansion and are already active in these key points of communist 
operation. " 71 
Lane spent considerable time writing to prominent individuals and 
soliciting their support for the activities of the committee. 72 But Roz-
marek's insistence on controlling the committee and limiting the ac-
tivities of the public relations firm hired to achieve many of the goals 
of the organization soured Lane so much that he resigned his position 
early in 1948.73 Despite Lane's resignation and Rozmarek's failure to 
broaden the scope and activities of the Committee to Stop World 
Communism, it is significant that by 1947 the views of Polish Ameri-
cans about the Soviet Union and its satellites were now shared by most 
Americans and that the Truman administration had come around to 
a policy of toughness toward the Kremlin which American Polonia 
had advocated several years earlier. 
vm Conclusions 
United States postwar relations with Poland 
were conditioned by the arrangements reached at the Yalta Confer-
ence. By agreeing to an imprecise understanding which provided no 
enforcement mechanism to insure that an expanded provisional gov-
ernment in Warsaw would hold "free and unfettered elections," the 
United States took a major step in dissociating itself from Poland and 
eastern Europe. Neither Roosevelt at Yalta nor Truman at Potsdam 
pressed for international supervision of the promised elections, and 
thus implied American recognition of a Soviet sphere of influence over 
Poland. At Potsdam, it was possible for Truman to have linked the 
future Polish elections with American agreement to the Oder-Neisse 
boundary between Poland and Germany, as the British had suggested. 
But as American diplomacy at Potsdam revealed, Washington was 
more concerned about Germany than it was about Poland. When 
Truman brought up the promised Polish elections at Potsdam, he, like 
Roosevelt before him, made it appear that the Polish question was 
more of an issue in American domestic politics than it was a foreign 
policy matter of grave concern to Washington. 
The United States had an exaggerated faith in the impact that 
economic measures would have in preventing Poland from falling 
completely into the Soviet orbit. Poland's need for postwar credits, 
American officials believed, would help to moderate the situation in 
Warsaw and allow the Polish Peasant party under the leadership of 
Stanislaw Mikolajczyk to play a role in Polish political life. The 
United States did not tie credits to Poland to political conditions, 
though ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane and other hard-line State De-
partment officials favored such a quid pro quo. The refusal of Secre-
tary of State Byrnes to do so was consistent with his policy toward 
the Kremlin during most of 1946 which was based on a search for 
compromises that would get the Soviets to agree to the postwar peace 
treaties and a four power pact. 
The most compelling reason to grant credits to the Poles without 
linking them with the future electicns was the fact that Polish coal was 
needed to help western Europe to recover economically. Much of the 
economic aid from Washington to Warsaw would ostensibly be used 
to increase coal production and to transport a great deal of it to the 
West. Yet American credits were extended to Poland before the con-
troversial Polish referendum of June 1946, despite the atmosphere of 
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intimidation and harassment of the opposition in which the campaign 
was conducted. 
Credits did not have the expected results in improving the Ameri-
can political position in Poland. While credit and other economic 
negotiations were up.der way in Washington between American and 
Polish officials, the PPR-dominated government in Warsaw expanded 
its political control over the nation, concentrating on eliminating the 
PSL and its supporters as a force in Polish politics. 
The exaggerated expectations of the United States to be able to 
influence matters in Poland were matched by Mikolajczyk's unrealis-
tic belief that the PSL would have a meaningful place in the political 
life of postwar Poland. Mikolajczyk, despised by the right-wing emi-
gration for compromising with the communists and taking a seat in 
the postwar provisional government in Warsaw, became a symbol for 
most Poles who wanted an independent country. Mikolajczyk re-
turned to Poland without guarantees from either the United States or 
Great Britain, but he tried to exploit the illusion of western commit-
ments to him in his dealings with the leadership of his own party as 
well as with the opposition. It is difficult to determine how effective 
the ruse was because the PPR initially was interested more in concen-
trating upon the reconstruction of the country than it was in combat-
ing the PSL. But as the PPR increased its grip over Poland, it was 
clear to the Polish communists and their patrons in Moscow that the 
PSL had little more than the rhetorical and moral support of the 
United States. 
The closer the promised elections came, the more evident it became 
that neither Washington nor Mikolajczyk had any realistic political 
strategy other than to hope for the best. As Philip Moseley said, 
"hope, divorced from power, is not a policy." 1 Washington still clung 
to the naive notion that the PSL would not be entirely excluded from 
Polish political life while Mikolajczyk vainly hoped that somehow the 
United States would become involved in the desperate struggle for 
survival in which the PSL found itself. In the end, the PPR won the 
rigged elections and the PSL was reduced to impotence and political 
irrelevance. 
After the Polish elections of 1947 relations between the two coun-
tries rapidly deteriorated. Despite the obvious importance of Polish 
coal to the recovery of western Europe, Washington refused to grant 
additional credits to Poland to expand its coal industry. Even the 
needs of the Polish people for relief aid in order to fill the gap left by 
the end of UNRRA operations in Poland did not find a sympathetic 
audience in Washington. That is why the continued activities of pri-
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vate relief organizations filled important, if not crucial, gaps in west-
em relief to Poland. 
Although Secretary Byrnes's Stuttgart speech is often seen as a 
turning point in American policy toward the communist world, it was 
probably even more significant as a turning point in Polish perceptions 
of the United States. By challenging claims to the Oder-Neisse bound-
ary, Byrnes helped to unify the Polish people behind the communist-
controlled government and undermined the position of Mikolajczyk 
and the PSL, which had been so closely tied to the United States. 
Moreover, his speech shattered the idealistic expectations of most 
Poles that the United States could be depended upon to change the 
political situation in Poland. Secretary Marshall's later challenges to 
the permanency of the Oder-Neisse boundary confirmed in Polish 
minds the belief that it was better to join in the tasks of the nation's 
recovery than to engage in a hopeless struggle to dislodge the commu-
nists. 
Polish Americans tried but failed to influence American policies 
toward Poland and the Soviet Union. The policies of the Roosevelt 
and Truman administrations toward Poland had unified Polonia in 
the United States to such an extent that these policies became the 
major issue to which the Polish American Congress addressed itself 
for years. Despite its size, organizational ability, and propaganda 
activities, the Polish American Congress was no more able to change 
the direction of American policy toward Warsaw and Moscow in the 
immediate postwar years than it had been during the war. Neverthe-
less, the views of this large articulate body of Americans presaged 
what the American public in general came to believe about the com-
munist world later in the 1940s and early 1950s. 
Bitterness and disillusionment with the foreign policy of the United 
States predictably made Polish Americans vulnerable to a conspiracy 
theory concerning the fate of Poland. Polish Americans believed that 
Washington's deliberate appeasement of the communists enabled the 
Kremlin to gain control over Poland and charged that communists in 
the Department of State were responsible for influencing the direction 
of foreign policy. Polish Americans were so unhappy with the Tru-
man administration that in 1946large numbers of them defected from 
the ranks of the Democratic party, helping the Republicans to win 
control over the United States Congress. But after Truman an-
nounced aid to Greece and Turkey, signaling a tougher policy toward 
the Kremlin, Polish Americans strongly endorsed the Truman Doc-
trine, finding renewed confidence in the political party which they 
believed had let them down for so long. 
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It is difficult to see how the United States could have influenced 
affairs in Poland after World War II without far greater exertions than 
it was able or willing to make. Unfortunately, the time for the United 
States to have established an effective American presence in Poland 
had passed. As this study has shown, the communization of Poland 
in the period 1945-1947 was less the result of communist defensive 
reactions to American challenges than it was the consequence of 
Washington's having habituated the Kremlin to deal with political 
issues in eastern Europe without the United States during the war 
years. Such was the bitter legacy for the United States and Poland. 
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